Pierre Péan and Prince Antoine Nyetera Highlight ADAD Conference

Pierre Péan and Prince Antoine Nyetera Highlight ADAD Conference

Two of the highlights of this weekend's Conference of ICTR Defense attorneys in The Hague were the French investigative writer, Pierre Péan, author of the magnificent history of the Rwandan counter-revolution (1990-1994), "Noires fureurs, blancs menteurs," and the Tutsi Prince, Antoine Nyetera, the source of Péan's controversial four-page aria on the Rwandan (Tutsi) culture of the lie (known in Kinyarwanda as ubwenge) at the very beginning (pp 41-44) of his 500+page tome. One or the other or both of them smartly pointed out that the 'culture of the lie' is characteristic to all irrational, anti-democratic, neofeudal, monarchic, minoritarian--in a word, Fascist--political cultures. The ruling minority, in constant fear of being turned out by the masses they exploit for their privileges, always play it fast and loose with the Truth, with History, with Reality. And if you have a problem with that fact, then you're probably a neofeudal nostalgic, a cringing anti-democrat, a wincing Czarist, a putrid piece of Nazi scum.

Péan's book came out in 2005 at about the same time that journalist Stephen Smith leaked in Le Monde the report of French anti-terrorist judge, Jean-Louis Bruguière's investigation into the 6 April 1994 missile strike against the Rwandan presidential jet that cost the lives of two democratically elected African heads of state, Presidents Juvénal Habyarimana of Rwanda and Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi, their entourages, the Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Army, Déogratias Nsabimana, and the three-man French flight crew, Jacky Heraud (pilot), Jean-Pierre Minaberry (co-pilot), and Jean-Marc Perrine (flt engineer), the three French nationals whose families instigated the Bruguière investigation.

Bruguière not only found Paul Kagame and his RPF, currently the governing power in Rwanda and the darlings of American clerico-fascism, to be responsible for the 6 April terrorist attack on the Presidents' plane--a terrorist attack and not simply an act of war, as Paul Kagame would like to have it, because it took place while the Arusha Peace Accords of 3 August 1993, to which both the Habyarimana government and Kagame's RPF were signatory, were in place--but his investigation also traced the RPF's involvement in the liquefactionist destruction of the Rwandan revolution back to its 1 October 1990 invasion from Uganda, under the banner, using the arms, personnel and materiel of the Ugandan National Resistance Army (NRA), through a four-year reign of terror, the double presidential assassination and the subsequent bloody nationwide military offensive it triggered, unto the 1996-1998 invasions of Eastern Congo with their loss of innocent non-combattant lives now in the multi-millions and climbing everyday.

In the time-tested tradition of The Holocaust Industry, where with each military onslaught comes a parallel propaganda blitz keyed to the issue of the minority Tutsi genocide: from the Rwandan Social Revolution of 1959, where the Hutu majority overthrew colonially-supported, neofeudal Tutsi minority, to the ravaging of the Hutu refugee camps in Congo, the rationale has always been couched in a Human Rights defense of the Tutsis against genocide or against 'the ideology of genocide.' So when Judge Bruguière's report came out charging the Tutsi 'rebels' of the RPF with doing the bulk of the killing in Central Africa, and the Hutu majority making up the majority of the victims, Rwandan President Paul Kagame's reflex was to break off diplomatic relations with France, claiming the judge's report was politically motivated and an attempt to hide France's key role in planning and preparing the genocide of 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus in the one-hundred days between 6 April and 16 July 1994.

The initial 2008 civil suit brought by SOS-Racisme against Péan, one of the organization's founders and a long-time patron, and his editor, Claude Durand, seems part of this Holocaust Industry-like subterfuge for attempting damage control. Last November the Paris court acquitted Péan and Durand. But immediately the plaintiffs filed what is, here in France, called 'an appeal,' but what seems to someone who's only played a couple of lawyers on TV like double jeopardy.

So here is the AP story on Péan's recent re-acquittal that we translated from the French:

Pierre Péan acquitted a second time on charges of provoking racial discrimination
AP | 18.11.2009 | 16:16

The writer Pierre Péan was acquitted for a second time Wednesday (18/11/09), on charges of provoking racial discrimination in his book on the Rwandan genocide, "Noires fureurs, blancs menteurs" ["Black Fury, White Liars"--though no English version yet exists--nb], published in 2005. "It is a victory for freedom of expression," said his lawyer Florence Bourg. His editor, Claude Durand, was also acquitted.

"I'm very pleased with this decision, which is in keeping with the rule of law. There was no criminal intention on Pierre Péan's part, and he did not incite racial hatred," 'Maitre Bourg said. "'Noires fureurs, blancs menteurs' is, above all, a political analysis."

For the court, there was no defamation or incitement to racial hatred on the part of the writer. The Court of Appeals in Paris decided, as did the court in the first trial last year, that Pierre Péan and his editor did not promote racist thought. The complaint had called for them to be condemned for racial hatred.

SOS-Racisme had filed its complaint in October 2006, charging Péan with having written that the Tutsis resorted to lies and dissimulation or were masters of manipulation, the writer sometimes citing other authors in the pages in question.

In the first trial, Pierre Péan was acquitted of the two most important charges, "complicity in racial defamation" and "complicity in the provocation of racial discrimination."

The lawyer for SOS-Racisme, Lef Forster, said that the plaintiffs are going to file yet another appeal with the French Supreme Court.

As with the first trial, the court dismissed the countersuit by Péan and his editor against SOS-Racisme for "abusive persecution." --AP

***************************************

But this time out the Human Rights and Holocaust Industrialists brought some stronger shit into the game. Elie Wiesel, the renowned survivor of the Nazi concentration camps, who fled Auschwitz only to follow his Fascist tormentors back into Germany and await Western allied liberation at an abandoned Buchenwald, rather than be sprung in Poland by the Red Army, weighed in against Péan--in a case he seemed painfully unfamiliar with--by charging the writer with failing to 'privilege the victims' truth' in his recounting of the mass killings in Rwanda, which The Wiesel would liken to The Shoah.--in what the French would call an 'amalgame.' So it turns out that the HI's stronger shit is really pretty weak.

Péan's response to The Wiesel's intimations of revisionism or negationism is worth taking a good look at:


The Péan Trial/RWANDA

Rwanda: Pierre Péan answers Elie Wiesel

His actions called into question by the Nobel [Peace] laureate in the midst of the civil trial over his book dedicated to the Rwandan genocide, Pierre Péan sent us the following letter:

“What an honor for a writer to arouse a response from a Nobel Peace Prize winner!

Did he write his article a few hours before the beginning of my trial so as to influence French Justice? Such would not be worthy of him. In fact, I’d like to believe that, despite what he wrote, he has not really read my book, “Noire fureurs, blancs menteurs,” and that that is why he caricatured it as “Morally deplorable and historically regrettable.”

For those readers who would not know my book except for Elie Wiesel’s critique, I will straight away point out that I was acquitted by the court of these same charges of racial defamation and incitement to racial hatred, brought by SOS-Racisme, after the first trial. The action was brought because of a few sentences, found on pages 41 to 44 of my 500-page book, which were part of a quick political history of Rwanda since the beginning of the 20th century: I wrote these pages with Antoine Nyetera, a Tutsi descendant of the royal family.

Elie Wiesel distorts my intentions by looking to capture the whole book in a single sentence: “The Tutsi chiefs were responsible for their own catastrophic downfall, which they, then, called genocide.”

Why speak in the plural of ‘Tutsi chiefs,’ when it is a political organization, the RPF, equipped with its own armed forces, that I am charging?

I acknowledge that Paul Kagame, at that time the leader of the RPF, is responsible for the attack of 6 April 1994 against Juvénal Habyarimana, the legitimate president of Rwanda. But, today, the whole world knows that this act of war was what triggered the genocide. Because of this, Kagame bears an important part of the responsibility for the genocide of the Rwandan Tutsis.

Since my book came out in 2005, [French anti-terrorist] judge [Jean-Louis] Bruguière and Spanish judge [Fernando] Andreu Merelles, have likewise determined that the criminal responsibility for this terrorist act lies with the current Rwandan dictator. The Spanish judge has even issued 40 arrest warrants against Kagame’s inner circle charging them with the crime of genocide.

Elie Wiesel speaks of his experiences in The Shoah. But, these two historical calamities, the WWII Jewish Holocaust and the genocide of the Tutsis, have nothing to do with one another, and cannot be compared. It is the RPF that, on 1 October 1990, crossed into Rwanda from Uganda and, with 7,000 Tutsi rebel troops, pushed to within a few miles of Kigali: War was declared against the Habyarimana regime. After four years of military hostilities, after the genocide of the Tutsis and the mass slaughter of the Hutus, it is Paul Kagame who took state power in Kigali.

“The victims’ truth deserves to be privileged,” says Elie Wiesel. But Paul Kagame is not a victim, and the ‘truth’ that he would impose on the world is a grotesque affront to the memory of the victims. I respect the comparison that Elie Wiesel makes between these victims because it is grounded in his memory of The Shoah, but this comparison is not sufficient for seeking after and discerning the truth.

The story of the Rwandan tragedy has not yet been written; I believe I have made a modest contribution, especially by noting that the Tutsis were not the only victims, that there were also hundreds of thousands of Hutu victims.

