Sunday, June 9, 2013

OBSERVATIONS ON THE BOOK BY ANDRÉ GUICHAOUA, "Rwanda: from War to Genocide"--Open letter from General Augustin Ndindiliyimana (4 August 2010)

[There has been some renewed interest in this post since the nominations of Susan Rice and Samantha Power to new positions in the Obama administration.  The PDF of General Ndindiliyimana's letter to André Guichaoua was lost with our old server, Blogcollective.  Here's a slapdash attempt at recovering that very important history of the Rwandan troubles.--mc]

OBSERVATIONS ON THE BOOK BY ANDRÉ GUICHAOUA, "Rwanda: from War to Genocide"--Open letter from General Augustin Ndindiliyimana (4 August 2010)[translated from the French by Christopher Black & Mick Collins]

[I first saw Guichaoua's fat purple tome, “Rwanda: de la guerre au genocide,” on the shelves at FNAC. I knew his name, but nothing distinguished him from the other professional Africa experts, the ICTR Prosecution's private faculty of contractors, who were kept on the UN payroll as long as they kept the Tutsi-Genocide-of-100-days-committed-by-'extremist'-elements-of-the-Rwandan-(Hutu)-governments-and-military out of the chiottes of Historical Waste where it belongs. As General Ndindiliyimana specifies below in this posted PDF, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) demanded the UN set up a Tribunal to try those who committed the crime of genocide on 12 April 1994, that is, six days into the so-called tribal killing spree. So experts like Guichaoua, Alison Des Forges, Colette Braeckman, Gérard Prunier, Samantha Power, Bernard Lugan and Filip Reyntjens, got their mission plan significantly before all the bodies had fallen, been sorted out and counted. And as more evidence has rolled in with each new trial at the ICTR, most of these 'experts'—some more than others—have continued to cling to the 'Genocide Fallacy' that is at the heart of this chapter in Central African history, just as it is the constitutional rationale for the current Rwandan military dictatorship.

Like the ‘Genetic Fallacy’ in logic, the 'Genocide Fallacy' invalidates all arguments or institutions premised on it because of its essential flaw, its original sin, its falsifying bias. But to experts, scholars like Guichaoua et al, the Rwandan Genocide of 800,000 to a million Tutsis and moderate Hutus between 6 April 1994 (the date of the assassinations by the RPF [and no one any longer seriously argues this fact, wetfe The New Yorker readership might think!] of the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi (Juvénal Habyarimana and Cyprien Ntaryamira, resp.), as well as the Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Army (as The General will point out, this position should not be confused or conflated, as it often is by these experts, with the Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Armed Forces [FAR], which was made up of the Army and the Natl. Gendarmerie, and commanded by the President or, in his absense, the Minister of Defense [both civilian positions]), and 16 July 1994, when the RPF had effectively seized power throughout the country, and claimed to have stopped the 100 days of Genocide (which they, in fact, date as far back as the Social Revolution of 1959-1962 that deposed the Tutsi monarchy and instituted, by majority vote and UN recognition, the Rwandan Republic).

But the evolution of the ‘Genocide Fallacy’ is interesting and should be noted here—because The General is far too erudite and refined, far too polite, and far too compassionate toward his torturers, to speak in such crude terms. Being able to take the low rhetorical road is one of the few indulgences allowed a retired Hollywood day-player whom no one need take seriously.

So . . . In the Beginning was the Word. And the Word was with the RPF, and the Word was Genocide. After years of playing with ethnic numbers (and in the final accounting, the real significance of ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi,’ and the reason the current neo-feudal government in Kigali eschews ethnic distinctions, is that ‘Hutu’ means ‘majority’ and ‘Tutsi’ means ‘[tiny, elitist] minority’) and trying to bury all information relevant to the foreign aggression of 1 October 1990, or the four-year RPF reign of terrorist murder and mayhem that culminated with the multiple assassinations of 6 April 1994, a terrorist act in violation of the duly-signed Arusha Peace Accords of 4 August 1993, and the unilateral resumption, again by the RPF, of the war they had started in October 1990—though it had been in pre-production for more than a decade before with infiltration, the planting of mines and other explosives, and the agitation and propaganda for vile ethnic hatred that became the cover for this primal international crime against Peace—the genocide of the Tutsi minority was declared, by the victorious military leaders of that same Tutsi minority, to be over. The perpetrators of the mass killings, the ruthless prosecutors of the war against Rwanda, declared 16 July 1994 to be VG day. And this fallacy became the raison d'être, not only for the Rwandan military dictatorship, but also for a whole new system of International Justice. The Rwandan Genocide became a sort of Holocaust redux.

But, as should have been expected, with the Genocide victims’ actual vanquishing of the genocidaires and driving them all out of their country into neighboring Congo, the 'hapless victim' jacket would start to chafe under the coarse weight of the conquistador's armor. Former-RPF warriors, like Lt Abdul Ruzibiza, in his "Rwanda: L'Histoire secrète," started bragging about his RPF-mates’ mass killing of Rwandan civilians, the seizure of their lands with millions displaced, and the pillaging of their homes and the looting of the goods and livestock, all to be sent back and sold in Uganda.

As with Naser Oric's bragging on German TV about his killing and mutilation of Serb civilians around Srebrenica, Ruzibiza's blood-curdling confessions had little effect on the primary Genocide Fallacy. But with his testimony before the ICTR, as well as to the French anti-terrorist judge, Jean-Louis Bruguière, a sort of 'second genocide' was born: the 'Extremist Hutu' government had committed genocide against the Tutsi minority; but so had the Tutsi RPF committed genocide against the majority Hutu civilian population of Rwanda.

And Ruzibiza had the ICTR disinterred certain independent reports on RPF crimes: Gersony and Hourigan had their reports revived, though, unlike the private academic experts, they were under orders from their government patrons to dummy up and stay that way. Of course, being good guys, they didn’t.

Then Pierre Péan, the formidable French investigative journalist, came out with his "Noire fureurs, blancs menteurs" (a seminal work on Rwanda which, shamefully, is still not translated into English) and uncovered the RPF's vast propaganda network. Again, it became clear that the Genocide Fallacy was instrumental to the cover-up of the imperialist (US/UK) aggression and military occupation of Central Africa; it was the sentimental hook by which the international public was cajoled into accepting the forced conversion of Rwanda into a privatized loading dock for the stolen resources of Congo. After all, those Rwandan Defense Forces were over in Goma and Kivu hunting escaped Hutu genocidaires--and their genocidaire wives and kids. It was just ‘Never Again’ all over again.

But ours is pretty much a monotheistic (mono-genocidal) cosmology. Just as with the one true and living God, the Primal Genocide does not suffer competitors. Yet, there was too much evidence of RPF (Tutsi) mass crimes for the expert witnesses contracted by the ICTR Prosecutor just to continue pretending ignorance. So guys like Prunier and Guichaoua had to start talking about mass crimes on both sides. As they used to say in Yugoslavia: plenty of ethnic atrocities to go around. And though this compromise weakened the One True and Living Genocide theory, there was already too much invested to simply abandon it in favor or irrelevancies like evidence and justice.

And this brings me to the second and last time I saw Guichaoua’s massive volume: During a post-screening discussion of the documentary, “D’Arusha à Arusha,” I was doing my best to compliment the filmmaker, Christophe Gargot, and his well-heeled Human Rights sponsors, on the real effectiveness of their film. But it quickly became clear I was being somewhat less than sincere (you can check out my deconstruction of this doc elsewhere on CM/P at:
because the point I was praising them on was not exactly the point they had intended to make. They had wanted to show how the ICTR was working effectively to end impunity for governments who commit mass crimes like Genocide; I told them their choice of trials and the prominences they gave to the Defense (with great attorneys like Ramsey Clark and Raphael Constant featured), and certain cases, like the Military I trial of Bagosora et al, made a very strong case for the imperialists’ insturmentalization of the Genocide Fallacy—say what?! Their film had cast in doubt almost every premise the Prosecution had.

As if to shut me up by sticking it in my mouth, they whipped out Guichaoua’s book and started talking about how it could answer all the questions they couldn’t—had all the numbers, all the details to demonstrate beyond all doubt that the Tutsis (and ‘moderate’ Hutus) had been genocided by the ‘Extremist Hutus.’ But no one seemed aware of, or could, much less, explain, the outcome of their Star Trial: Military I had acquitted Bagosora et al of ‘conspiracy or planning to commit genocide.’ But, hey, as Don Rumsfeld once mused: Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. Just because OJ was acquitted doesn’t mean he didn’t decapitate his wife, while his kids slept nearby. Just because the Genocide is a Fallacy (or at least a paranoid fantasy) does not mean there was no genocide. Right?

But Military I and the almost contemporaneous Military II trial (the Prosecutor v Ndindiliyimana et al) were the straws that drove the last of the hired experts off the sinking USS Genocide—and out of their tiny, pathetically closed minds.

When the judgment was rendered in Military I on 28 December 2008, the Tribunal acquitted the defendants of 'planning or conspiracy to commit genocide'. As legal wonks were quick to point out, this only meant the Prosecution could not prove that Colonel Bagosora et al had planned or conspired to commit genocide—not that THERE WAS NO GENOCIDE! In fact, the same judgment convicted them of genocidal crimes committed by those in their charge, crimes like the killing of the 10 Belgian UN Blue Helmets (some say they saw as many as 13 bodies at the morgue) and the murder while under UN protection of Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana. But there is no more evidence of Bagosora et al having committed these 'genocidal crimes' than there is of their 'planning and conspiracy to commit genocide'. The strong evidence actually points to the RPF’s responsibility for these, like all the other, killings.

This Mil I conviction was based almost entirely on the 16 June 2006 order to the Trial Chamber in Arusha from the ICTR Appeals Chamber in The Hague (the ICTR and ICTY share a single Appeals Chamber—how conveeeeeeeeeeeenient!) to 'Take Judicial Notice' of the Rwandan Genocide. That is to say, that the Genocide Fallacy must be accepted without having to be proved under evidence—like the address of the Courthouse, or who's buried in Grant's Tomb.

This patently anti-legal manipulation seems to have befuddled Guichaoua and the Genocide Fallacy claque of private scholastic contractors (whose chief concern has always been the demonization—or, at least, the trivialization—of the Rwandan majority [Hutu, MRND] governmental and military institutions), but it has increased their ranks to the tune of one ICTR Defense lawyers association—who saw in the Mil I judgment, and some of the reconsiderations and reversals of legal fortune that came in its wake, a perfect opportunity for a big payday, the kind of career bump that turns an ambulance chaser into Johnny Cochran (i.e., a rich ambulance chaser).

But when the racist and classist arrogance of these Euro-American scholar/shysters led them directly into the maw of the monster conceived by the Genocide Fallacy, and they started waving their well-researched bona fides around Kigali like Cal pennants at Stanford stadium, things went sideways. They wound up (like their ICTR clients, one might consider) in an African jail having to explain how their multi-genocide theory was not Genocide denial or even revision, high crimes in that nation whose very legal existence is based on this primal Genocide. So, then they went all soft-centered, bent over and grabbed their ankles and started singing every song the jailor requested: Of course there was a Genocide, and just One Genocide and, of course, it's existence is so far beyond doubt that it need not be proven. Just get me outta here! Genocide akbar!

But, I digress—comme d’hab. General Ndindiliyimana’s observations on Guichaoua’s massive pavé—which, for those gluttons who just can’t get enough disinformation, is backed up with a web site—makes it abundantly clear that many in the West have badly underestimated the sophistication of African social and political institutions. What was destroyed between October 1990 and April 1994 was nothing less than the Rwandan democratic socialist revolution. The counter-revolution led from Kigali and Kampala is on going, with millions and millions of victims in Rwanda and Congo, and the blood on the hands of these liberal academics, journalists and jurists, will not soon dry or ever be washed away. —mc ]

{Because I can't figure out how to attach a PDF file here, I'm just pasting on the whole text of the General's observations on Guichaoua's book.--exsqueeze me.}



Open letter addressed to Mr. André Guichaoua, Professor at the University of Paris 1, 
Pantheon-Sorbonne, France 

General Augustin Ndindiliyimana 

4 August 2010 


Augustin Ndindiliyimana      Arusha, 4 August 2010 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
B.P. 6061 UNDF – Arusha – Tanzanie 

         To:  Mr André Guichaoua 
          Professor at 
         The University of Paris 1, 
         Pantheon-Sorbonne, France 

RE:  Reactions to some false information contained in your book:   
“Rwanda, from War to Genocide.”  Edition:  La Découverte.  Paris (France) 

Dear Professor, 

I have always read your books and certain of your statements on Rwanda with great interest.  I 
believe that an expert, one who is motivated by a real desire to discover the truth, should never 
avoid any ideas or information that come his way.  This is why I am sending you my observations 
on your recent book, “Rwanda, from War to Genocide.”  I do not believe anyone can pretend to 
know the whole truth about a situation as complex as the tragedy that unfolded in Rwanda.  It 
was in my desire to contribute to the search for truth that, in 1997, I sent a similar letter to 
Professor Reyntjens1.  I also addressed myself to Mme Alison Des Forges’s book, “Aucun 
témoins ne doit survivre” [“Leave None to Tell the Story”].  My observations on Mme Des 
Forges’s work were entered into evidence before the ICTR.2 

I will limit the observations of your work I am offering here to the essential points that concern 
me directly.  I will not comment on what is contained in Mme Pauline Nyiramasuhuko’s diary, 
because I am not surprised that she noted my presence in Murambi on 13 and 22 April 1994. I 
was there on the 13th to ask the government to support the negotiations between the FAR and the 
RPF, and on the 22nd with Colonel Rusatira to ask the Ministers and Politicians present to make 
greater efforts toward the pacification of the country. 

As to the evidence given by Major Epiphane Hanyurwimana, it is widely known that it is made 
up entirely of false information.3 

For example, this fabrication of false information was corroborated by one of your favorite 
sources, Colonel Balthazar Ndengeyinka.  In the notes from their interview with Ndengeyinka on 
 The letter to Prof. Reyntjens concerned his book, “Rwanda, Trois jours qui ont fait basculer l’histoire [“Rwanda, Three Days 
that Shook History”], Edition L’Harmatan 1995, Paris” and on the analysis of the transcripts of the hearings of the Belgian 
Parliamentary Commission on the events in Rwanda. 
 My observations on Mme Des Forges’s “Leave None to Tell the Story—Genocide in Rwanda” (Human Rights Watch, 1999) 
[], was entered into evidence in the trial of Bagosora et al (Military I) as item DK 14. 
 Major Epiphane Hanyurwimana and Lt-Col. Cyprien Kayumba made up false information about the minutes of meetings that 
never took place and you cited them in your book, “Le roi est mort, vivre le roi” [“The King is Dead, Long Live the King”]. 
26 March 2010, ICTR Prosecutor Don Webster and a member of his staff, Jean Baptiste 
Nsanzimfura, wrote: 

Concerning the meeting on the morning of 7 April 1994 that was held in the conference room of 
the MINADEF [Ministry of Defense—trans] and presided over by the Cabinet Director of the 
Minister of Defense with the leaders of the MRND, the witness stated that he had not taken part 
in this meeting.  His name, which appears on page K036-5921, must have been written in at some 
later date, along with the names of the other participants.”4 

On this question, your two sources fundamentally destroy one another. 

I understand that in the book that concerns us here you admit that you were unable to take any of 
my testimony.5  However, with my modest experience of the Rwandan events, I think if you had 
heard my version of things, you certainly would not have found it without interest, and you could 
easily have checked it against your other sources. 

I have no doubt as to your concern with the rigors of the scientific method, especially when I 
consider the position you expressed on 24 September 2001, when you testified as an expert 
witness in the Cyangugu trial.  You stated: 

“Finally, I would like to add one thing, and to tell you that rumors can, from time to time, come 
up, and I might not have verified some of the information before filing this report. 

I have, in the course of this weekend, asked a certain number of questions to clarify a point that 
has remained for me—page 24—a question mark, and that concerned the killing of Ephrem 

I asked:  Some contradictory versions are going round about the identity of the members of the 
unit responsible for this operation:  FAR or RPA? 

I can answer you today, with certitude, that the first interpretation is now obsolete; it was, in fact, 
a unit of the RPA. 

There it is.  So, counselor, I move forward, slowly but surely, rumors arise and other versions 
can be confirmed, but that all takes time.”6  
1. The informal meeting of the Army Command, the appointment of a Chief of Staff 
 of the Army and the image of the Minister of Defense. 

On page 250 of your book, it states: 

The reconstruction of this meeting from the testimonies gathered from several of those present 
leads to the following description of the events of that evening.” 
 Interview notes of 26 March 2010, ICTR document K0473922, paragraph 2. 
 Professor André Guichaoua:  “Rwanda, De la guerre au Génocide”; Edition:  La Découverte. Paris, pg. 506, footnote to pg. 30.   
 Deposition of André Guichaoua in the Cyangugu case, 24 September 2001, pp. 22-23. 

And you add at the bottom of this page that it is: 

“. . . from a note written, identified and reviewed by Lt-Col. Cyprien Kayumba” 

I would like to point out that your reconstruction of that meeting is different from what I noted in 
the chronology and my schedule, especially where it concerns Prime Minister Agathe.7  I draw 
your attention to the fact that on the night of 6-7 April 1994, there were the regular staff of the 
Defense Ministry and that of the Chief of Staff of the Army present.  According to the statement 
made by Colonel Ndengeyinka that you cite:  at the moment when the (UN) Blue Helmets and 
Prime Minister Agathe’s house were fired on, Ndengeyinka asked the Minister’s staff what had 
happened and Lt-Col. Kayumba answered him:  “It is us who are keeping the Prime Minister 
from going on the radio.”  It must be noted that certain actors in these events were posted in front 
of the residence of Col. Ndengeyuinka8.  After that, you can understand that these officers are 
ready to do everything to avoid answering for what they did or did not do in what happened at 
Prime Minister Agathe’s residence. 

You write on page 252: 

“Finally, the eyes of the officers present returned naturally to Augustin Ndindiliyimana, Chief of 
Staff of the Gendarmerie and the only officer holding the rank of General, to assume the position 
as interim Chief of Staff of the FAR until a replacement for the dead Chief of Staff could be 

Knowingly or by mistake, people continue to conflate things in maintaining the confusion 
regarding the Command of the FAR.  It is important to make it clear that there was no Chief of 
Staff of the FAR. 

Conforming to legal regulations, the Rwandan Armed Forces are understood to be the Rwandan 
Army and the National Gendarmerie9.  The FAR is composed of two distinct entities each of 
which has its own Chief of Staff and its own missions.  At this time, there was no General Chief 
of Staff and it was the Minister of Defense who coordinated the activities of the two Chiefs of 
Staff.  In accordance with Article 45 of the 10 June 1991 Rwandan Constitution, the President of 
the Republic is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, and Article 50 states:  “The 
Government determines and conducts the policies of the Nation.  It has at its disposal the 
administration and the Armed Forces.” 