All the victims deserve our respect and our compassion. To cry only for the Tutsi victims is “morally deplorable and historically regrettable.”

Pierre Péan

**************************

But the kicker in this whole story--and the major clear moment at last weekend's Conference in The Hague--was when Prince Antoine Nyetera testified that the greatest act of racism in the entire Péan case was when SOS-Racsime went after the European Jew, Péan, instead of his source, the African Jewish nobleman, Nyetera. (My amalgame, The Economist called the Tutsis the "Jews of Africa.")

And though I am sure we have not heard the last of Kagame and his HI/HR/Liberal/STFG minions--even with the recent spate of reversals of RPF fortunes in ICTR cases, like the acquittals on genocide charges of Fr. Hormisdas Nsengimana; of Protais Zigiranyirazo, the martyred President Habyarimana's brother-in-law whose acquittal also exploded the whole Akazu (Little House) myth of the late President's inner circle and family plotting his assassination to trigger the genocide of the Tutsis; while both these rulings followed on the extraordinary Military I judgement of December 2008 (published in February 2009) in which the 'brains of the genocide,' Colonel Theoneste Bagosora and his three co-defendants were found not guilty of any conspiracy or planning in the Tutsi genocide of 1994: it is becoming more and more apparent that the ICTR's continuing service as a mosquito net protecting the expansionist military interests in Africa of the US, the UK and Israel, is rapidly being obviated by the intense shredding of the false history and outright lies from which it was spun that is currently being carried out by the courageous and commited lawyers of ADAD and its support network--to which we here at CM/P are proud to belong. --mc

History Will Judge the ICTR - by Bernard Lugan

KKKarla by Duci Simonovic

The black dog in front is Zoran Djindjic. In the time when I made the poster he was alive.

The dog down with the mustache is the (Djindjic’s) police chief Mihajlovic.

The dog with the big nose is the (Dj…) minister of justice Batic.

The dog with the glasses is the (Dj…) minister for Kosovo Covic.

The dog who is fucking Covic is one of lieder of Albanian UCK Hashim Taschi.

History Will Judge the ICTR -- by Bernard Lugan

[So, I’m on the train to The Hague for this Conference thrown by the Defense Lawyers at the ICTR in Arusha, and this at the very moment that The General’s case is winding to a close--or so one hopes. I’ve just finished six-weeks’ work translating an extraordinary book by the former-Rwandan Ambassador to France, Jean-Marie Vianney Ndagijimana: ‘How General Paul Kagame Sacrificed the Tutsis.’ And, with still a slight jones from watching the Situation Room at midnight over the top of my MacBook, my face full of French and my head full of English writerly affectations, I decided I’d just get right back on to translating this Lugan piece about how History will judge the ICTR. Bernard Lugan is a French scholar who’s done a passel of good writing on Central Africa.

If you make it past this intro and actually read the Lugan article, I’m betting you won’t be able to stop scratching your head as to just how and why these ad hocs (primarily the ICTR and ICTY, though there are a bunch more now, like for Sierra Leone and Lebanon) are still standing. The original idea of International Justice was--as Ramsey Clark put it Saturday morning at the Conference--to limit power in pursuit of Truth and Justice in bringing an end to intra-State violence. But since these Tribs were the extra-legal spawn of the UN Security Council and, in practice, are so undisciplined, so unscrupulous, so judicially unethical and immoral in any human sense, that they have gone quite a ways in turning their putative purposes inside out and upside down. In fact, these two wings of the Western Vulture Culture (feeding on that smoldering putrescence left by the Globalization Hawks), can really only maintain a light-operatic gentility while continuing to lay waste to the rights, unto the very lives, of the superfluous (i.e., powerless) peoples of planet earth.

When the ICTY made the mistake of trying Slobodan Milosevic for whatever they thought they could get on him--and, of course, this changed from month to month, from amended indictment to amended indictment, until in desperation over ever being able to convict him of anything, they just had to have him murdered in his cell--the Yugoslav President characterized his Tribunal tormentors as ‘a farce.’ Way too kind, you ask me, considering what this ‘farce’ did to him, his family, his party and his country.

Currently in the box in The Hague, Dr Seselj, leader of the Serbian Radical Party, had a take that was a little more along the lines of what I’ve always felt about these Gilbert ‘n’ Sullivan Guignols: Dr. Seselj, charged primarily with Hate Speech, whatever that means, said simply, “This Tribunal can suck my dick!”

But the Conference--and this post--are not primarily about Yugoslavia--though the two wars, the two Tribunals are as inseparable as Tweedle Dum and Tweedle Dummer. (The ICTR and ICTY share the same appeals chamber--like in a cheap hotel--and that’s the appeals chamber that told the ICTR that they should take ‘judicial notice’ of the Rwandan genocide: meaning they should recognize it as a natural fact of Jesus, even if they can’t prove it!).

Lugan, like so many ‘experts’ seems pretty careless about what he knows and what he thinks we know. He gets names wrong (he has ‘Harbour’ for ‘Arbour’)--or maybe he’s just being anecdotal here, sketchy--but, hey, I don’t wanna nit-pick, piss off another ‘expert’--so let me just fill in a few spaces he left when it came to The General’s case--that’s General Augustin Ndindiliyimana, Chief of the Rwandan National Gendarmerie during the troubles, whose back we’ve had here at CM/P for some time now.

Sure, the Tribs are all about false witnesses giving scripted and rehearsed testimony as part of some plea deal with the DAs in Arusha or Kigali--and the rules of evidence and procedure (like the bad Joint Criminal Enterprise joke) are pretty much cooked down to allow the Prosecutor, who is indistinguishable from the Court, which is indistinguishable from NATO (which is indistinguishable from al Qaeda), to have it his way without breaking a sweat. But to be complicit in this shit, to dignify this grotesquery with your participation, is not without lethal side effects--Milosevic turned out so many prosecution witnesses in his court that Judge Richard May got brain cancer and died. So to see all these Canadian shysters in Arusha actually organize to fight against the essential injustice at the stinking heart of International Justice is a singularly gratifying surprise.

But more on the ADAD Conference anon (post hoctor proct, as Maitres Derek and Clive would have it)--after I recule my cul back to Paris. For now let Chris and Bernard Lugan have the parole:

Chris Black:

The latest development in the trial is the episode re the recanting prosecution witness, GFR. I can't remember if I told you. GFR was a major witness against The General re alleged crimes committed by gendarmes in his home town, including an allegation that they took part in a massacre at Kansi Parish church.

GFR contacted me by letter the day we made our oral argument, stating he wanted to recant as he had been forced to lie by the regime (he had escaped from prison in Rwanda and fled to Burundi). I raised it in court and asked for a meeting with the judges about what to do, as I knew if I raised it in court without seeing the judges first, the prosecutor would accuse me of fabricating the letter.

So I gave it to the judges in chambers with the prosecutor present. The prosecutor quickly accused me of fabricating the letter and being in cahoots with the witness. The judges, who have been fairly sympathetic to us the last year or so, rejected that suggestion and told me I could raise it in court, read the letter openly, so it is on the record, and ask for a remedy. They told the prosecutor that he could say what he wanted, but when I asked for a remedy they were going to do something.

So in open court I stood up, said this and that, read the letter and demanded that it be admitted as an exhibit, and that the judges throw out GFR's testimony and call for an investigation into how Rwanda fabricates witnesses and the prosecution’s role in it.

The Prosecutor accused me of fabricating the whole thing.

The Judges told me to file a written motion asking for a remedy. I did. The Prosecutor replied that I better be careful as an investigation could lead to my arrest. I protested that threat. The Judges reprimanded the prosecutor for those remarks.

The judges then appointed in August an amicus curiae to try to contact GFR and see if he really wrote the letter and if he was telling the truth about its contents. That lawyer did meet with GFR in Burundi in mid-September and filed his report which we were finally given in late October.

He confirmed that in his opinion GFR was truthful and that GFR explained how he had been forced to lie against The General on threat of death and that one of the ICTR prosecution lawyers knew about this and he gave the name.

The Judges then asked what I wanted, so I asked that his testimony be thrown out and that they do the same with the entire group of witnesses from that town as they were all linked and that they consider a deeper investigation. However, that could take years and I don’t want The General rotting in prison until that takes place, so I asked that if they call for an investigation he be released on bail. If not, then to just throw out the charges related to that witness (they are the worst charges against him). We are waiting for their decision.

--mc]

And here’s Bernard Lugan:


The ICTR Faces the Judgement of History

by Bernard Lugan
Expert witness before the ICTR
From B. Lugan's official Blog


To a professional historian the methods of the ICTR are unacceptable for at least six important reasons:

--Its refusal to consider the evolution of knowledge
--Its obstinate refusal to investigate the attack of 6 April 1994
--The unethical manipulations of the Prosecution
--Its resort to false witnesses
--Its suppression of witnesses for the defense and its rejection of evidence benefitting the defense
--Its violation of the neutrality principle



1-Its refusal to consider the evolution of knowledge

At no time has the Prosecution considered the new facts that have
developed over the course of the Tribunal's existence. Quite the contrary,
it remains grounded, even mired, in by-now obsolete assumptions, based
primarily on Alison Des Forges, the Prosecution's expert whose constant
parti pris, pseudo scientific presentation, confused reasoning and fuzzy
methodology have allowed the Prosecution to construct a false history of
the genocide from which the Tribunal's judgements have been rendered.