 The chronology and my schedule were matters of debate and entered as exhibits in the trial of Ndindiliyimana et al.  See the 
Prosecution’s exhibit number P 245. 
 Witnesses including a Ghanaian soldier who was posted at Agathe’s house noticed a road block set up the night of 6-7 April 
1994 on the Avenue Paul VI:  “Counselor, during my service, I said that I observed the area of the Prime Minister’s residence, 
and I went around on the street; from the main gate, when I was going out, I think it was the third time—each time that I made a 
round of the area, I went out to verify if there was a threat.  So I noticed that at 60 or 70 meters from the main gate, there was a 
road block that was quickly set up at a crossroads close to the US embassy in the direction of the camp.  So I saw an unusual road 
block” This distance corresponds to Ndengeyinka’s residence. 
 Status of the Officers of the Rwandan Armed Forces:  Presidential Order No01/02 of 3 January 1977, article 2. 
It was never planned for these two functions to be taken on by one Chief of Staff.  The officers of 
the FAR found that I could not even claim this post:   

Major-General Ndindiliyimana was Chief of Staff of the National Gendarmerie.  Because of 
this, he was on the same rung of the hierarchy as the Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Army [chef 
EMAR].  Even if he had greater seniority, he could not take this position because he would be 
replacing the Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Army and not the Director of Operations.  At any 
rate, since the Rwandan Army had the most troops on the ground, it was up to the Chief of Staff 
of the Rwandan Army to do this job.”10 

The officers who created the document “Contributions of the FAR to the search for the truth” 
presented the criteria that would guide the selection of a candidate for the temporary Chief of 
Staff.  It was a matter for these experienced officers and for certain people you have noted as 
being members of the Crisis Committee and/or in attendance at different meetings.  By writing in 
this document that I could not claim this position, they were affirming the contrary of what you 

Concerning the depiction of the Minister, you wrote:  

We have noted that at this particular moment it is the Minister, himself, who selects his cabinet 
chief.” Pg 280. 

What you stated could only be an exception.  I was Defense Minister and Colonel Rusatira was 
my General Secretary, a position equivalent to that of Cabinet Director.  In the case of an 
absence, he would normally replace me in bringing the two Chiefs of Staff together.  It was not a 
matter of personal choice but an application of the rules and the laws:  “the job trumps the rank.” 

As to the precedence of the Cabinet Director over the Defense Minister in dealings with the 
Chiefs of Staff, in their document, “The contribution of the FAR to the search for the truth,” the 
officers are even more explicit: 

Given the politico-military character of the points under debate, it is the Defense Minister who 
was supposed to direct this meeting.  In his absence, he should be replaced by his Cabinet 
Director, Colonel BEMS Bagosora.”11 

Moreover, in the executive order of the Prime Minister, No. 08/02 of 28 August 1992, bearing on 
the organization and allocation of services of the central administration, it is stated that the 
 The document entitled “The contribution of the FAR to the search for the truth” sent to the ICTR in 1995 was put together by a 
commission made up of the following officers: Col. Ntiwiragabo, Aloys (président); Lt.-Col. Kanyandekwe, Emmanuel; Lt.- 
Col. Rwarakabije, Paul; Maj. Ntamagezo, Gérard; Maj. Gakara, Théophile; Capt. Nsengimana; Lt. Bihirumuhatsi; and 
others.  In reference to section 1:  Continuity of command and the setting up of a Crisis Committee and the role of this 
Committee.  This document was placed in evidence in the case of Prosecutor v Bagosora et al as item number DK 81 and is 
among the Annexes requested by the Ndindiliyimana Defense [Mil II] in its “Motion for the transfer of applicant’s trial to a 
national jurisdiction on the basis that a fair trial cannot be obtained before the tribunal,” 20th day of September 2004.  
Cabinet Director of the Ministry of Defense should replace the Defense Minister in the case of 
his absence or some other impediment to his carrying out his immediate duties.12 

In his note of 27 January 1993 relative to the functioning of the services of the Ministry in the 
absence of the Defense Minister, the Minister of Defense wrote: 

The Cabinet Director can call and preside over a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff or the Directors 
of the MINADEF [Ministry of Defense—trans].”13 

2.  Meetings of the Crisis Committee in the evenings of 7 & 8 April 1994. 

Several times, you returned to the meeting in the evening of 7 April to elect a president of the 
Committee, and to the meeting in the evening of 8 April for the presentation of the new 

a)  The meeting in the evening of 7 April 

“Called for 18.00 hours, the Crisis Committee, as constituted, met for the first time around 19.00 
hours to elect its president, General Ndindiliyimana.”  P 265. 

You cite Balthazar Ndengeyinka: 

“Ndindiliyimana accepted without enthusiasm to preside over the Committee.  To the best of my 
recollection, he did not effectively preside over a single meeting.”  p 279. 

In the afternoon of 7 April 1994, I realized we were in a critical situation: 

 -  People, including political authorities, had been killed.  The RPF had resumed  
   hostilities.  The Territorial Company at Remera had been attacked.  The Gendarmerie’s  
   camp at Kacyiru (the Gendarmerie’s largest camp, which contained all the corps  
   logistical means) was facing off against the RPF. 

-  Then came the murder of the UN Blue Helmets at Camp Kigali. 

Given the gravity of the situation and not being able to find the Cabinet Director (I later learned 
he had left the city to evacuate his family), I took the initiative to call the Crisis Committee 
together and to invite the representatives of the UNAMIR to the meeting.  General Dallaire 
showed up alone.  We studied the situation and took the following measures: 

Facing the RPF threat of continuing the war, we asked General Dallaire to get us a ceasefire and 
the Chief of Staff of the Army to reinforce the Gendarmerie at Kacyiru. 

 Ruling of the Prime Minister, No 08/02 of 28 August 1992, regarding the organization and attributions of duties of the Central 
Administration: Official Journal number 22 of 15 November 1992, page 1766. 
 ICTR document number L0020567-69. 
General Dallaire, Colonel Murasampongo (interim Chief of Staff of the Army) and I went to the 
morgue to identify the UN Blue Helmets who had been killed.  After these murders, the 
consequences of which were unimaginable, this is what the Belgian ambassador had to say about 
our conversation: 

. . . a long telephone conversation that I had with the General, during the night of 7-8.  This had 
to be around 2, 3 am, and it was the General who called me.  And, what was the tenor of the call?  
“Don’t evacuate, don’t leave, stay, keep your countrymen here . . .  This had to be a catastrophe, 
a disaster for the [peace] process . . . We were trying to save Arusha and to save the pacification 
process, if the Belgians left . . .’  And maybe he said the same thing to my French and American 
colleagues, for example—in any case, he said to me:  ‘If you, the Belgians, . . . if you leave, we 
will feel abandoned.  And it is dangerous for the process.  We need your presence and your 
encouragement that . . . that you have symbolized to us until . . . until now in this difficult 

And on that evening of 7 April 1994, there were no elections for the president of the Crisis 
Committee.  In the absence of the [Defense—trans] Minister’s representative, being the senior- 
most and highest-ranking officer there, it was normal, unto automatic, that I preside over the 
meeting that I had just called. 

The statement of Colonel Ndengeyinka on 26 March 2010, mentioned above15, shows that he 
obviously was not present at the meeting on the evening of 7 April 1994.  How, then, could he 
comment on events in which he did not take part? 

b)  The meeting on the evening of April 8. 

The evening of 8 April 1994 (Bagosora was with the politicians), I led a meeting of the Crisis 
Committee to evaluate that day’s gathering of representatives of the political parties at the ESM 
[École Supérieure Militaire] to inquire as to the security situation in the country.  I welcomed 
them.  When they told us that they had formed a government, we were all very happy.  The 
country had finally found its leaders.  So the mission of the Crisis Committee, as it had been 
established by the commanders of the FAR in the meeting of the night before at the ESM, was 
accomplished.  They laid it out in these terms: 

The participants at the meeting set up a crisis committee charged with closely following the 
security situation in the country and lending support to political leaders.  It then called on the 
politicians to take advantage of their efforts to bring the country out of this crisis.”16  

3. The resumption of the war and the bad faith of the RPF. 

In citing Colonel Ndengeyinka, you state: 

 Ambassador Swinnen before the ICTR in the case of the Prosecutor v Ndindiliyimana et al, 22 October 2008, p 11. 
 Interview note from 26 March 2010, pg K0473923. 
 See the communiqué on the meeting at the ESM, a document entered in evidence as item D 529. 
We were all convinced, without the slightest equivocation, that the murder was at the instigation 
of the RPF.  We were concerned about making decisions in an atmosphere that would give us 
more latitude to better understand the real aims of the RPF and to find the most adapted 
solutions.” Pg 278. 

After the attack, I had doubts about whether the RPF would continue to abide by the accords.  
General Dallaire described this feeling when he wrote in his book about the telephone 
conversation I had on the afternoon of 7 April 1994 with the RPF representative on the CND: 

After hanging up, Ndindiliyimana said that there was nothing to be done.  The RPF insisted that 
the members of the Presidential Guard be arrested and imprisoned, and that the killings stop 
immediately.  Ndindiliyimana responded that everything was being done to take control of the 
situation, but, seeing Seth’s negative reaction, he concluded that the RPF would attack soon.”17 

When I was at the Ministry of Defense with General Dallaire and Colonel Bagosora, already 
actions were effectively being taken.  The Operations Commander of the Kigali Sector had gone 
to the Presidential Guard’s camp.  The Reconnaissance Battalion had gotten orders to intervene 
against elements of the Presidential Guard outside their camp, and Colonel Bagosora, himself, 
gave an order to the Commander of the Presidential Guard to regain control of his men.  General 
Dallaire acknowledged that an officer from the General Staff had come and that he had received 
an order to prepare to use his armor.18 

 But the RPF did not wait. 

UNAMIR, which was also responsible for security in the weapons-free zone, had still not been 
able to intervene before the RPF went on the attack.  Colonel Marchal, who was on the ground at 
the time, described the situation in these terms: 

But before even having had a chance to try something in this direction, something to suppress or 
arrest the massacres, the RPF came out.  So, they said: ‘If that doesn’t stop, I’m coming out,’ but 
they didn’t even wait for us to try and stop this and they came out immediately.  So, there is here, 
as I followed it, there is . . . these are the pretexts, the massacres were a false pretext.  They had 
to come out because these are personal considerations, but this conversation here, I followed it 
directly.  And UNAMIR didn’t even have the chance to try and respond in one way or another to 
the preoccupation of the RPF, its battalion came out before it had even completely enunciated its 
threat to come out.”19 

Several witnesses among the members of the RPF and other observers confirmed that the attacks 
began directly after the shoot-down.  Some elements of the RPF moved out of the CND on the 
night of 6 to 7 April 1994.  This is what Capt. Lemaire of the Belgian contingent of UNAMIR 
stated.  He responded to the Prosecutor’s question like this: 

Prosecutor:  “When did this fighting begin?” 
 General Roméo Dallaire:  J’ai serré la main du diable [Shake Hands with the Devil], pp 324-325 
 See General Dallaire’s testimony in the Mil I trial of Bagosora et al, on 23 January 2003, transcript pp 6-7 
 Testimony of Luc Marchal in the case of the Prosecutor v Ndindiliyimana et al, 21 January 2008, pg 73. 

Capt. Lemaire:  “For all intents and purposes, the combat began on 7 April.  As soon as the 
incidents started, as the plane blew up, the RPF people attempted to move out and a company 
was immediately sent to the City Center, while another part went north, to try and hook up with 
elements coming from the north.  And a goodly part stayed, still in defense around the 

Today there is a great deal of data on the RPF war, on the preparation and execution of its final 
phase, which was launched directly after the Chief of State was assassinated.  These crimes 
against the Peace that are at the origin of the Rwandan drama must not be underestimated so as to 
continue to support the obsolete versions of the RPF and its sponsors. 

General Dallaire clearly expressed that the RPF’s mobilization had another significance.  It is 
what Colonel Marchal reported in these terms: 

Mr. Prosecutor, I believe that if we isolate one particular element from a complex series of 
events, which, at the same moment overlap . . . but I believe that at this moment, we can explain 
everything.  The view we had on 7 April at 16.00 hours . . . but this is not exactly the same view 
we have now 14 years or so . . . 14 years later.  At the same time, there was a whole series of 
occurrences to which there has to be an answer. 

“And as I was saying, the possibility of analyzing, the possibility of becoming aware of exactly 
what happened, this possibility was practically non-existent on 7 April.  But what there is, that— 
that remains, in an objective sense, as the important element, and it was this that made General 
Dallaire take notice, is the resumption of hostilities. That is one step that had a completely 
different significance. 

“General Dallaire put it very well:  ‘Be careful, if you resume hostilities, you risk not ever 
knowing how to get back.’  So, in the move or moves that were taken this afternoon, and it was 
heavy with consequences because at this particular moment, exactly, the war was reignited and 
hostilities were resumed.  So General Dallaire was very clear, he wanted—and this is the 
message he had repeated since the night before—he wanted the situation to be kept under 
control.  In many ways, it had gotten immediately out of control, this is really right, but this is not 
why the thing failed.  We would not have been able to resolve the problem within a very short 
time.  But in the situation of the 7th at 16.00 hours, this is the start, the resumption of hostilities, 
which unleashed all that was to follow on the level of the Armed Forces.”21 

On 8 April 1994, around 10 am, General Dallaire came to tell us that the RPF did not want to 
listen to anything, that its troops were arrogant, but he was going to continue to act. 

Actually, he sent this message to Kagame: 

UNAMIR will not take any offensive action, because its mandate is only to be present for 
defensive actions in the maintenance of the peace. UNAMIR, the Gendarmerie and elements of 
 The deposition of Capt. Lemaire in the transcript of the Rutaganda case from 30 September 1997, p 153. 
 Testimony of Luc Marchal in the case of the Prosecutor v Ndindiliyimana et al, 21 January 2008, pp 73-74. 
the Army that remained loyal to Rwanda tried to stabilize the situation. UNAMIR did not take an 
offensive attitude, and if, tonight, the RPF makes a move from the CND or launches an offensive 
into the DeMilitarized Zone, this would be considered a serious violation of the ceasefire.  The 
peacekeeping mandate of UNAMIR would be essentially violated.  I ask that you reconsider these 
actions with consideration for the forces who remain loyal and UNAMIR, which is trying to 
reestablish order and to contain all aggression in Kigali.”22 

It is clear that for the FAR and UNAMIR, we tried to bring Kagame to reason but were up 
against a wall.  To hush up this situation by pretending to show the reality of the events of 1994 is 
a deliberate error aimed at covering up the grave responsibilities of the RPF in the Rwandan 

Mme Des Forges clearly recognized this responsibility.  She stated it thusly:   

I believe that I said clearly, in my declarations, that the RPF thought that victory was possible 
and they tried to obtain it.  I think it was their principal concern; I would not say it was the only 
thing that interested them, but, in light of the RPF’s behavior at that time, it is obvious that this 
concern was a priority over their other considerations, including the saving of human lives.  This 
is not a new position on my part.  It is clear that you have seen it in your careful examination of 
my writings.”23 

4. By killing the President, the RPF showed it was not interested in the Peace Plan, 
      the cornerstone of which they had just taken out. 

a)  Many witnesses and analysts have taken this view point.  Colonel Claeys, Intelligence Officer 
in the general staff of General Dallaire, stated: 

For me, the President was the person who signed the Arusha Accords. It was in this capacity 
that he must be considered; he took part in the execution of the Arusha Peace Plan, he was 
supposed to follow the signed Accords.  He was, thus, for me, the cement in the Peace Process, 

But, the attack was part of the RPF’s plan.  This terrorist act, committed on 6 April 1994, was 
written in the RPF’s plan to destabilize the country by creating chaos with subversive 
propaganda, the planting of mines and other explosives, as well as the targeted assassinations of 
political figures like, among others, Emmanuel Gapyisi, Felicien Gatabazi, Martin Bucyana, 
Fidele Rwambuka and elected officials of the sub-prefecture of Kirambo in the Prefecture of 
Ruhengeri.  The Gendarmerie, with the aid of French experts, conducted investigations for the 
purpose of identifying the perpetrators of terrorist acts in Rwanda.  Colonel Francis Damy, then 
an advisor to Chief of Staff, Colonel Robardey, and other expert French gendarmes with our 
investigators from the Gendarmerie, proved that it was actually the RPF that had conducted these 
terrorist operations and that its elements instigated the massacres.  However, we have a right to 
 General Roméo Dallaire:  J’ai serré la main du diable [Shake Hands with the Devil], p 323. 
 Statement by Mme Des Forges in the trial of Ndindiliyimana et al, 10 October 2006, transcripts, p 81 
. Testimony of Col. Claeys at the Ndindiliyimana et al trial on 18 October 2005, transcript p 75. 
wonder why the French authorities do not want to reveal the existence of this advisor to the Chief 
of Staff of the Gendarmerie and his work.  Why did these same French authorities put limitations 
on the testimony before the ICTR of the Officer directing the investigations and demand that 
statements remained sealed?25 

b)  I have always been convinced that the RPF carried out the attack against President 
Habyarimana’s plane.  The report of the committee of inquiry presided over by Dr. Mutsinzi tried 
to create confusion by pretending that at the time of my deposition before French investigative 
magistrate [Jean-Louis] Bruguière, I expressed doubt as to the involvement of the RPF in the 
missile-strike against Habyarimana’s executive jet.26  But, already by the end of July and the 
beginning of August 1994, in my first statements before the Belgian magistrate, Mr. N. Van 
Wissen, I expressed my conviction that the RPF was responsible for the attack.  Moreover, I 
submitted to Judge Bruguière the telegram that the commander of the RPF sent to his units 
bragging about the success of this criminal mission. 

c)  This telegram, intercepted 7 April by the radio-monitoring services of the Army indicates that 
the attack was carried out by the RPF with the aid of their Belgian friends27.  This message has 
confirmed what was considered until then a rumor, especially among the officers of  UNAMIR in 
their situation report, “KIBAT [Kigali Battalion—trans] log of 6 April - 19 April 1994.”  
Speaking of 7 April 1994, they write: 

At 06.03, according to information from the C6, S6 warned all stations that a rumor was 
circulating that the Belgians had shot down the President’s plane.”28  

This was confirmed by Colonel Dewez in his testimony in the Military trials [I & II].  He stated: 

Now, as to your question about the rumor that the Belgians had shot down the plane, I actually 
heard this kind of rumor going around that evening.  The precise time, I don’t know; I think it 
was sort of at the beginning of the morning of 7 April.”29 

 See the Mucyo Report:  1. 3.2.2 The DAMI, p 27:  “The DAMI gendarmerie train the gendarmes in the maintenance of order 
and participate in intelligence gathering, notably through the DAMI’s judiciary policy.  Notice that the Chief of Staff of the 
Gendarmerie also had a French advisor who was totally hidden by the official description of the MIP.” 