Compared to what we knew right after the assassination of President
Habyarimana, what new knowledge do we have in 2009, 15 years later and
never considered by the ICTR?

-The attack of 6 April 1994 that took the life of Rwandan President
Habyarimana was not carried out by so-called 'Extremist Hutus,' but
rather by the Tutsi leadership of the faction currently in power in Rwanda
(Bruguière 2006; Merelles 2008)

-Between 1991 and 1994, several important so-called 'moderate' Hutus,
notably Félicien Gatabazi and Emmanuel Gapyisi, were assassinated,
which, at that time, brought on the condemnation and sanctioning of the
Habyarimana regime, accused of having ordered these crimes. But,
these murders were also carried out on the orders of the clique currently
in power in Kigali. The investigations of French judge Jean Louis
Bruguière (2006) and Spanish judge Fernando Andreu Merelles (2008)
have even yielded the names of the shooters, the drivers of the vehicles
and motorcycles, etc., used in these attacks.

-In 1991 and 1992, dozens of blind attacks (mines, grenades, etc.,)
exacerbated ethnic hatred. When they happened they were credited
to President Habyarimana's henchmen, his famous 'death squads.'
Today, Judges Bruguière and Merelles contend that these attacks
were carried out by members of the RPF and that they were part of
a strategy of heightening tension to provoke sufficient chaos to allow
the RPF to seize power. (Bruguière, 2006; Merelles, 2008).

-The Interahamwe, whose name is associated with the Tutsi genocide,
was created by a Tutsi who later became a Minister in the government
of General Kagame (Anastase Gasana). The president of this militia in
Kigali (Robert Kajuga) was, himself, a Tutsi, as were many of those who
infiltrated important positions in the organization and who were later
made known to us by name and sometime by nickname. (Bruguière,
2006; Merelles, 2008).

-Trial after trial, in spite of all its efforts, the Prosecution of the ICTR was
unable to show that the genocide was programed, even if it did, in fact,
take place. With the accumulation of countervailing evidence, Alison
Des Forges was forced to admit that with the convoluted presentation of
events that had become her trademark, she was never able to prove the
intention to commit genocide:

"(. . .) everything about the existence of a clear plan, I don't have any
way, any method to establish that people who took part in this plan
had the intention to commit a genocide" (ICTR-97-31-T, Monday
5 March 2007, Des Forges)

In 2000, with a great sense of immediacy, the OAU (Organization of
African Unity) had this to say about this subject:

"(. . .) There is no document, no transcript of any meeting and no other
evidence that puts a finger on the precise moment when certain
individuals, within the cntext of an organized plan, decided to eliminate
the Tutsis (. . .) What we know (. . .) is that after 1 October 1990, Rwanda
went through three and a half years of violent anti-Tutsi incidents, any
one of which could have been interpreted in retrospect as a deliberate
stage of an elaborate conspiracy which would end up with the shooting
down of President Habyarimana's plane and the triggering of the
genocide. However, all these interpretations remain mere speculation.
No one knows who shot down the plane, no one can prove that the
innumerable demonstrations of anti-Tutsi sentiment over those years
were part of a grand diabolical plan." (OAU, report 2000, 7 January)

At no time has the Prosecution at the ICTR acknowledged these very
essential pieces of new information, and, quite to the contrary, it continued
to designate the so-called 'Extremist' Hutus as the only ones responsible
for this tragedy. While the indictment remains frozen in these outdated
assumptions, the defendants suffered and they continue to suffer through
a process that violates their rights while they are being tried for charges
that are now obsolete.


2- Its refusal to investigate the attack of 6 April 1994 against the life of then
Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana that is the origin of everything . . .

The ICTR has constantly claimed and tried to make us believe that the
attack of 6 April 1994 and the genocide that it led to are unconnected.

With the exception of the 8-year investigation led by French anti-terrorist
judge Jean-Louis Bruguière, there has been no inquiry into this international
terrorist act which was the spark that set off the genocide. On the other hand,
it is possible to demonstrate constant obstruction to the search for the truth
by the UN as well as by the ICTR.
A review of some dates and other facts is necessary here:
.
-On 7 April 1994, the day after the attack that cost the lives of two sitting
heads of state, the President of the UN Security Council invited the
Secretary General of the United Nations to gather all relevant information
concerning this terrorist act and to compile a detailed report on it for the
Security Council.
-The Secretary General's response was silence. So, on 21 April 1994,
the Security Council once again asked the UN Secretary General to
deliver to it all the information on the subject of this attack, but again
without success.
-On 27 May 1994, the Security Council reiterated its earlier demands, and
once again received no satisfaction.
-On 28 June 1994, Mr. René Degni Segui, UN Special Envoy to Rwanda,
admitted that the attack of 6 April was most certainly the cause of the dramatic
events that followed, that is, of the genocide. But after he demanded the
formation of an investigatory commission, he was told that the UN did not
have the budget for that..
-Nevertheless, in the Autumn of 1994, a commission of experts submitted
a report to the UN Secretary General demanding the creation of an
International Tribunal whose mission would be "to investigate, among
other things, the events that led to the current situation, especially the attack
on the airplane carrying the presidents of Burundi and Rwanda."


Effectively created on 8 November 1994 by UN Security Council Resolution
955, with authority over events between 1 January and 31 December 1994,
to judge the alleged organizers of the Rwandan genocide of 1994, the ICTR
(International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda) was set up in Arusha, Tanzania.

So the attack of 6 April 1994 is unquestionably included within the
time-window of the Tribunal's authority. Yet, with great consistency, the
ICTR has refused to investigate this attack. However, in February 1997,
certain evidence gathered by ICTR investigators working in Kigali, Michael
Hourigan chief among them, established the responsibility of the RPF in this
attack.

These investigators were acting under the authority of the ICTR Chief Prosecutor
Mme Louise Arbour who, at that time, considered the attack against the Rwandan
president's plane to be well within the authority of the ICTR.

On 1 August 1997, a report establishing the responsibility of the RPF in
the attack of 6 April 1994 was submitted to the ICTR, which did not
follow-up on it. The existence of this document was disclosed in March
2000 by a Canadian newspaper. Forced to react, on 27 March 2000,
UN Legal Services acknowledged the reality of this report, specifying
that it had been directly sent to the Chief Justice of the ICTR in Arusha.

The ICTR refused to furnish this document to Judge Bruguière who was
investigating the attack of 6 April 1994:

--"(Considering) That an international rogatory letter was delivered
on 23 May 2000 to the authorities of the I.C.T.R. requesting a
copy of this report and of the ‘internal memorandum’ that was
sent to Mme Louise ARBOUR; and
That though Madame Navanethem PILAY, President of the Tribunal,
let it be known in response to this judicial inquiry that she, in fact,
was in possession of the document in question, she said it was
impossible for her to respond favorably to the French request;"--
(the Report of Jean-Louis Bruguière, The Superior Court of Paris,
17 November 2006, ¶s 123 & 124, CM/P translation at
http://cirqueminime.blogcollective.com/blog/_archives/2007/9/30/3262522.html)--


Fortunately for the progress of the investigation, the 'Hourigan Report' got
to Judge Bruguière despite the letter of refusal from the ICTR:

--"(. . .) on 31 August 2000, the Court of Paris, on the instructions of the
Minister of Justice, passed on a copy of said report, which was attached
to the current with a view toward its future use; and
That the documents thus sent by the Court of Paris were authenticated
by Mr Michael HOURIGAN, (. . .) at the time of his testimony in Paris on
29 December 2000;"--
(the Report of Jean-Louis Bruguière, The Superior Court of Paris,
17 November 2006, ¶s 125 & 126, CM/P translation at
http://cirqueminime.blogcollective.com/blog/_archives/2007/9/30/3262522.html)--

Mr. Hourigan gave very important information to Judge Bruguière:

--"(. . .) with regard to his mission for the I.C.T.R., Michael HOURIGAN
stated that the investigators on his team, empowered by their superiors
to investigate the attack, considered themselves to be entering a field
of inquiry within the authority of the Tribunal, never found any tangible
evidence implicating the Hutu extremists, but, on the contrary, were
drawn to an evidentiary trail leading directly to the R.P.F.;
(. . .) That on a secure telephone line from the U.S. Embassy in Kigali,
he had, on or about 7 March 1997, a conversation with Madame Louise
ARBOUR and that in the course of their exchange she told him that she
had received, through other channels, intelligence that backed up his own
and that at no time had she told him that the investigation into the attack
was not within the authority of the I.C.T.R.;"--
(the Report of Jean-Louis Bruguière, The Superior Court of Paris,
17 November 2006, ¶s 129 & 133, CM/P translation at
http://cirqueminime.blogcollective.com/blog/_archives/2007/9/30/3262522.html)--

Later under questioning by Judge Bruguière, Michael Hourigan stated
that Mme Arbour had, at that time, suddenly changed her opinion. Contrary
to what she had told Hourigan before, Arbour now criticized him for having
conducted his investigation, which, she said was outside the authority of the
ICTR, and then she told him to break off all relations with his informants.
This position was confirmed by at least one other investigator.
(the Report of Jean-Louis Bruguière, The Superior Court of Paris,
17 November 2006, pp 22 in Fr original, CM/P translation at
http://cirqueminime.blogcollective.com/blog/_archives/2007/9/30/3262522.html)--


A decade earlier, on 7 February 1997, Maitre Tiphaine Dickson, the
defense lawyer for Georges Rutaganda at his trial before the ICTR,
made a request that bench order the Prosecutor to make public all
the evidence that he had on the subject of the attack against the
president's plane, as well as to initiate an investigation on this subject.
The response she received was, in its own way, stupefying:

--"Our responsibility is not to conduct an investigation into a plane crash (sic!!!),
this is not our job. So, I am going, in the most categorical way, to set this
question aside. And, first of all, I will say that we don't have to conduct such
investigations, we don't have to report on such investigations either.
Secondly, it is not our role, it is not our mission to conduct investigations
into the crash (sic!!!) of a plane carrying some presidents or vice-presidents.
This question does not fall within our authority."--
(ICTR 96-3-T, Prosecutor v Rutaganda, 7 February 1997).