See the request of 10 July 2008, “Augustin Ndindiliyimana’s urgent application for hearing the testimony of Colonel Michel 
Robardey by video-link.”   The statements and correspondence have been sealed. 

 Report of the inquiry into the causes and the circumstances of and the responsibilities for the attack of 6 April 1994 against the 
Rwandan presidential Falcon 50, tail-number 9XP-NN.  Report dated 20 April 2009 of the Investigative Committee established by 
the government of Kigali on 16 April 2007. 
 This telegram, entered as evidence in the case of the Prosecutor v Ndindiliyimana et al as item number D257, among other 
things states that:  “The Chief has gotten back to Kampala without a problem and the communications of our elements in-country 
with his services have been carried out in the best of conditions, and, with the aid of the Belgian community and our elements in 
the South of the country, we have been helped to succeed in our mission (attack), which was easily executed. . . .  It remains to be 
seen if Bikomagu will agree to come up from the South to meet us in the main city in the enemy country, with the South currently 
decapitated.”  The radio operator, who testified for the Prosecution in the trials of Bagosora et al and Karemera et al, admitted to 
having intercepted this message. 
 KIBAT:  Log 6 April – 19 April 1994, para 18. A.  Document ICTR UNKIBAT-01, item number K008 1815-98.  
 Deposition of Colonel Dewez in the trial of Bagosora et al, transcript of 24 June 2005, pp 3-4 & 8. 
5. The coup d’état by Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana. 

On pages 201 and 202, you have written this: 

It happened on 2 April 1994 when she was accused of attempting a coup d’État with the officers 
from the South whom she had called together the night before at her home. . . .  Another 
participant, Lt. Pascal Baziruwiha, was stopped the next day on the orders of Augustin 
Ndindiliyimana, who was very irritated to learn from his G2 of the organization of such a 
meeting by Agathe Uwilingiyimana. . . .  Then, in the emotional mood of the times being afraid of 
accusations of approving of this ‘putsch’ and of being put in danger, Augustin Ndindiliyimana’s 
family, at that time vacationing at their home in Nyaruhengeri, and Edouard Karemera’s family, 
who were also staying there, sought refuge at the home of Colonel Gatsinzi. . . .” 

a)  Actually, it was my former G2 officer, Major Karangwa, who first informed me of this 
gathering organized by Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana.  However, the fact that the 
Karemera family was at my place in Nyaruhengeri around 15 April 1994, fleeing the RPF, had 
nothing to do with this so-called meeting of 2 April 1994 at the home of Prime Minister Agathe.  
As to what you have written about Lt. Pascal Baziruwiha, this can only be the result of flights of 
fantasy by your informants.         

b)  The examination of events, and some of the elements in the investigation into the deaths of 
Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana and the UN Blue Helmets, convinced me that this so- 
called ‘coup d’état’ was an integral part of the RPF’s plans to follow-up on the attack against 
President Habyarimana.  In effect, the Southern Officers (the moderates) were going to be called 
to the Prime Minister’s house.  They were then going to be seen as those responsible for the 
shoot-down and then attacked by the Northern Officers.  This confrontation was meant to 
provoke chaos with the FAR and would give the RPF, alone or with its supporters, the 
opportunity to step in, restore order, and then seize state power.  In this way, the problem of the 
perpetrators of the attack and the taking of power by the RPF would be solved. 

c)  The questions of Professor Reyntjens, who used several tricks to make me admit that I had 
taken part in that famous gathering at Prime Minister Agathe’s, made my analysis stronger.  The 
Professor’s goal was at that time to create his hypothesis of the assassination of the President by a 
democratic coup d’état of the moderate officers (cfr Reyntjens, “Three Days That Shook 
History,” pp 33 & ss). 

d)  The idea for this plan was in the mind of General Dallaire, himself, who, having been invited 
to the meeting on the night of 6-7 April 1994 to manage the crisis, found himself disconcerted 
when he arrived.  He wrote: 

Was it a well-organized coup d’État or were these officers there to keep the peace until a person 
could be chosen to take power?  The presence of Bagosora shook up the meager hope that I was 
entertaining:  that if there was to be a coup d’État, it would be one planned by the moderate 
elements in the Army and the Gendarmerie.”30 
 Romeo Dallaire, op cit, p 291. 

e)  A series of actions by the RPF and other facts confirmed this plan. 

- In fact, the RPF rejected the peace agreement in favor of one in which it would be the only 
master.  The process of taking power had to be carried out very quickly.  According to the RPF, 
by the 12th of April 1994, the war had to end. 

The RPF claimed to have 2,400 troops in the capital.  They said they would wait for the 
evacuation of foreigners to be finished before taking control of the city.  They even stated that 
they thought they could reach this objective during the day on Wednesday.  General Dallaire 
estimated that the FAR had no chance to defeat the RPF.”31 

- Already on 13 April 1994, the RPF had demanded that the UN Security Council create an 
International Tribunal to judge those criminals who had committed genocide, a list of whom had 
already been prepared.32  The trials were certainly meant to be quick, such as was the trial of 
Froduard Karamira and the other people executed along with him. 

-  On 13 April the Belgian authorities initiated motions at the UN for the withdrawal of UNAMIR 
because one of the warring sides was about to occupy certain strategic points (read: the taking of 
Kigali by the RPF). 

-  Opinion makers were already onside to convince the International Community that the RPF’s 
solution was well founded. 

d) The intelligence services of UNAMIR had been aware of this RPF plan since January 1994.  
The report of the intelligence officer, Lt. Nees, stated that: 

Rumors are growing in Kigali that the RPF have already arrived in the capital with 3.000 
personnel, including 600 officially in the CND. In the North there are also 15.000 RPF troops 
awaiting a sign to carry out a coup from Kigali. This explains their patience and their passive 
attitude towards the institution of a government.” (Annex 1).33 

This information, far from being a rumor, was in fact part of a game-plan for the present and 
future situations the RPF found itself in.34 Today, the actors in and sponsors of this plan to 
create conflicts around Prime Minister Agathe have failed.  The perpetrators of the attack and 
their backers, who were well-aware that the death of the President would be the principal cause of 
the Rwandan drama, at first put out a story to make the world believe that it was an accidental 
 Confidential report from the Belgian General Intelligence Service, dated 13 April 1994, entered as evidence in the trial of the 
Prosecutor v Ndindiliyimana et al as item number 362. 
 - See the list of presumed genocidaires of the first order. 
     - See the outgoing cable from Annan to Booh-Booh and the letter from the RPF to the Security Council signed by Claude 
Dusaidi on 13 April 1994 demanding an International Tribunal for Rwanda.  Letter is ICTR No. L0006461. 
 Report of Lt. Nees, dated 21 January 1994, re the planned coup d’état by the RPF. 
 ‘L’environnement actuel et l’avenir de l’organization’ [‘the present and future situations the RPF found itself in’—trans]:  
Document cited in your book, “Les crises politique au Burundi et au Rwanda (1993-1994)” [Political Crises in Burundi and 
Rwanda (1993-1994—trans]. 
plane crash, so they then could blame this attack on extremist Hutus.  This thesis was quickly 
abandoned because of all the evidence that pointed to the RPF.  After that, the plan became to 
bury the whole story.  Very recently, the RPF returned to the by-now bankrupt theory that 
extremist Hutus carried out the attack.35 

Here we have to salute your courage, and it is a great step forward on your part, Professor, to 
have recognized that the RPF was responsible for the attack.  But must we leave it at that? 

6. Errors in understanding and the death of Agathe. 

a)  The RPF planners committed a grave error in thinking that Prime Minister Agathe 
Uwilingiyimana  was going to tell the Rwandan people and the world that President 
Habyarimana’s plane had met with an accident.  She had already been accused by RTLM [Radio 
Télévision Libre des Milles Collines—trans] of having fomented a coup d’état two days before 
the attack, and she no longer agreed to play this game.  She knew who the perpetrators of the 
attack were and of the involvement of the Belgian [UN] Blue Helmets who had been sent to her 
residence.  From that point on, Agathe was of no more value to those who were expecting her to 
become involved in their plan, and she even constituted a danger to them because she knew too 

b)  She signed her own death warrant when she refused to be evacuated in a UNAMIR armored 
vehicle, while Faustin Twagiramungu accepted this service.  General Dallaire’s second in 
command, General Anyidoho, described the situation like this: 

The Force Commander reached the Prime Minister on the telephone and offered to take her out 
of her house.  She declined.  She was indeed a bold woman.”36 

If Prime Minister Agathe had been willing to make such a speech, this offer would have been the 
chance to do so with all the security that the UNAMIR could offer, and, moreover, the Director 
of ORINFOR [Rwandan Bureau of Information and Broadcasting—trans] had even offered her 
the opportunity to broadcast the speech by telephone from her residence.37 

c)  General Dallaire’s attitude should be noted here because, when he passed right by the place 
where PM Agathe was being hidden, he did nothing to save her and said nothing about the Prime 
Minister’s plight when he got to the meeting at the ESM.  In this same sense, the Belgian [UN] 
 Report of the inquiry into the causes and circumstances of, and the responsibilities for, the attack of 6 April 1994 against the 
Rwandan President’s plane, a Falcon 50, tail number 9XP-NN.  A Report by the Rwandan government dated 20 April 2009. 
 Brigadier Henry Kwami Anyidoho, Deputy Force Commander and Chief of Staff of UNAMIR Forces in Rwanda.  “Guns Over 
Kigali,” Fountain Publishers, Ltd., 1998, p 24. 
 The Director of ORINFOR, Mr. Jean Marie Vianney Higiro, wrote to Mr. Hervé Deguine of Reporter sans frontières (France) 
on 29 September 1994:  “Around 4.20 am, I called her (Prime Minister Agathe) to ask her to prepare to record her speech over the 
telephone, because it was impossible to send anyone out to her residence to do it.” 
Blue Helmets were simply sacrificed. 