In December 1999, without fear of contradiction, and completely turning
the truth inside out, the Prosecutor, Mme Carla Del Ponte, stated with
serene confidence:

--"If the Tribune doesn't do anything about it (the attack), it is because it
does not have jurisdiction in the matter. It is quite true that this is the
event that triggered everything. But as such, the act of attacking an
airplane and killing the president does not fall within the articles that
define our jurisdiction."--

So, if we follow Mme Del Ponte's reasoning, everything that contributed to
the 'preparation' of the genocide is within the authority of the ICTR, but not
the attack, itself, which, she tells us, is the 'event that triggered it all,' and
that she, furthermore, considers one of the elements in the planning of
the genocide.
Special justice allows the taking of liberties with logic, history and, especially,
the law. . . .


3- The Prosecution and its manipulations

Captain Innocent Sagahutu, who commanded Squadron A of the
Reconnaissance Battalion (Recce) of the old Rwandan Army (FAR), is a
prisoner of the United Nations being held in Arusha since February 2000
because of an incredible manipulation by the Prosecutor. In his indictment
dated 20 January 2000, the Prosecution wrote, in effect, that Capt. Sagahutu
was the 'second in command' of the Reconnaissance Battalion (Recce).
that due to this fact he had authority over the whole battalion, and that he
was thus responsible for all crimes committed by any of the members of
this unit.

The improbability of such a charge did not escape the Court which:

--"(. . .) invited the Prosecutor to verify the official post he (Capt. Sagahutu)
occupied in the Reconnaissance Battalion of the Rwandan Army at the
time of the facts in the case and failed to correct the information provided
in the indictment. (ICTR-Decision of 25 September 2002, ¶ 30)--

But, in the modified indictment of 23 August 2004, the Prosecutor did
not follow the orders of the Court, and even dared to write the following
lines:

--"At the time of the events cited in the present indictment, Innocent Sagahutu
was assigned as the second in command of the Reconnaissance Battalion
(Recce) of the Rwandan Army and was responsible for Company A of said
battalion. He held the rank of Captain. In his position as second in command
of the Reconnaissance Battalion or in his duties, Innocent Sagahutu was
given authority over every unit of the battalion."--
(ICTR-00-56-1, Modified Indictment, 23 August 2004, ¶s 11 & 12).

Not having verified if Captain Sagahutu was, or was not, "the second in
command" of the Reconnaissance Battalion known as Recce, the Prosecutor
maintained his suppositions, even adding, peremptorily, the qualification
"or in his duties." But, the Prosecutor added, in a totally and intrinsically
fantastic way, that the duties of the "second in command" assigned to
Capt. Sagahutu were mentioned only as a way to save an indictment
from perdition because of its total disconnect with the facts.


It is painful to have to mention that the Prosecutor did not even make the
effort to verify the grounds for his accusations when he had in his possession
the official documents that indicated the innocence of the defendant, in this
case, the schedule of postings of the officers of the Rwandan Army in
1 January 1993 and 1 March 1994, a document that was not unknown to him
because it is referred to by the ICTR as K0078420-K0078512. But, this
document shows that "the second in command" did not exist within the FAR,
and neither did the "officers performing these duties," other than for some
duly specified exceptions, none of which exist in the present case.

So the Prosecutor not only hid the evidence that would acquit the
defendant, but even more, he invented and promoted the opposite with
full knowledge of what he was doing. Before any other court but the ICTR,
we could be talking here about a mistrial with all that that implies.


4- Its resort to false witnesses

The witnesses at the ICTR come in large part from Rwanda where they
are imprisoned or 'free,' but always held accountable for their statements
and their testimony when they return to Kigali. So their honesty is subject
to question.

One example among many will illustrate my point: heard in closed session
by the ICTR, an anonymous witness for the prosecution who is identified as
"XXQ" stated under oath that on 15 February 1994, at 10 am, Colonel--today
General--Gratien Kabiligi (ICTR-97-34), came to Ruhengeri by helicopter on
orders from the Operations Section, and that he presided over a meeting
there, telling those officers present that the "genocide had to begin on 23
February 1994 and everywhere in Rwanda at the same time (. .)."

Throughout this testimony, the Prosecution reinforced its assumption which
is, let's remember, that the genocide was programmed and that the
assassination of President Habyarimana on 6 April 1994, that is, less than
two months later, had nothing to do with it.

Since the ICTR works on the Anglo-Saxon system of Common Law, no
examining judge, in pre-trial, to accuse or acquit, or to 'weed out' the
fantasists or the liars, before testimony is admitted; but this was an
actual instance of a false witness.

Testifying before the ICTR, Belgian Colonel Luc Marchal, former commander
of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) section in
Kigali, explained that:

--conforming to the Arusha Accords and the agreement for the Arms
Consignment Zone in Kigali, the FAR's helicopters were at that time placed
under the control of UNAMIR in the hangars at the International Airport at
Kanombe. Under 24-hour surveillance, they were disarmed and their
weapons were stocked in separate hangars;--

--every flight plan was submitted for strict and obligatory authorization to
the UNAMIR which could then warn the RPF that the flight was authorized
and for a very good reason. But, with supporting documents, Col. Marchal
demonstrated that on 15 February 1994, no flights took place and that,
consequently, Col. Kabiligi could not have gone to Ruhengeri by helicopter;--

--furthermore, on this day, 15 February 1994, Col. Kabiligi could not
have physically been in Ruhengeri because of what had just taken
place in Kigali, the inspection of the Belgian contingent of UNAMIR
by Lt. General Uttyerhoven, Inspector for the Belgian Army on a special
mission from Europe. But, between 10 am and 3.30 pm, Col. Kabiligi
took part in the whole inspection, which brought this from Col. Marchal:--

-- --"I can confirm to you that on this day and at the hour that you have
mentioned, Colonel, now General Kabiligi was in my presence."
(ICTR-98-41-T, Marchal, 20 November 2006, p. 14.)-- --

So, "XXQ" gave false testimony. Sure, General Kabiligi was eventually
acquitted, but he spent 10 years in prison on the strength of this testimony
which was unverified by the ICTR, but so useful to the Prosecutor.


5- Witnesses for the defense are disqualified and evidence for acquittal
is rejected. . .

Before the ICTR, it often happens that witnesses for the defense are
disqualified and that evidence for acquittal is rejected. The case of
Ndindabahizi (ICTR-2001-71-T) is indicative in this regard because
it presents several properly hallucinatory examples.

Emmanuel Ndindabahizi, Finance Minister of the GIR (Interim Government
of Rwanda) was charged with genocide and murder. At his trial, the
Prosecutor presented 14 witnesses accusing him. The "honesty" of 11
of them being considered questionable, the judges removed them straight
away and only three witnesses for the prosecution were kept, and it is only
on their testimony that Emmanuel Ndindabahizi was convicted.

These three anonymous witnesses, whose code names were CGY, CGN
and CGC, began by stating that they knew the accused very well because
he was the manager of the Trafipro peasants' cooperative store in Kibuye.
CGM added that he knew Emmanuel Ndindabahizi in 1966-67 as a teacher
in Nyarutovu. But, as was established, Emmanuel Ndindabahizi was never
the manager of a Trafipro store and also never a teacher. . . . A 'normal' court
would have understood from the evidence that it was in the presence of
'dubious' witnesses, but the trial chamber at ICTR where Emmanuel
Ndindabahizi was tried could not disqualify them for the simple reason that
with 11 other witnesses already having been disqualified, the Prosecutor
might well have found himself completely empty handed. And without
prosecution witnesses, how do you continue to develop the case against
the accused?

But the most incredible is still to come. The jurisprudence of the ICTR allows
non-corroborated witnesses to be accepted, and so it is only on the testimony
of CGY that Emmanuel Ndindabahizi was found guilty of genocide on the hill
at Gitwa on 23 April 1994, and only on the testimony of CGC that he was found
guilty of murdering one Mr. Nors, a mixed race Belgian Rwandan.

But, in another trial before the ICTR, involving the same Prosecutor,
Me Philips Adeogun, the witness CGY stated under oath that no massacre
took place on the hill at Gitwa between 20 and 26 April 1994. In the
Ndindabahizi trial, once again under questioning by Prosecutor Philips
Adeogun, and still under oath, CGY calmly confirmed that Emmanuel
Ndindabahizi took part in the genocide of the Tutsis at Gitwa between
23 and 25 April 1994 and that he had witnessed it. These two suspect
testimonies were allowed by the Court to stand.

On the other hand, three witness for the defense were disqualified:

-the witness DC, sentenced to life in prison in Rwanda, totally exonerated
the defendant but the Court rejected his testimony.

-a Tutsi legislator who lost his family during the genocide in the region
where Emmanuel Ndindabahizi was supposed to have committed these
murders which had been investigated for a long time, questioned the
survivors and the inhabitants of the hill at Gitwa to know how, by whom
and where his loved ones had been massacred. Before the Court he
stated that the name of Ndindabahizi was never spoken by anyone he
interviewed. This testimony was not considered in the judgement.

-the witness DX, former investigator for the ICTR who had interrogated
Emmanuel Ndindabahizi before his arrest, declared to the bench that
Ndindabahizi was only charged because he refused to "make a deal"
with the ICTR. In reality, he declined "the offer" that the Prosecutor
made him to become a snitch for the ICTR in exchange for dropping
the charges against him. His testimony was rejected.


A document entitled "The Preliminary Report Identifying the Sites of the
Genocide and of the Massacres from April to July 1994" put out in February
1996 by the Rwandan Ministry Higher Education on Research in Science
and Culture, is used by the ICTR which has made of it a judicial notice
because it collects all the places where the genocide happened, the
number of victims and the names of the killers or those who ordered the
killings. The name of Emmanuel Ndindabahizi is nowhere in this report.
The Court refused to consider this fact as a means of defense for the
accused. But, at the same moment, this document was presented and
accepted as evidence for the prosecution in another trial, that of the
so-called "members of the government."

Before the ICTR, when the same document was presented by the
Prosecutor, it was accepted as evidence of guilt, but when it was
presented by the Defense, it was rejected.

Finally, regarding Emmanuel Ndindabahizi being charged with the
murder of Mr. Nors: the daughter of the murdered man testified before
the ICTR, claiming that Ndindabahizi had nothing to do with murder of
her father, who had been killed over a private disagreement by
someone named Nkubito, who was later tried and convicted of this
murder by the court in Kibuye, and has since died in prison. For the
sake of justice, the charges against Ndindabahizi should have been
dropped at this point, but nothing at all was done.

On 15 July 2004, the ICTR convicted Mr. Emmanuel Ndindabahizi and
sentenced him to life in prison for genocide on the hill at Gitwa and the
murder of Mr. Nors!!!


6- Its violation of the neutrality principle


On 23 November 2006, reacting to the Bruguière report's charges that
the RPF was responsible for the assassination of President Habyarimana,
Mr. O'Donnell, then the spokesman for the ICTR, was clearly out of his
realm when he claimed he had documents that proved the FAR was in
possession of SAM 16 missiles, something which was unbeknownst to
Judge Bruguière, and that, under these circumstances, the French judge
had been premature in his charging the RPF.

As Colonel Bagosora was accused by Mr. O'Donnell, on 25 November 2006,
his Defense team wrote to the Clerk of the Court to ask him to retract these
"erroneous and false" statements. On 30 November 2006, the Public Affairs
and Information Unit put out a less than subtle communiqué in which the
ICTR Administration acknowledged that their spokesman had repeated
information coming from the Prosecutor's office.
So, Mr. O'Donnell:

willfully 'tricked out' the reality of the evidence file, in hopes of limiting
the range and effects of the Bruguière Report, deliberately violated
the principle of neutrality to which he is sworn, and made the spokesman
a de facto member of the Prosecution's team.

But, these false claims should not have been made in any case. A little
more than a month before Mr. O'Donnell's unfortunate inventions, the
Tribunal had examined at great lengths the information to which he
alluded and that the Prosecution tried to pass off as evidence that the
FAR possessed SAM 16 missiles.

To understand this manipulation, it is important to have a sense of
the chronology:

-In the Summer of 1991, Col. Laurent Serubuga, Chief of Staff of the
Rwandan Army (FAR), asked the Egyptian government, which had
been a principal arms supplier to Rwanda, to send him a pro-forma
invoice for the eventual purchase of SAM 16 missiles.

-On 2 September 1991, the Egyptians sent this document to
Col. Serubuga.

-On 17 January, after having studied it thoroughly, Col. Serubuga sent
it to the Minister of Defense asking him to give it his approval.

-In April 1992, a coalition government led by the opposition to
President Habyarimana was put in place.

-In June, Col. Serubuga was replaced as Chief of Staff of the FAR by Col.
Déogratias Nsabinmana. The opposition government known as the
'Coalition,' and whose Prime Minister was Mr. Nsengiyaremye of the
MDR, did not follow-up on this request so as not to inconvenience the
RPF, on whom it was depending to defeat President Habyarimana.

So the record could not be clearer: there was no order, thus no purchase
and furthermore no delivery of the SAM 16 missiles by Egypt. So the FAR
did not have these anti-aircraft missiles, which was formally confirmed
before the ICTR by Belgian Col. Luc Marchal, at that time the Chief of the
UNAMIR section in Kigali and in charge of the inventory of confiscated
war materials from the FAR.
(ICTR-98-41-T, Marchal, 30 November 2006, p. 30).

Under such circumstances, how could Mr. O'Donnell have referred to
these documents? It was at the trial of Col. Bagosora that the Prosecutor
presented the pro-forma Egyptian invoice and the technical notes that
were annexed to it to be used against the defendant. He thus associated,
in a totally convoluted way, the name of Col. Bagosora to this file solely
because the defendant was at that time Commander of Camp Kanombe
and had full control of the anti-aircraft units of the FAR. The implication
was quite clear: the 'brains behind the genocide' had control over the
SAM 16 missiles bought from Egypt, so it was Col. Bagosora who shot
down President Habyarimana's plane. QED!

So the Prosecutor's argument rested on the manipulation of a pro-forma
invoice that he tried to pass off as an actual bill(!!!). In the face of such
enormous 'evidence tampering', the Tribunal was bound to react because
it would go to its credibility, and on 17 October 2006, it set aside all
responsibility on the part of Col. Bagosora in the attack against President
Habyarimana:

"No allegation implicating the Accused (Bagosora) in the
assassination of the President is to be found in the indictment, the
Pre-Trial Brief or any other Prosecution communication. Indeed, no
actual evidence in support of that allegation was heard during the
Prosecution case.” ( TPIR- Decision on Request for Disclosure and
Investigations Concerning the Assassination of President Habyarimana
(TC) 17 October 2006)

Before the Tribunal, the neutrality principle has been flouted, and there is
even, perhaps, a sort of understanding between the Prosecution, and the
ICTR's Communication Unit, that is, Mr. O'Donnell. Why would the
Prosecution and the ICTR's spokesman take such huge risks? The answer
is clear: the official thesis shared by the regime in Kigali and the Prosecution
at the ICTR is broken to bits because of the evolution of historiography. The
Prosecutor who saw, in session after session, his indictments dissolve like
popsicles in the desert sun, had no alternative strategy to shift to. He was left
totally without a case, which is why he resorted to the incoherences, the
evidence tampering and the manipulations of documents and facts like those
we have just entered into evidence.

The judgement of history will be very severe toward the ICTR. A half century
after the Stalinist trials in the USSR, we ought to be able to think that such
aberrations are no longer possible. Especially as the ICTR is a creature of the UN. . . .
The Stalinist Tribunals at least had the advantage over the ICTR of not being meant
to work for the 'reconciliation' of communities. . . . It is further legitimate to wonder if
such violations of the most elementary principle of the law, if such an absence of any
of the exigencies of the Scientific Method, would have taken place if the ICTR had
been trying Whites and not Blacks, and if the trials had not been held in Arusha, in
a veritable closed session to the media.

*****************************************


Bernard Lugan was an Expert Witness in the cases of Emmanuel Ndindabahizi
(ICTR-2001-71-T), Théoneste Bagosora (ICTR-98-41-T), Tharcisse Renzaho
(ICTR-97-31-I), Protais Zigiranyirazo. (ICTR-2001-73-T), Innocent Sagahutu
(ICTR-2000-56-T) , Augustin Bizimungu (ICTR- 2000-56-T). Commissioned
in the cases of Edouard Karemera (ICTR-98-44 I) et J.C Bicamumpaka.
(ICTR-99-50-T). A synthesis of these reports and work of the ICTR Bernard
Lugan (2007) Rwanda : Contre-enquête sur le génocide. Paris.