On page 203, you write: 

Basically, unlike other important figures in the MDR and the Opposition, Agathe Uwilingiyimana 
organized this meeting with very few reservations, considering, contrary to a wide-spread notion, 
she never subscribed to the pro-RPF positions of Faustin Twagiramungu.  Within the Opposition, 
she was considered to be much more with the ‘nationalists,’ like Emmanuel Gapyisi and Félicien 
Gatabazi, that is to say, with those who refused to accept that the RPF should seize power.” 

a)  Prime Minister Agathe, despite her differences with Faustin Twagiramungu in their relations 
with the RPF, had become an enemy of the RPF, especially after 23 March 1994 when she 
acknowledged that the CDR party was in line with the Arusha Accords.  In a communiqué, she 
let the Rwandan people know that.  (Annex 2)38  The CDR took this as a free pass into the 
transitional institutions (Annex 3).39  Because of all this, the RPF refused to take part in the 
inauguration of the transitional institutions planned for 25 March 1994 and threatened to organize 
demonstrations inside the demilitarized zone.  Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana had 
crossed the Rubicon, and she won the support of the diplomatic corps, who, on 28 March, signed 
a communiqué recognizing the CDR’s right to have a representative in the transitional assembly. 

b)  Professor, do you not think that Agathe Uwilingiyimana could have suffered the same fate as 
the nationalists you mentioned, Mr. Gatabazi and Mr. Gapyisi?  

 7.  The purging of “ibyitso” officers, a list of twelve officers, p 506ss 

a)  I have never seen the list mentioned in your book, nor do I know of this meeting on 17 May 
1994.  I went to Murambi on my own for my own reasons. 

The term “ibyitso” was abundantly used with the arrests following the outbreak of war with the 
RPF in October 1990 to refer to those who collaborated with the aggressors, civilian or military.  
More particularly, within the FAR, certain officers, those known to have had set backs on the 
battlefield, were considered, rightly or wrongly, to be “ibyitso.”  I will cite the particular cases of:  
Colonel of Gendarmes Uwihoreye (Gisenyi), Major Ngira of Ruhengeri, Major Mutambuka 
(Byumba), Major Habyarimana (Byumba), Major Nteziryayo (Butare), Major Sabakunzi 
(Gikongoro).  Fortunately, the government did the right thing by restoring the rights to certain of 
these officers. 

With the politico-military evolution of the country between 1990 and 1994, the term was so 
popular that it was central to propaganda and all suspicions.  But it could be applied universally 
 Speech of Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana on 23 March 1994 on Radio Rwanda. 
 Message from Mr. Booh-Booh to Mr. Annan, dated 23 March 1994:  Solution found to CDR problem. 
to all those who sided with the RPF. 

When the RPF resumed the war after the assassination of the President of the Republic, it 
intensified its propaganda with an eye toward dividing its adversaries and thereby weakening 
them.  In its campaign of disinformation, it tried on several occasions to exacerbate the North- 
South antagonisms as a way to feed the chaos by spreading false stories about how the Northern 
officers eliminated Southerners by inviting them to join their ranks.  It is in this spirit that Radio 
Muhabura [RPF radio on which RTLM was based—trans] announced that Colonel Rutayisire, 
Major Karangwa and myself had been assassinated.  Colonel Rutayisire and I reacted vigorously 
on Radio Rwanda to deny these falsehoods spewed by the RPF to divide the FAR and 
Rwandans, in general.40 

b)  It is, furthermore, this RPF strategy of destabilization unto destruction of the FAR by 
subversion that is described in the letter from Edouard Karemera in these terms: 

The RPF continues to base its arguments for the division of the Army on the bad treatment 
received by Southern officers with you at the top of the list.” (Annex 4).41 

c)  Unfortunately, it must be noted that this line of propaganda was pursued to demonstrate that 
the FAR was not a coherent resistance force.  This is what you tried to show in your chapter on 
the elimination of the “ibyitso,” but the reality is something else. 

I do not know how you came by this list of twelve officers, all of whom I know.  I worked with 
most of them before as well as after the attack on the President’s plane.  Since the night of 6 April 
1994 and during the war that followed, I was with certain of them until I left the country in June 
of 1994.  Until then, I knew the situations of each and every one of them, and what their major 
problems were. 

From 6 April 1994 until my departure, except for Colonel Ndengeyinka, who was sanctioned for 
un-professionalism, I know of no one among the officers you cite who received even demerits.  
Some were promoted and all remained in their assignments until the end of the war.  As concerns 
Colonel Ndengeyinka, he was suspended from his duties in the beginning of June 1994.  He was 
not the only one, as Colonel Munyarugarama (Ruhengeri) and Lt.-Col. Nkundiye (Giseny) were 
also suspended under the same conditions.  

More specifically, Colonel Balthazar Ndengeyinka was appointed Commander of the Operations 
Sector of Bugesera in mid-May 1994, replacing Colonel Munyarugarama, who was seen to be 
weak.  Unfortunately, Colonel Ndengeyinka fared no better than his predecessor.  He very 
quickly abandoned his sector to set up a command post in Myanza (about 20 km from the front).  
 See the presentation by Colonel Rutayisire on Radio Rwanda on 22 April 1994 seeking pacification and a ceasefire from the 
RPF, in the document “Contributions of the FAR to the search for the truth,” (pp 118 & 126).   See the presentation of General 
Ndindiliyimana on Radio Rwanda on 22 April 1994, document entered in evidence at trial as D504. 
 Letter from Edouard Karemera, dated 26 April 1994, entered in evidence at the trial of Ndindiliyimana et al, as item 507. 
He gave the order to cut off the bridge from Rwabusoro over the Akanyaru river behind his 
troops who were still in Bugesera.  His soldiers rebelled and some of them refused to continue 

It is surprising to hear Colonel Ndengeyinka talk to you about this list of officers that he has 
never before mentioned in any of his other statements.  So, for example, you note that in his 
statement of 15 June 1995, Colonel NDENGEYINKA stated that he, himself, from 2 June 1994, 
was called a “ibyitso.”  He says: 

Personally, I did my job until 2 June 1994, the day I was suspended because two or three days 
before I had told Prime Minister Kambanda to change his policies.  I was immediately called an 

In the interview you had with Colonel Ndengeyinka on 24 August 2004, he told you that it was 
Colonel Muberuka who had informed him of the existence of this list of 12 officers on which both 
their names appeared.  Muberuka had, himself, been informed by Semanza.  So this is hear-say of 
the third degree.  Moreover, you write that Semanza denied these facts. 

To my knowledge, Colonel Muberuka was never suspected of being an “ibyitso.”  It must be 
recalled that this officer, who originated from Kigali, was commander of the logistical base of the 
Rwandan Army from 1989 to 1992.  From June 1992, he was in charge of the important military 
camp at Kanombe, a duty he held at the same time as he commanded the Operational Sector of 
the City of Kigali.  From April until mid-May 1994, he was commander of military operations in 
the Ops Sector of the City of Kigali, and he acquitted himself correctly in his duties until he was 
wounded.  He was chosen by the Government to replace me as Chief of Staff of the Gendarmerie 
when I was named ambassador.  I find it difficult to imagine that the Government would, on 5 
June 1994, have named him to the post of Chief of Staff of the Gendarmerie, if they had already 
identified him, on 17 May 1994, as one of the traitors whose heads they would have rolled, as 
you write on page 506. 

You have Lt.-Col. Rwabalinda on this list of officers, and you say, correctly, that he was an 
advisor to the Chief of Staff of the Army.  I know that it was on the recommendation of the Chief 
of Staff of the Army that Rwabalinda, who at that same time served as liaison officer to 
UNAMIR, was sent on a mission to Paris.  And no one would send a traitor on such a mission.  
Rwabalinda remained with the Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Army until he was killed by the 
RPA in an ambush in July 1994.  You know that the propagandists attributed his death to the 
Command of the Rwandan Army, which was a typical strategy trope by detractors of the FAR. 