A. Des Forges was the Prosecution's Expert Witness in the trials of Akayezu (ICTR-
96-4-T), Gacumbitsi (ICTR- 01-64-T), MEDIA compiles the cases of
Nahimana Ferdinand (ICTR-96-11), Ngeze Hassan François (ICTR-97-27) and
Barayagwiza Jean Bosco (ICTR-97-19). In the case of Emmanuel
Ndindabahizi (ICTR- 01-71-T) , in the Butare trials Butare combining the cases of
Kanyabashi Joseph (ICTR-96-15),Ndayambaje Elie
( ICTR-96-8), Nsabimana Sylvain (ICTR-97-29), Ntahobali Arsène
(ICTR-99-21),Ntaziryayo Alphonse (ICTR-97-29) and Nyiramasuhuko Pauline
(ICTR-99-21), in the cases of Bizimungu Casimir (ICTR-99-45),
Mugenzi Justin (ICTR-99-47), Bicamumpaka Jérôme (ICTR-99-49),
Mugiraneza Prosper (ICTR-99-48), in the case known as MILITAIRES I
combining the cases of Colonel Bagosora Théoneste (ICTR-96-7) of Général
Kabiligi Gratien (ICTR-97-34), of Lt Colonel Nsengiyumva Anatole
(ICTR-96-12) and of Major Ntabakuze Aloys (ICTR-97-30), as well as in the cases of
Rwamakuba, (ICTR- 98-44-T) and Renzaho (ICTR- 97-31-I).
Bruguière J-L ( 2006) Judgement of Jean-Louis Bruguière, Tribunal de
Grande Instance de Paris, Paris, 17 November 2006.

But only the Hutus were tried while the ICTR constantly refused to go after
the Tutsis, beginning with those who are known to have ordered or executed
various crimes and attacks some of which have been noted here.

Report of the International Group of eminent individuals for leading an
investigation into the genocide of 1994 in Rwanda and its consequences
on the region of the Great Lakes. Addis-Abeba, July 2000, 600 pages.

In June1994, in Tunis, the members of the OAU demanded the creation of an impartial commission of inquiry.
The General Prosecutor at the ICTR was Mr. Richard Goldstone (Nov. 1994 to
Sept. 1996), Mme Louise Arbour (Sept. 1996 to Sept. 1999), Mme Carla Del
Ponte (Sept. 1999 to Aug. 2002) and Mr. Hassan Bubacar Jallow from Aug.
2002 to the present.

Excerpt from The Commonwealth Human Rights Iniative Report on Rwanda

Excerpt from The Commonwealth Human Rights Iniative Report on Rwanda

[This excerpt from the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative Report on Rwanda (with a pdf of the full Report attached below) makes a significant contribution to the establishment of the ‘double genocide’ thesis which we here at CM/P are counting on as the pry-bar that will open the courtroom door to allow the real evidence of the recent dramatic history of Central Africa to be entered into the debate.

Of course, the ‘double genocide’ is considered heresy or revisionism or even negationism by all those who have a parti prix in this story. The RPF/Tutsi lobby contend that talk of an accompanying genocide of Hutus by the invading and conquering and now-ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front and Army is tantamount to claiming the Jews invaded Nazi Germany, put a stop to The Holocaust, and slaughtered and displaced hundreds of thousands unto millions of European non-Jews. I know--about as historically cogent an analysis as Tarantino’s in ‘Inglorious Basterds.’

And then many survivors of the events, Hutu and Tutsi alike, claim without undue fervor that 'Ça ne s’est pas passé comme ça à Kigali' (Robin Philpot’s great book now in English as ‘Rwanda 1994: Old Colonialism Dies Hard’--I was pulling for ‘It Didn’t Go Down Thataway in Kigali’). From the Ugandan Army invasion (in the person of the RPF/A) of 1 October 1990, to the Arusha Accords-breaking (and therefore terrorist) double presidential assassination of 6 April 1994 and the subsequent all-out resumption of hostilities on all fronts by the RPA, to the merciless liquidation of the refugee camps throughout the area but especially in Eastern Zaire (now Congo) in 1996-1998, the survivors claim the real victims were not just the more populous Hutus, but the entire superfluous, powerless population of Rwanda and Congo. This has been codified in various legal instruments within today’s Rwanda (including the new constitution) as an expression of a criminal genocidal ideology. This, they say, is negationism and revisionism and, just as in the EU, a punishable offense against civil society.

The cut from the CHRI report below is also lumbered with this flabby notion of Ethnic or Tribal determinism. All the difficulties in proving the crime of genocide withstanding, the Hutu genocide of the Tutsi and the Tutsi genocide of the Hutu just do not stand up to any kind of postmortem. As they found out with the victims of the Srebrenica ‘genocide’, there is no DNA test to determine ethnicity or nationality--how could they know the bodies they’d recovered (and keep reburying each July) were really Muslim men and boys and not Slavs or Catholics? So it is with Hutus and Tutsis--especially after decades, even centuries, of cohabitation. But don’t worry, there’s plenty enough murder and mayhem to gratify the militarist-humanitarian’s most prurient interests. Deaths for days to be mourned for ages.

But once we have opened up the discussion with the ‘double genocide’ pass key, what do we hope to gain in the name of Truth and Justice? We are quite certain that the evidence that has been accumulated by various courts, including, but not restricted to, the ICTR, the Spanish inquiry into the deaths of a dozen clerics by judge Fernando Andreu Merelles, and the investigation of the deaths of three French nationals by anti-terrorist judge Jean-Louis Bruguière, will topple the scales right out of Lady Justice’s blind hands and onto the side of a thoroughly premeditated, pre-planned and mercilessly executed genocide against the powerless people of Central Africa by the forces of US/UK/EU/Israeli militarism with their Ugandan and Rwandan proxies, like the RPF/RPA/NRA.

To circumvent the Nuremberg Judgement, much is made about a balance of violence, a balance of terror between the invaders and the invaded, the aggressors and the aggressed, the villains and the victims. This balance quickly becomes, first a confusion of the two, then a conflation, and finally an equation, especially a moral equation, of the two warring sides. (e.g., Hannah Arendt’s Fascism=Communism) The attached report is full of this kind of mix and match, and it makes what limited sense it does only because we have so internalized the notion of racial, tribal, religious or ethnic animosities as the primary motor of History.

Never Class Struggle--Never Political Genocide!

What the discussion of the ‘double genocide’ will show is that the real victims in Rwanda and Congo were the powerless majority, and they suffered and died to advance the cruel, selfish concerns of a powerful minority.

The Hutu represented 85% of the population of Rwanda--and their revolutionary government represented the interests of an even greater percentage of the Rwandan people. The invading Ugandan refugee/rebels, with their longings for the ancient Tutsi monarchy and its droit de cuissage (the Tutsi master’s right to cop the thigh of his Hutu slave’s daughters), had only their own narrow interests--first among them being to serve their Western military masters by offering their lands for AFRICOM bases and as dumps for burning off the maximum possible surplus ordnance while replacing the region’s natural riches with the murdered corpses of its superfluous souls.

Always like to end with an anecdote: What really happened in Central Africa? This is from Gérard Prunier’s ‘Africa’s World War’ (Oxford University Press, 2009), footnote 142 from page 137--as I see it, how the Rwandan refugees got wiped out anyway: [Note: Prunier’s craven parti prix for the Hutu genocide of the Tutsi makes it necessary for him to describe all evidence to the contrary as ‘paradoxical.’]

--In a paradoxical development typical of the general confusion, Brig. Delphin Muland, the Tigers’ commander-in-chief [The Tigers were the former Army of Katanga aka Gendarmes Katangais, backed by Communist Angola to fight against Mobutu in the 1970s], found himself faced with thousands of Hutu refugees streaming down toward the Angolan border as he and his troops were coming up by way of Luachimo. The refugees were being chased by RPA elements, and because they were obviously harmless civilians, Muland fired on the RPA to let the refugees flee*. This caused him to be imprisoned in Kinshasa after the war was over on orders from the RPA officers who were furious at having lost their quarry. [Interview with Deogratias Symba, Washington, D.C., March 2000]--
{*However, several million didn’t get this pass. cm/p}

The Rwandan experience demonstrates the chief problem with the Human Rights movement: Human Rights are seen as the rights of oppressed minorities and never those of militarily-eradicated majorities. Rwanda was not Hutu v Tutsi. Just like Iraq and Yugoslavia, where popular leaders were also murdered by Western occupiers, Rwanda was another case of the expansion of Western Military Wastage v a small independent majority-ruled nation.

And now Human Rights are sprinkled on this story like perfume on a corpse. --mc]

*****************************


First part of the CHRI Report (non commented, but enlighted), concerning RPF's crimes against Hutu.
[See complete CHRI Report attached]

The Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative's (CHRI) report on Rwanda is published in order to assist the Commonwealth Heads of Governments in arriving at a decision as to whether Rwanda should be admitted to Commonwealth membership. The decision would be momentous, as until recently the rules for admission to the Commonwealth restricted membership to those states that have had a close constitutional relationship with a Commonwealth state. Mozambique was the exception, when it was formally admitted in 1995, because of its intimate links with Southern African Commonwealth states and its role in ending the apartheid era within South Africa. (. . .)

(. . .) The Commonwealth Secretariat has prepared a report on Rwanda's application, which presumably includes an assessment of Rwanda's compliance with Commonwealth standards of human rights and democracy. Unfortunately the report has not been made public. (. . .)

(. . .) CHRI is concerned to ensure that the issues of human rights and democracy are given due consideration in the decision on Rwanda's application. (. . .) After several months of research and preparation, the team visited Rwanda during May 2009, and a report has been published by Professor Yash Ghai, with assistance from Lucy Mathieson. (. . .)



Killings by the Tutsi

But there is another side to the story. Lemarchand talks of the studied disregard of the narratives of the Hutu refugees about the massive persecution and killings inflicted on Hutus by the RPF, "all of these add up to a devastating commentary on the conspiracy of silence surrounding one of the biggest ethnic cleansing operations that followed in the wake of the genocide" (p. 11)[1]. So, briefly, the RPF, closely associated with Museveni's regime in Uganda (having helped him to overthrow Obote's government), planned to capture Rwanda, assisted by Uganda. President Habyarimana's regime in Rwanda was somewhat shaky and was forced into a process of democratisation[2]. Among its new policies was the repatriation of the Rwandese refugees in Uganda, set for November 1990. Gérard Prunier, the distinguished historian of the Great Lakes Region, writes, "this new development augured ill for the RPF militants who were now in danger of losing their support among the refugees if the latter felt that their return to Rwanda could be achieved without fighting. Accordingly, they accelerated their preparations to beat the November deadline"[3]. Prunier says that the RPF was goaded into action for another reason: intellectual circles in Rwanda were busy preparing to launch political parties, as Habyarimana, now under pressure also from the French, "could not long delay the acceptance of a multiparty system— which would deprive the RPF of one its best public relations points, i.e., that it was fighting a totalitarian single-party dictatorship." (p. 91).

The early phase of the RPF's invasion was rather unsuccessful; it lost four of its key leaders to enemy bullets[4], and had to retreat to Uganda (with the help of that country's government) to regroup and reorganise. On its return, it achieved greater success, and forced the Habyarimana government into peace negotiations and a ceasefire agreement. However, after the agreement on power sharing, and violence by some Hutu groups, the RPF broke the ceasefire and unleashed its own violence, with such success that a large number of Hutus (estimated at over 800,000) began to flee from their homes. The attack by the RPF alarmed many Hutus who had previously supported it or assumed that it had peaceful intentions. Fulfilment of the Arusha agreement, through consensus decisions, depended on trust among the parties, which was in short supply.

However, it was the murder [21 October 1993] of the [democratically elected] president of Burundi, Melchior Ndadye, the first [majoritarian] Hutu to hold that post, by extremist [minoritarian] Tutsi army officers, that caused a major crisis in Burundi which spilled over into Rwanda. The murder led to anti-Tutsi pogroms and anti-Hutu army killings. About 150,000 Tutsis left their homes and sought protection in army-controlled towns, and some 30,000 Hutus fled, mostly to Rwanda. These events strengthened the hands of Hutu extremists in Rwanda, and their coming together. RPF sympathisers were murdered, other Tutsis as well as Hutus regarded as untrustworthy were killed. Anti-Tutsi propaganda escalated, and the political situation was compounded by the failure of Habyarimana to implement the Arusha agreement* and hand over power to a government of national unity (despite considerable local and international pressure).

The shooting down of Habyarimana's plane precipitated numerous killings, initially of "moderate" Hutus, followed by massacres of Tutsis, in what seemed a very systematic way that suggested prior planning. The question whether the genocide was planned in advance, and by whom, is much contested (and can easily be consulted in books and personal narratives). Little purpose would be served by rehearsing it here. The scale and horror of the atrocities against the Tutsi are well documented and well known.

The pertinent question is how one-sided were the atrocities, and in what ways, if any, were the RPF complicit in atrocities against the Hutu. There seems to be credible evidence that the RPF killed Hutus, but there is less agreement on the number killed. Some killings took place in revenge or retribution, others were intended to intimidate the Hutu and force them to submission.

[*''Habyarimana's failure to implement the Arusha agreement' is a highly problematic description of the situation. From the 4 August 1993 signing of the Arush Accords, President Habyarimana worked tirelessly to set up the a broad-based transitional goverment. So much so, that the RPF faction that fought so hard against the institution of this interim government, which anticipated multi-party elections within 23 months--elections they could never hope to win support from any more than a tiny minority--tried to blame Habyarimana's murder on his own MRND party's, his own wife and family's dissatisfaction with his cooperation with the Tutsi-RPF.--cm/p]


Fate of Hutu Refugees

There is better evidence for the complicity of the RPF in the persecution and killing of Hutu refugees (estimated at 2 million) who fled during and shortly after the genocide to Zaire (now Democratic Republic of the Congo), Burundi and Tanzania for fear that the victorious military wing of the RPF (the RPA) would seek revenge and as a result of intimidation by the leaders who had orchestrated the genocide. Another 1.2 to 1.5 million people fled to the "zone turquoise" in the south-west of Rwanda established by the French government with the approval of the UN and became internally displaced, until the last camp, hosting around 120,000 people, was violently dismantled by the RPA in April 1995, and people forced to return.

More critical was the issue of Rwandese refugee camps in the Congo (1996); there were perhaps as many as 500,000 refugees[5]. They were at risk from armed infiltrators and there was the real danger that thousands would be killed. There were many calls for an international military-humanitarian intervention, to protect the refugees, and to allow those who wanted to return to Rwanda to do so (opening up safe corridors). While there was considerable support for the protection of refugees within the camps, the RPF government wanted the repatriation of the refugees and threatened to fight any resistance to it. Paul Kagame (at the time Vice-President and Defence Minister) did all he could to prevent the creation of such an international force, including stopping any observers or journalists from entering Goma to ensure that there would be no publicity about the situation. The refugees were repatriated by force by the Rwandan government, the impression being created that they had returned voluntarily. The international community and the media were prevented from investigating the truth of these claims by the Rwandan government which closed off the area and refused visas. As Reyntjens says, Kagame declared that most refugees had returned; "just a few scattered refugees" remained in Zaire and he accused the humanitarian agencies of exaggerating the figures[6]. At the same time, the World Food Programme estimated that 700,000 refugees were unaccounted for.

The United States of America and the United Kingdom supported the Rwandan position that there was no need for an international force as only a few thousand refugees remained in the Congo, at the same time as the United Nations High Commission for Refugees put the figure at close to 500,000[7]. To quote Reyntjens again,

--Disinformation, dubbed "Operation Restore Silence" by Oxfam emergencies director Nick Stockton, in which `the US, UK and other governments (…) managed the magical disappearance"[8], was crucial: the cynical numbers game and the manipulation of information have been decisive in a process which proved extremely costly in terms of human lives.--

When, as the gravity of the threat to the large number of refugees became obvious ("condemned to death through starvation, exhaustion, illness or assassination by those who have been chasing them for months")[9], the United Kingdom argued strongly against, and succeeded in frustrating, fresh proposals for an international force, supported by some European Union (EU) members. The lack of international intervention may be compared to the earlier ineffectiveness of the international community, during the 1994 genocide. On the other hand, there is some evidence of support by the United States of America, Uganda and Britain to the RPF in the invasion of Rwanda and subsequent killing of Hutu[10].

There had been persistent rumours that the RPA killed a large number of Hutus, including those who had taken refuge in other countries. These rumours acquired considerable legitimacy from a report of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees consultant, Robert Gersony, that the RPF had massacred 30,000 Hutus, and that many more were under threat, leading to an exodus of Hutu refugees into neighbouring countries. The accuracy of Gersony's report has become a matter of controversy between those who say that it was delegitimised or suppressed to save embarrassment to the Kagame regime and the UN[11], and others who deny that there was reliable evidence to support his conclusions (see further below). Roméo Dallaire, the commander of the UN Forces in Rwanda, writes that there were many incidents of revenge murders, looting and rape of Hutus by the RPF, but doubts if these had the backing of the top leaders[12].

It now seems clear that thousands of Hutus were killed by the Rwanda [RPF--cm/p] army and militias supported by it[13]. The matter became so serious that the Office of the Higher Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the UN Security Council despatched teams to investigate the scale of atrocities. Rwanda and also, at Uganda's insistence, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, placed every possible obstacle in the way of investigations: Reyntjens mentions, in connection with the Security Council team, "travel restrictions, `spontaneous' demonstrations organised by the government, intimidation of witnesses and physical threats against members of the team"[14]. Nevertheless that team did produce a report, which concluded that the RPA had committed large-scale war crimes and abhorrent crimes against humanity, based on the systematic massacre of Hutu refugees remaining in Zaire[15]. The RPF denied any humanitarian assistance to the refugees (as it had done during the genocide in the areas it controlled), so much so, that the then UN Secretary General, Boutros-Ghali stated that "two years ago, the international community was confronted with the genocide of the Tutsi by weapons. Today we are faced with the genocide of the Hutu by starvation" (November 1996). Six months later, his successor Kofi Annan said that "it is possible to kill by weapons or by hunger. The killing is done by hunger today".

On 13 July, the Security Council condemned the massacres, other atrocities and violations of international humanitarian law, including crimes against humanity. It requested that the Congolese and Rwandan governments carry out inquiries and punish the guilty[16]. Although well-founded estimates are that nearly 250,000 Hutus (including children and women) were killed, these governments ignored the Security Council resolution (which had also demanded a report on compliance from these governments), and the Council did not revisit the matter. Impunity prevailed yet again.

It is also possible that when it was strategic, the RPF allowed the killing of the Tutsis. Dallaire writes that the deaths of Rwandans can also be laid "at the door of the military genius, Paul Kagame, who did not speed up his campaign when the scale of genocide became clear and even talked candidly with me at several points about the price his fellow Tutsi might have to pay for the cause"[17]. Dallaire reports that, during the killings, he advised Kagame to accept ceasefire and use troops to stop the massacre, but Kagame refused, Dallaire thinks, because Kagame was winning the war. Reyntjens states that Kagame implicitly justified mass killings by the RPF when he said: "People see this in terms of human rights (…), which is a poor analysis. One must understand that every conflict is not bad. There are conflicts that are a sort of purification. In certain cases, conflicts erupt in order to make a real transformation possible."[18] In these ways, thousands of lives, which could have been saved, including those of Tutsis, were lost.