As to Colonel Anselme Nshizirungu, he was an advisor to Prime Minister Agathe 
Uwilingiyimana.  Since then, he has not set foot within the FAR, he was retired and no longer on 
 See the Ndengeyinka testimony before the investigatory commission of Damien Vandermeersch, on 15 June 1995.  PV No 148 
Dossier No CRIM/DA-KK/KGL/95. 
the battle roster of the Rwandan Armed Forces. 

d)  As to what concerns me, I had particular problems with the Defense Minister, Augustin 
Bizimana, at that time.  The letter from Edouard Karemera gives an idea of the gravity of this: 

“Regarding the position of the Minadef [Minister of Defense—trans] on certain questions, I am 
ready to take the risk of seriously discussing them with him . . .”43 
The Minister of Defense had no confidence in me as his Chief of Staff.  He made this especially 
clear in what concerned the security of the Ministers as shown by E. Karemera in his letter 
mentioned above.  I was sent to Murambi several times by the General Staff to invite the Defense 
Minister to Kigali so he could see these problems to be solved at his level or submitted to the 
government.  On these occasions, he seemed wary and often just did not come.  He refused to 
transfer an undisciplined and aggressive officer from my general staff.  These facts are verifiable.  
These are the questions I discussed with the Prime Minister and the President of the Republic, 
and not this alleged list of “ibyitso.” 

e)  Following the above-mentioned RPF broadcasts on Radio Muhabura, Colonel Rutayisre, 
Major Karangwa and I were targeted by killers of every stripe.  In my case, this situation was 
exploited by Radio Milles Collines (RTLM), who called on the population to stop my vehicle 
because I was transporting RPF combatants:  this being an allusion to the Tutsi gendarmes in my 
escort and the people I was trying to bring to safety.  I do not know of a case of another officer 
who lived through such a situation.  Despite the danger, my colleagues and I did our job of taking 
threatened people to places of greater security. 

f)  Prime Minister Kambanda had information from his intelligence services that there were 
threats made against me.  He stated, in effect: 

I further attest that I was informed by my services that General Ndindiliyimana ran many life- 
threatening risks because of his positive attitude toward a return to peace.  It was then that I 
decided to name him Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, with a view toward 
removing these threats.”44 

You affirm on page 506: 

On returning to Kigali on 19 May, around 4-5 am, Ndindiliyimana had Colonel Rutayisire and 
Major Pierre Claver Karangwa come to him and urged them to take protective measure without 
giving any explicit reasons why.  He immediately prepared his family to flee and arranged for his 
own departure.” 

 Letter from Edouard Karemera, dated 26 April 1994. 
 See the written declaration of Prime Minister Kambanda entered in evidence as item 449. 
You add at the bottom of the page:  “Ndindiliyimana’s testimony could not be taken.”  

g)  I was offered the post of Ambassador on 5 June 1994.  The security situation was badly 
degraded and my family, like those of my colleagues, had left home.  I left on 16 June 1994 and 
made the decision not to return to the country.  Before leaving Rwanda, I encouraged my 
collaborators to remain alert to their security and announced that I was leaving on a mission 
abroad.  Once again I attest that I have never spoken to anyone on the alleged list of 12 officers 
that never really existed.  It only reveals the imagination of certain individuals who, for some 
unadmitted interests, go until they include my name.  With the exception of Colonel 
Ndengeyinka, we notice that no one else speaks of this alleged list. 

In any case, if this list of “ibyitso” had existed, these officers would have been the first to know 
about it since some of them (like Colonel Rutayisire and Major Karangwa) worked in Intelligence. 

 8.  The government falls back to Murambi. 

One wonders if Théoneste Bagosora and Augustin Ndindiliyimana deliberately arranged for the 
Interim Government to withdraw to Murambi (Gitarama Prefecture) before it had exhausted all 
opportunities for negotiation required by the majority of the General Staff.” P 347. 

It was not just the majority of officers in the General Staff who believed in the capability of the 
Interim Government to accomplish its missions, but many other Rwandans believed in this as 

a)  For the Interim Government to leave Kigali for Murambi in the Prefecture of Gitarama meant 
that 12 April 1994 was a day of great risk and confusion.  The Commander of the Operational 
Sector of the City of Kigali, Colonel Muberuka and the Chief of Staff of the Army, Colonel 
Gatsinzi, reported the situation in the capital to Defense Minister Augustin Bizimana early that 
morning.  The enemy had attacked the Camp of the Gendarmerie at Jali and occupied the high- 
ground in Jali.  The refugee camp at Nyacyonga was attacked, and this led to a tidal wave of about 
one million displaced persons breaking over the City of Kigali and on the highway toward 
Gitarama, which was, at that time, under threat from the enemy. 

b)  On the other side of the city, the RPF had been in Kicukiro and on Mount Rebero since the 
afternoon of 11 April 1994, and controlled the highway out of Kigali toward Bugesera and the 
two roads connecting Kanombe with Kigali.  This situation was confirmed in the 12 April 1994 
report to General Dallaire from his Intelligence Services, which notably said the following: 

“1.-  On 11 April 94, about 300 RPF liaised with their friendly troops at [the] CND around 
1600B.  02 other battalions (900) were following. 

2.-  RPF infiltrated into Kicukiru, Gikondo and Rebero and made contact with governmental 
troops.” (Annex 5)45 

c)  On 12 April 1994, Colonel Rwabalinda, the Liaison Officer with UNAMIR, informed the 
Defense Minister of an imminent attack on the City of Kigali.  This information was confirmed 
by the Belgian Intelligence Services: 

“The RPF spokesperson, Christine Umutoni, confirmed from Kampala that the RPF was awaiting 
orders from Mulindi to take Kigali.”46 

 d)  The Defense Minister went on to inform the President [Sindikubwabo—trans] who then 
made the decision to leave Kigali with the government to wait and see how the situation evolved.  
Bagosora and I at no time deliberately organized the fallback of the government to Murambi.  I 
must say that as to the setting up of this government, I did not take part in the work of the 
politicians, but I referred to the declarations of Prime Minister Kambanda.47  The FAR did not get 
involved in this chaotic process.48  The FAR never questioned the legality [of the Interim 

My conclusion is that the officers who gave this information to the Minister were concerned 
about the security of the government, whose protection against the threat of the RPF and all the 
confusion created by the infiltrations and the mass of refugees was hard to assure.  I received an 
order from Minister of Defense Augustin Bizimana to arrange an escort for the government to 
Gitarama, and the Chief of Staff of the Army put at my disposal two armored vehicles to make 
the trip from Nyabugogo to the Nyabarongo river. 

 9.  The RPF, certain of victory, refused all negotiations.  

a)  During the evening of 12 April 1994, the  gravity of the situation was confirmed to such a 
degree that the Chief of Staff of the Army sent a communiqué demanding a ceasefire from and 
negotiations with the RPF.  This decision was so hugely important that, on learning of it, I 
reacted as General Gatsinzi indicated in his 25 June 1995 letter to Professor Reyntjens.  Gatsinzi 

 UNAMIR Military division inter-office memorandum: Complementary information To FC from MIO through COO, DFC 12 
April 1994.  No du document L0025. 
 General Intelligence Service, 12 April 1994, Document entered in evidence as item number 496. 
 Declaration of Prime Minister Kambanda, op. cit. 
 In the interview he gave on 10 April 1994, Colonel BEM Gatsinzi, who was the Interim Chief of Staff of the Army, said:  “So, 
steps were taken and carried out so that peace would return, uh, more . . . more and more progressively in the country and it is 
the . . . number one concern of the Crisis Committee that peace return and that, uh, the political authorities be able to resume the 
direction of the State to give all the instructions and do all that is born . . . of their power to return peace, for a normal life, 
organized so that the government is able to work.  We also helped to facilitate the bringing together of parties of the Left and the 
Right to decide for themselves the future of the country.  The military did not get involved at all in these encounters, it only 
facilitated them, their contacts and all the decisions that were made by the government and put in place by the government were 
produced by the political authorities.  The military did not get involved.  [Radio Rwanda:  Interview of Colonel Gatsinzi on 10 
April 1994.”  ICTR document number K0278476] 
General Ndindiliyimana telephoned me from Gitarama when he learned of this communiqué (of 
12 April) to tell me that he was entirely in agreement with us and with its content.  He may have 
tried to convince the Government that had left us, but not with any ligh-heartedness, to establish 
dialogue with the RPF.”49 

b)  For the FAR, the situation was truly critical, as can be seen in the evaluation Mr. Booh-Booh 
sent to Mr. Annan, that the RPF was very close to victory and that “12 April ’94 was a 
reasonable [sic] successful day for the RPF.”  (Annex 6)50  The Government was not in a 
position to enter into negotiations after it had cleared out of Kigali and at the moment when the 
RPF delivered an ultimatum that all foreign troops must leave the country in 48 hours so they 
could then take the capital city.  The RPF, rather than respond to the demand by the FAR for a 
ceasefire, intensified the infiltration of Kigali from every direction and demanded the UN 
Security Council establish a Tribunal to judge the genocidaires.  (Annexes 7 and 11)51 

c)  The Government designated me to conduct the negotiations.  (Annex 8)52  Finally, the RPF 
bluntly refused any negotiations between militaries.  (Annex 9)53  It was then that the 
Government, on the invitation of the Ugandan and Tanzanian Presidents, took the negotiations in 
hand and brought together Minister Ntagerura with General Gatsinzi and Colonel Ntiwiragabo.  
The latter two officers signed a ceasefire protocol on behalf of the Government.54  The RPF’s 
conduct was intractable.  