It will be obvious from the above account that the Rwandan genocide and massacres do not help us to distinguish "good guys" from "bad guys" or, in a simple way, victims from oppressors. [What about majority v minority interests? Or democracy v feudalism? cm/p] The complexity of the great tragedy in Rwanda cannot be analysed in these simple categories, nor in terms of communities as corporate entities. Judgements have been made at different stages of the unfolding of the tragedy, without access to all the relevant information. The problem has been compounded by considerable, and often skilful, disinformation (particularly by the RPF, and also by some states, including the United States of America).

Professor René Lemarchand provides a useful summary of consensus as well as differences among academics[19]. He cites what he describes as, "Alison Des Forges's landmark investigation", Leave No One to Tell the Story[20], which he describes as "the most wide-ranging, thoroughly researched and reliable source of information on the 1994 genocide…. If any work on the genocide can be called definitive, this is it." According to her, while Tutsi civilians were the prime target of the génocidaires, a "substantial number of Hutu affiliated to opposition parties were massacred in the south and central regions"[21]. When the RPF captured Kigali, on 4 July 1994, although killing of Tutsis stopped, that of Hutus did not. Des Forges says that many Hutu civilians were "deliberately massacred" by RPF troops[22], including sometimes by holding "public meetings designed to round up and kill Hutu civilians"[23].

It is evident that some Hutus, prominent in their own community, were the victims of the genocide at the hands of their kin group, while some Tutsis sacrificed members of their kin group for the "higher cause". Members of each community provided shelter and protection for their friends, even strangers, of the other community, from the threats and violence of their own community, at great personal risk. Despite the troubled history of inter-community relations in the pre-colonial and colonial periods, Rwandese had learnt to live together in peace and cooperation, except when goaded into violence by ambitious individuals and groups, intent on their own profit, using ethnicity as the tool. It is therefore unjustified to blame the whole community (in this case the Hutus) for the sins of some members, as is the wont of the RPF. Kagame wants each Hutu to apologise for the atrocities of a limited number, while at the same time denying that Tutsis engaged in any counter-killing.


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Notes:

[1] The complexity of the violence of genocide is well captured in the memoir of a survivor. Lemarchand says, "One of the most arresting and unbiased of such testimonies, by a survivor of mixed origins, is Edouard Kabagema's Carnage d'une nation : Genocide et massacres au Rwanda, 1994 (2001). His message comes clear and loud in the first pages: "Not only have I seen the genocide of Tutsi perpetrated by their neighbors and their huts going up in flames... I also saw many Hutu using a thousand tricks to save their Tutsi neighbors... and I saw FPR rebels engaging in a selective and then a large-scale massacre of Hutu, to avenge their own people and consolidate their grip on the country" (State of Research p. 5).

[2] COMMENTARY: FALSE: President Juvénal Habyarimana had begun the process of democratization following the Franco-African Summit at La Baule in June 1990. It is precisely because democratization was instituted in Rwanda, and within a multi-party system, and the RPF could not risk the possibility of remaining forever in the opposition, that the RPF attacked on 1 October 1990 with the support of the Ugandan military.

[3] Prunier, pp. 90-91.

[4] COMMENTARY: FALSE: Major-General Fred Rwigema and Majors Chris Bunyenyezi and Peter Bayingana were assassinated by members of the RPF and the Ugandan National Resistance Army (NRA).

[5] A full account of the politics of the refugee camps and its consequences is Filip Reyntjens, The Great African War (Cambridge University Press, 2009), especially chapter 3. [And better yet--though only in French--is Faustin Ntilikina's 'La prise de Kigali et la chasse aux réfugiés par l'Armée du Général Paul Kagame' on Editions Sources du Nil--cm/p]

[6] While Kagame claimed that the refugees had returned voluntarily, Reyntjens says, "First, the refugees did not have much of a choice, as they were fired upon and the only safe passage opened to them led into Rwanda. Secondly, the fact that the refugees interviewed by the international press upon their arrival in Gisenyi claimed they were "happy to come home" and expressed relief at being "freed from their intimidators" was not convincing for those who know how Rwandans communicate. For many returnees, declarations of that kind were part of a survival strategy: they said what they felt they had to say in view of the expectations of those who held the power over life and death in their hands; saying the opposite would entail all the unpleasant consequences of being considered interahamwe. Thirdly, observers were struck by the fact that the refugees walked back like sheep, without showing the slightest enthusiasm for being "freed" and returning to their home country at last."

[7] This was not the first time that the US State Department disagreed with the analysis of the UNHCR (even against the US Department of Defence). It tried to discredit Robert Gersony's report (mentioned elsewhere in this report) on the scale of RPF atrocities against the Hutu refugees. As Reyntjens puts it, it is surprising that the US Ambassador in Rwanda, R. E. Gribbin, took this position. In his memoirs (In the Aftermath of Genocide. The U.S. Role in Rwanda, New York, iUniverse, 2005, pp. 144-145), he states that that "RPF luminaries proved to be masters of spin (…) The RPF played the genocide card shamelessly (correctly so, in my view, because genocide had defined the Rwandan tragedy) and staked out the moral high ground. The claim to righteousness was then misused to shield or justify political decisions" (p. 199, quoted by Reyntjens).

[8] N. Gowing, New challenges and problems…, op. cit., p. 56 (fn. in original).

[9] Le Monde, 12 March 1997, quoting the French Secretary of State for Humanitarian Action, Xavier Emmanuelli (from Reyntjens).

[10] In September 1997, Amnesty International observed that US military assistance to Rwanda had intensified during the months preceding the RPA's operation in Zaire. The report said that a US-supported public information campaign "played a significant role in convincing foreign governments and humanitarian organisations that it was safe for Rwandese refugees to return home, where many of them have subsequently been subjected to human rights violations, including extrajudicial execution and `disappearances'". The organisation concluded that "the apparently uncritical political support of the USA for the Rwandese government can only be encouraging the Rwandese authorities to believe that they can carry on violating human rights with little fear of criticism from their most important allies".

[11] See below.

[12] Roméo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil (Vintage Canada, 2003), p 479.

[13] A Human Rights Watch report (Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno15-8-03.htm#P810_253140 in the internet version) states: "In their drive for military victory and a halt to the genocide, the RPF killed thousands, including non-combatants as well as government troops and members of militia. As RPF soldiers sought to establish their control over the local population, they also killed civilians in numerous summary executions and in massacres. They may have slaughtered tens of thousands during the four months of combat from April to July. The killings diminished in August and were markedly reduced after mid-September when the international community exerted pressure for an end to the carnage. Carried out by soldiers who were part of a highly disciplined military organisation, these killings by the RPF rarely involved civilian participation, except to identify the persons to be slain. In only a few cases, particularly in areas near the border with Burundi, civilian assailants reportedly joined soldiers in attacking other civilians."

[14] Reyntjens also states that the deputy leader of the Security Council team, a Zimbabwean, Andrew Chigovera, resigned, referring to his "great difficulty in believing that an environment favourable to an independent and impartial inquiry on human rights existed in the RDC [DRC] or could present itself " (Reyntjens cites "AFP, Kinshasa, 13 February1997").

[15] UN Security Council, Report of the Investigative Team Charged with Investigating Serious Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law in the Democratic Republic of Congo, S/1998/581, 29 June 1998, paragraph 96.

[16] According to Reyntjens, after a new war broke out between Rwanda and the DRC, the Congolese government was to recognise the facts, but blamed them on Rwanda. Minister Victor Mpoyo claimed that the AFDL was unaware of the massacres: "The Rwandan army controlled the area and, therefore, the information. (…) We could not imagine that those men who survived a genocide could behave in such a bloodthirsty fashion". Even after coming to power in Kinshasa, "we were gagged by the Rwandans on this subject" (Libération, 17 September 1998)".

[17] Roméo Dallaire, op. cit., p. 515.

[18] Great African War citing "AP, Kigali, 7 June 1997".

[19] State of Research.

[20] See above. But this book has not necessarily been influential on policymakers in the US and the UK. That credit must go to a NY Times journalist, Peter Gourevitch's acclaimed bestseller, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families: Stories from Rwanda (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1998). Of this book Lemarchand writes, "Allusions to the Holocaust as a frame of reference are unconvincing. So is his breathless tribute to Paul Kagame as the hero who brought the genocide to an end … From this uncomplicated tale of woe emerges an image of the Hutu as the collective embodiment of evil. This is where his narrative carries implications that go beyond the realm of travel writing: it is not unreasonable to assume that this highly naïve and uncritical rendering of the genocide has had a powerful hold on the official thinking of US policymakers towards the new Rwandan state. To this day, the Tutsi-dominated State enjoys the unconditional support of the US government" (p. 8).

[21] Citing des Forges, pp. 555-559.

[22] Citing Des Forges, pp. 726-34.

[23] Citing Des Forges, pp. 109, 707, 728.

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Attachments:

• Commonwealth Report on Rwanda.pdf (1.4MB)