Furthermore, the analysts of the American Secret Service came to the conclusion that since the 
resumption of hostilities, the RPF could not accept any negotiations because they had not as yet 
taken Kigali, and everything that they did disingenuously accept was meant to further pit the 
FAR against the Government and to amuse their International gallery.55 

 We referred to this letter from General Gatsinzi in the [Mil II] trial of Ndindiliyimana et al.  See the transcripts of 30 May 
2006,  p 31. 
 Special Sitrep 12 April 1994:  The objective of cutting off Kanombe (airport, Camp Kanombe and the Army base) from the 
city [Kigali—trans] was decisive. 
 Sitrep covering the period 120600B to 130600B Apr ’94 from Booh-Booh to Annan; See the letter from Mr. Claude Dusaidi 
sent by Mr. Annan to Mr. Booh-Booh.  ICTR document No L0006461. 
 See “imvaho No 1046 spesiyali mata 1994 Amakuru y’u Rwanda umunsi kuwundi”:  It was I whom the Interim Government 
designated to conduct its negotiations with full powers.  In a meeting of a select group of officers with General Dallaire was 
convened so that negotiations concerning Kigali would be conducted by those military leaders who were there, but I intervened at 
a higher level.  The pre-conditions presented to the RPF, about carrying out security operations and actions toward the 
pacification of the country conjointly with UNAMIR, the RPF and the Gendarmerie, were a strong opening and did not go against 
anything in the peace accords.  The RPF refused to negotiate with the military, and, when the government took over the 
negotiations, it refused to negotiate with them, saying it wanted to negotiate with the military, with whom they had just bluntly 
refused to deal. 
 Letter bluntly refusing negotiations signed by Kanyarengwe, document entered as evidence in the [Mil II] trial of 
Ndindiliyimana et al, number D 212. 
 Ceasefire Protocol signed in Gbadolite by General Gatsinzi and Colonel Ntiwiragabo; document entered as evidence in the 
[Mil II] trial of Ndindiliyimana et al as item D 250. 
 See ICTR document D-661, entered as evidence in the case of the Prosecutor v Ndindiliyimana et alii.  This is a declassified 
American document: Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 58-113012, 10 June 1994) “Unless its advance stalls completely, 
the RPF will not agree to any lasting ceasefire at least until Kigali falls.  Any talks the RPF agrees to before then will be 
calculated to weaken its opponents by dividing the military from the interim government and against itself—and to 
impress the international galleries.” 
 10.  Individual conflicts and hidden maneuvers. 

“As a former officer in the FAR described it:  All twelve of these officers were chosen as targets 
They were supposed to be among the officers resistant to orders from the self-proclaimed 
They embarrassed the government’s plans; 
They knew things that could compromise the genocidaires . . .” p 509 

In order to join the ranks of the RPF, some officers had to adopt its version of events and, for 
certain of them, the easiest way into the Front was to get refugee status in a Western country.  All 
were obliged to speak the common language of the RPF or they might be considered 
genocidaires.  Moreover, because of their previous functions, they ran the risk of winding up in 
the crosshairs of RPF informants, especially when they appeared on lists of presumed, first-class 

I know of officers among the twelve who made sensational statements against people to the 
Prosecutor but then later retracted these statements and refused to testify for him.  This attitude is 

And moreover, everybody knows there were conflicts between individuals, notably the one 
between Colonel Rusatira and Colonel Bagosora.  This is what you might call an ancient feud.56  
They expressed their antagonism at a meeting of the Crisis Committee on the morning of 8 April 
1994.  Rusatira did not want Bagosora to take part in the Crisis Committee. I calmed down the 
confrontation between these two officers by leading the meeting myself.  

I should point out that it was I who got Colonel Rusatira to come to the meeting on the night of 6- 
7 April 1994.  I knew of his relations with the RPF and especially with Colonel Kanyarengwe, 
then president of the RPF, and with important American representatives.  I counted on his 
cooperation in managing the crisis and his contribution to facilitating contacts.  The officers 
present at the meeting and I noticed that he left before we had finished examining the whole 
situation.  That was noted in the reflections of “Contributions of the FAR to the search for truth.”  
There it is written: 

“In the course of the meeting, Colonel Léonidas Rusatira, Commander of the École Supérieure 
Militaire [Military Academy—trans], a senior officer with great experience, and General Roméo 
Dallaire, Force Commander of UNAMIR, were invited to take part.  Rusatira, however, showed 
very little interest in the meeting, so little that he left the meeting before it adjourned.”57 

Today we know where he went, and it was Belgian Ambassador Swinnen who revealed this 
during his deposition before the ICTR. 

The presiding judge asked Ambassador Swinnen the question: 

 This confrontation is written off as an ancient feud in a footnote on 280 of your book. 
 Contributions of the FAR to the search for truth, op. cit. 
Q:  “So, here’s what I said:  you stated that on the 7th in the morning, around 8 o’clock, you were 
getting ready to go to the Embassy, but you weren’t able to do that, so what stopped you from 
going to the Embassy, that morning?”  

A: “ The previous night, before midnight, I think, I had a visit from Colonel Rusatira, and he told 
me:  ‘Ambassador, listen, if I were you, I . . . I would not walk too much outside your residence.’ 

“He even told me that I must be or that I was on a list of men to be killed or eliminated, or 

Obviously Colonel Rusatira is one of those who caused the failure of the last-chance meeting at 
the US Ambassador’s residence, a meeting arranged by the UN Representative Mr. Booh-Booh.  
Until then I did not know that this officer had other projects.  

It seems right to assume that your intervention, as well as that of Mme Des Forges, into Brigadier 
General Léonidas Rusatira’s judiciary file, with the intentions of quashing the ICTR arrest 
warrant against him and bringing about his subsequent liberation, were meant to keep the cover 
on Pandora’s box.  Rusatira, himself, was called as a witness before the ICTR, but preferred to 
remain in hiding.  You see why we are not further down the road to discovering the truth about 
the Rwandan drama.  

As to Rusatira’s feelings about me, I will not comment here because he has expressed them in his 
own book.59  To put it simply, I dare think he could never accept my being designated Minister of 
Defense in December 1991 when I held a lower rank than his.   

Colonel Rusatira was not alone in undertaking his own actions.  This was also the case with 
Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana, who, in all these meetings, never had her authority 
questioned or was ever stopped from going to speak on the radio.  General Dallaire confirmed 
this in his responses to questions on this subject: 

“Q.  Did you inform the military leaders of your decision to have the Prime Minister speak on the 

A.  No. 

Q.  Can you tell us why? 

A.  Because I considered the situation to be precarious on a security level . . . precarious on a 
security level for her because of the fact that several times already . . . during the months that we 
had protected her, and that the fewer people who knew about this operation the better.”60 

 Deposition of Belgian Ambassador to Rwanda Mr. Swinnen in the ICTR case of Ndindiliyimana et al, transcript of 22 October 
2008, p 57. 
 See Léonidas Rusatira’s book, “Rwanda, le droit à l’espoir” [The Right to Hope] Edition l’Harmatan 2005, p 184.  The officer 
of whom he speaks without citing his name, who was made Defense Minister, was Colonel Augustin Ndindiliyimana. 
 Deposition of General Dallaire in the [Mil I] trial of Bagosora et al, transcript of 22 January 2004, p 90. 
Also, the measures taken by Colonel Bagosora to counter this operation were of his own 
initiatives.  The officers were never informed about it during any of these meetings. 

Monsieur le Professeur, 

It would be a great pity if a researcher held immutable positions and did research only into 
information that agreed with his theses.  In my opinion, such an activity is contrary to the ethics 
of a true scientist like you.  I also know that it is not easy to take back what one has said.  I had 
the same experience with Professor Reyntjens, with whom I had long discussions to try and make 
him understand that there are many manipulations in the Rwandan dossier.  He finally discovered 
this for himself and gave honest testimony in his letter of 31 December 1997.  He wrote me to 
this effect: 

“I cosign your questions.  There are obviously people who are not interested in discovering the 
truth and who, on the contrary, pursue political strategies, sometimes Belgo-Belgain, sometimes 
Rwando-Rwandan.  However, I am not without hope that the Truth will triumph in the end.”  
(Annex 10)61 

For my part, I am convinced that your position as a scientist of international renown will ever 
guide you in search of the Truth, transcending all passions, the settling of scores and the personal 
positions of individuals who take advantage of you to promote versions of history that are suited 
to their interests. 

I have no doubt that you will examine my observations in the most objective manner possible and 
that you will correct the errors that I have pointed out.  Thus you will have contributed to the 
recovery of the history of my country and you will honor the memory of all the victims of the 
Rwandan drama. 

Veuillez agréer, monsieur le Professeur, l’expression de ma haute consideration. 


        Augustin Ndindiliyimana 

[Translated from the French by Christopher Black and Mick Collins.-- CM/P] 
 Letter from Professor Reyntjens to me after my observations on some passages of the Report of the Parliamentary Investigative 
Commission regarding me, personally, and the Gendarmerie, generally, dated 2 February 1998. 
Annex 1:  Report of Lt Nees on the plan of the RPF. 
Annex 2:  Communiqué from P.M Agathe recognizing that the CDR had come into line ( in  
Annex 3:   UNAMIR Sitrep on the CDR satisfied.   

Annex 4:  Letter from Edouard Karemera dated 26 April 1994. 

Annex 5:  Intelligence Officer’s Report to Général Dallaire on the situation in the SE part of the 
City of Kigali. 
Annex 6:  Outgoing fax from Mr. Booh-Booh to Mr. Annan, dated 12 April 1994, re the success 
of the RPF. 
Annex 7:  Outgoing fax from Mr. Booh-Booh to Mr. Annan, dated 13 April 1994, re the attitude 
of the RPF.  

Annex 8:  Proposed High-level Negotiations conducted by Ndindiliyimana.  

Annex 9:  Letter on the abrupt cancellation of negotiations from Kanyarengwe.  

Annex 10:  Letter of response from Professor Reyntjens to my letter of clarification.  

Annex 11:  Letter from the RPF, dated 13 April 1994, demanding the UN Security Council 
establish a Tribunal to judge genocidaires.  

No comments: