Deep Delusions, Bitter Truth (The Trial of a Rwandan General) [A Play in Two Acts]-- Compiled by CM/P from the actual trial transcripts of 24 & 25 June, 2009
[It's as if Obama just can't exert himself, can't stand up to his full moral height, in the face of US militarism. After all, he didn't pick the Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates--Gates was Bush's replacement for the piss-drunk and mendacious Donald Rumsfeld. He's trying to stand by his campaign promises of pulling US troops out of Iraq--though he has really nothing to say about US military strategy and tactics, martial appointments, field promotions. And as the violence mounts--and the bizarre phenomenon of multiple daily suicide bombings moves inexorably from Israel/Palestine and Iraq (with the occasional diversion into a Western capital like NYC/Washington, DC, London or Madrid) into Iran and Afghanistan--and with mostly political feints toward moving US troops around in that bedeviled region; and the Zionist campaign to destabilize the entire Middle East unto Russia's Central Asian 'near abroad' get kicked into some hyperdrive with uncritical--even, in some cases, unconscious mainstream media support of the by-now familiar manipulations of 'pro-Democracy', 'non-violent', ‘civil society’ regime changers attempting to invalidate popular elections: the US president can only react as if everything he knew about everything he learned from Wolf Blitzer in the Sitchiation Room.
{--Or, even worse than The Wolfman is the gruelingly unfunny Hoser, Jonathan Mann, who, while commenting on Obama’s Russian excursion on his pretentiously named CNN show, The Political Mann, noted that Russia now has two leaders: PM Vladimir Putin and President SERGEI Medvedev. I have yet to read or hear an erratum on this one--but there go all the Dr Strangelove gags.}
Look at President Obama’s speech in Accra:
Obama: “But the West is not responsible for the destruction of the Zimbabwean economy over the last decade, or wars in which children are enlisted as combatants.”
Really? CNN might've missed this, or it might be another Bush legacy, but . . .
--The Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001 states that U.S. sanctions will remain in place against the Zimbabwean "government" [euphemism for "the people"] until the U.S. president certifies that the "rule of law has been restored in Zimbabwe, including respect for ownership and title to property. . . and an end to. . .lawlessness."
(from a site at http://www.nathanielturner.com/sanctionsonzimbabwe.htm -- with the interesting headnote: "Let's review the history of Zimbabwe lest we forget how European White settlers killed, plundered and stole in order to position themselves where they are today in Zimbabwe.")
One would think a Harvard lawyer might be able to work his way rhetorically around such dishonest denial without having to dump on all his criminal predecessors. For were not these British settlers Cecil Rhodes led into the former-Rhodesia to seize the best land for themselves, and work it with the life forces of the local residents, the same sort of parasitic teabags who used to call President Obama's Kenyan father and grandfather 'boy'?
And, though, ok, maybe Colonialism IS way overrated, why does he seem to gloat over the managed elections of March 2008 in Zimbabwe--a political strong-arm robbery mirrored in the Iranian voting of June 2009.
Obama: “We saw it in Zimbabwe, where the Election Support Network braved brutal repression to stand up for the principle that a person's vote is their sacred right. . . . “
In both cases the minority opposition made a preemptive claim of victory before the polls had even closed. Then the ensuing street demonstrations instigated by Western Democracy-thru-non-violent-regime-change agents-provocateurs, spawns of the NED, USAID, and Geo Soros' Open Society cabal, created sufficient bloody chaos to break down the authority of the majority government. Because US liberals, including Obama, see little difference between majority interests and minority interests, this sort of glib, equivocating obscurantism is no surprise:
--”The people of Ghana have worked hard to put democracy on a firmer footing, with repeated peaceful transfers of power even in the wake of closely contested elections. (Applause.) And by the way, can I say that for that the minority deserves as much credit as the majority.”--(What does this mean?)
And, of course, what is being obscured is the far too obvious iron hand of American militarism at the throat of African history. Obama cites all the usual African transgressions, but manages to turn responsibility for them back onto the victims, themselves: Tribal or ethnic or religious wars, using child soldiers, involving rape (systemic rape, whatever that is), and the inevitable terrorism unto genocide--and he localizes all these abominations most strategically: 'the value of every child in Darfur and the dignity of every woman in the Congo'; genocide in Darfur and (Islamic?) terrorism in Somalia; no US-ordered foreign invasions, no US-trained and equipped mercenaries leading death squads throughout the continent, no unconscionable dumping of deadly weapons and as-deadly medicines to mix with the unregulated degradation of ecosystems by the effluvia of industrial mining--the real African plagues being covered up by the HIV/AIDS phantasmagoria.
I suppose that Obama got out of Russia without ever acknowledging the US and NATO's responsibility for the wave of terrorism that has afflicted that country since the destabilization of Afghanistan by the US-backed mujahadeen in the late 1970s (now the Taliban), and the so-called Islamic uprisings from Bosnia and Kosovo to Chechnya that allowed the metastasis of US military bases currently strangling the former Soviet territories and China; that he got out of Italy without having to kiss Berlesconi's ring or the Pope's teenage boyfriend; and that he got out of Africa without having to explain why his hands-off policy toward his ancient homeland last year necessitated at $2 billion allotment for military aid and a still undisclosed budget for AFRICOM: I suppose these are all testimony to Obama's endearing young charm and his skills as an orator. But as long as he remains this far away from quotidian Reality, driven off by the monstrous killing machine that has taken over the entire reproductive-force of the USA, there can be little or no hope of his ever realizing an end to territorial and resource wars and bringing international war criminals to justice.
As goes the African proverb sampled by Robin Philpot in his wonderful 'Ça n'est pas passé comme ça à Kigali' (now in English translation as 'Rwanda 1994: Colonialism Dies Hard', and available free on Phil Taylor's site linked to the right of this blog):
--Until lions produce their own historians, the story of the hunt will glorify only the hunter.--
But we here at CM/P are trying hard to produce our own hunters--or historians--or something. We're producing a new play, at any rate. And it's attached to the bottom of this post. We composed, or compiled this two-act, one-man show from the transcripts of General Ndindiliyimana's trial at the ICTR. To be exact, the piece is made up mostly of Chris Black's final summation to the Tribunal in the Military II case.
So, here it is: The End of The General's Trial. Soon in a Theatre near you!!--mc]
*********************************
{--Or, even worse than The Wolfman is the gruelingly unfunny Hoser, Jonathan Mann, who, while commenting on Obama’s Russian excursion on his pretentiously named CNN show, The Political Mann, noted that Russia now has two leaders: PM Vladimir Putin and President SERGEI Medvedev. I have yet to read or hear an erratum on this one--but there go all the Dr Strangelove gags.}
Look at President Obama’s speech in Accra:
Obama: “But the West is not responsible for the destruction of the Zimbabwean economy over the last decade, or wars in which children are enlisted as combatants.”
Really? CNN might've missed this, or it might be another Bush legacy, but . . .
--The Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001 states that U.S. sanctions will remain in place against the Zimbabwean "government" [euphemism for "the people"] until the U.S. president certifies that the "rule of law has been restored in Zimbabwe, including respect for ownership and title to property. . . and an end to. . .lawlessness."
(from a site at http://www.nathanielturner.com/sanctionsonzimbabwe.htm -- with the interesting headnote: "Let's review the history of Zimbabwe lest we forget how European White settlers killed, plundered and stole in order to position themselves where they are today in Zimbabwe.")
One would think a Harvard lawyer might be able to work his way rhetorically around such dishonest denial without having to dump on all his criminal predecessors. For were not these British settlers Cecil Rhodes led into the former-Rhodesia to seize the best land for themselves, and work it with the life forces of the local residents, the same sort of parasitic teabags who used to call President Obama's Kenyan father and grandfather 'boy'?
And, though, ok, maybe Colonialism IS way overrated, why does he seem to gloat over the managed elections of March 2008 in Zimbabwe--a political strong-arm robbery mirrored in the Iranian voting of June 2009.
Obama: “We saw it in Zimbabwe, where the Election Support Network braved brutal repression to stand up for the principle that a person's vote is their sacred right. . . . “
In both cases the minority opposition made a preemptive claim of victory before the polls had even closed. Then the ensuing street demonstrations instigated by Western Democracy-thru-non-violent-regime-change agents-provocateurs, spawns of the NED, USAID, and Geo Soros' Open Society cabal, created sufficient bloody chaos to break down the authority of the majority government. Because US liberals, including Obama, see little difference between majority interests and minority interests, this sort of glib, equivocating obscurantism is no surprise:
--”The people of Ghana have worked hard to put democracy on a firmer footing, with repeated peaceful transfers of power even in the wake of closely contested elections. (Applause.) And by the way, can I say that for that the minority deserves as much credit as the majority.”--(What does this mean?)
And, of course, what is being obscured is the far too obvious iron hand of American militarism at the throat of African history. Obama cites all the usual African transgressions, but manages to turn responsibility for them back onto the victims, themselves: Tribal or ethnic or religious wars, using child soldiers, involving rape (systemic rape, whatever that is), and the inevitable terrorism unto genocide--and he localizes all these abominations most strategically: 'the value of every child in Darfur and the dignity of every woman in the Congo'; genocide in Darfur and (Islamic?) terrorism in Somalia; no US-ordered foreign invasions, no US-trained and equipped mercenaries leading death squads throughout the continent, no unconscionable dumping of deadly weapons and as-deadly medicines to mix with the unregulated degradation of ecosystems by the effluvia of industrial mining--the real African plagues being covered up by the HIV/AIDS phantasmagoria.
I suppose that Obama got out of Russia without ever acknowledging the US and NATO's responsibility for the wave of terrorism that has afflicted that country since the destabilization of Afghanistan by the US-backed mujahadeen in the late 1970s (now the Taliban), and the so-called Islamic uprisings from Bosnia and Kosovo to Chechnya that allowed the metastasis of US military bases currently strangling the former Soviet territories and China; that he got out of Italy without having to kiss Berlesconi's ring or the Pope's teenage boyfriend; and that he got out of Africa without having to explain why his hands-off policy toward his ancient homeland last year necessitated at $2 billion allotment for military aid and a still undisclosed budget for AFRICOM: I suppose these are all testimony to Obama's endearing young charm and his skills as an orator. But as long as he remains this far away from quotidian Reality, driven off by the monstrous killing machine that has taken over the entire reproductive-force of the USA, there can be little or no hope of his ever realizing an end to territorial and resource wars and bringing international war criminals to justice.
As goes the African proverb sampled by Robin Philpot in his wonderful 'Ça n'est pas passé comme ça à Kigali' (now in English translation as 'Rwanda 1994: Colonialism Dies Hard', and available free on Phil Taylor's site linked to the right of this blog):
--Until lions produce their own historians, the story of the hunt will glorify only the hunter.--
But we here at CM/P are trying hard to produce our own hunters--or historians--or something. We're producing a new play, at any rate. And it's attached to the bottom of this post. We composed, or compiled this two-act, one-man show from the transcripts of General Ndindiliyimana's trial at the ICTR. To be exact, the piece is made up mostly of Chris Black's final summation to the Tribunal in the Military II case.
So, here it is: The End of The General's Trial. Soon in a Theatre near you!!--mc]
*********************************
Deep Delusions, Bitter Truth
(The Trial of a Rwandan General)
[A
Courtroom Drama in Two Acts]
[COMPILED
BY CM/P FROM THE ACTUAL TRIAL TRANSCRIPTS OF 24 & 25 JUNE, 2009]
THE
SET: The stage is empty but for a
small table with a lectern on it around CS. On the Cyclorama is a large ‘Big Brother’ screen on which
are projected images, still and moving pictures, appropriate to what is being
said on stage.
IN
BLACK:
FIRST
VO [Prosecutor Mr. Van]
Mr.
President, if you hate somebody, it's not because you want to live with that
person. And we are in a war
context. So if you consider that
the Tutsi are an enemy, the Hutu, who did not want the Tutsi, and actually
hated the Tutsi, logically had to hurriedly exterminate the Tutsi, or else the
Tutsi would exterminate them. And
that is the situation. When you
say that you hate somebody, it is not a joke.
Besides,
Mr. President, Your Honors, the results are there; the Tutsis were killed. They were massacred, they were
exterminated, and there was genocide.
SECOND
VO [Thespus]
Yet
the Tutsis minority wound up seizing state power and taking over Rwanda from
the Hutu majority!
FIRST
VO
In
the Karemera case, the Appeals Chamber took judicial note of that.
SECOND
VO
The
order to take ‘Judicial Notice’ effectively removed from the Prosecution any
burden of having to produce evidence to prove the genocide actually took place.
LIGHTS
UP:
Alone on stage is Maitre Christopher
Black, Defense attorney to Major General Augustin Ndindiliyimana, former Chief
of Staff of the Rwandan National Gendarmerie during the troubles of 1993 and
1994, on trial before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in
Arusha, Tanzania, on charges of Crimes against Humanity unto Genocide.
Mr. Black is just over 60 and very weary
from his long travail.
The
Judges sit OS DR, the Prosecution is OS UR, and the Defendants are OS UL. After
SEVERAL
BEATS, Maitre Black speaks:
MR.
BLACK:
Mr.
Sefon, yesterday, referred to two interesting books. And I find the reference he made--and the fact that he made
that reference--that the Prosecution made that reference, very
interesting. He referred to
Niccolò Machiavelli's book, The
Prince. Everybody here, I assume, who went to
law school has read that at some time.
And it's a book written by a man who was forced by a regime, the Medicis
at that time, to bow to a dictatorship, and decided to write a book to please
his master about how to rule a people who did not want to be ruled by a
dictator. And one of Machiavelli's
words of wisdom in that book of realpolitik was that deception is one of the
ways in which to control a people, deception and fear.
Mr
Sefon also made reference to The
Art of War, by the Chinese
military scholar, Sun Tzu. That is
also a very important book, studied in all military colleges and by
philosophers, because it sets out how wars are really conducted. And Sun Tzu's first lesson in that
book, in the opening pages, is about the art of deception, and how the art of
deception is the key to winning any conflict.
And
I raise that because it's quite clear that the Prosecution in this Tribunal is
part and parcel of the grand deception which is being woven--has been woven by
the RPF and its neocolonial masters, the United States and the United Kingdom,
for the last 15 years.
Why
do I say that? I will go into why
it's evident that the--the Prosecution here has manipulated this Court since
day-one, and how they have tried to cover up the crimes of the RPF, how they,
despite the rank hypocrisy expressed by Mr. [Abubacarr] Tambadou and Mr.
[Alphonse] Van, that they wish and desire international justice and the erasing
of immunity from prosecution for world leaders, when they, in fact, have done
nothing but grant those murderers in the RPF immunity from prosecution from the
beginning.
And
I'm not alone in saying this. I
have here a letter which has been sent by 50 world scholars and human rights
defenders from universities in Canada, the United States, Britain, from Human
Rights Watch, Amnesty International.
They include professors from Columbia University, Princeton, the
University of California, the University of Antwerp, and on and on. Including the husband of the late Dr.
Alison Des Forges, Professor Roger Des Forges, and including the former expert
for the Prosecution, Filip Reyntjens, who refuses to work for the Prosecution
any longer. This letter is
addressed to Ban Ki-Moon, President Barack Obama, Prime Minister Gordon Brown,
and copied to Hillary Clinton and various other American and British Foreign
Ministry officials, because, obviously, they're the ones who control this
Tribunal. It is also copied to
Judge Dennis Byron, and to Prosecutor Hassan B. Jallow.
It
says that Mr. Jallow—that the RPF has committed crimes, and that Mr. Jallow
expresses an evident reluctance to prosecute these RPF crimes. And this is clearly the result of
intimidation and obstructionism by the RPF, which now rules Rwanda. The Prosecutor, Jallow, has severely
compromised his prosecutorial independence and the Tribunal's integrity.
But
they conclude with this: "In
conclusion, we call on you to ensure that the ICTR prosecutes RPF crimes. This issue should be raised when
Prosecutor Jallow addresses the United Nations Security Council about his
completion strategy on June 4th, 2009.
Unless the Prosecutor acts swiftly, the ICTR will squander not only its
last chance to provide accountability for those serious crimes, but also its
legitimacy."
It's
dated May 31st of this year.
Another professor, Dr. Hans Köchler, at the University of Innsbruck in
Austria, and who was selected as the Secretary General's personal
representative at the Lockerbie trial and still acts in that capacity, wrote a
book called Global
Justice and Global Revenge,
about these ad hoc tribunals and, with respect to the ICTR, stated that the
Prosecution has engaged in selective prosecution on ‘a massive scale,’
quote-unquote, ‘a massive scale.’
Now, why?
I
don't think Mr. Jallow is afraid of a little man like Mr. Kagame in in Kigali. No. Mr. Jallow
is not afraid of that little man.
He is controlled by bigger powers than that. And that's why this letter is addressed to those
powers. And if my friends over
there [the Prosecution] want to sit in service of neocolonialism, shame on
them. But I don't think this Court
should acquiesce to the planning out of neocolonialism and imperialism in
Africa by listening and accepting the manipulations presented to this Court and
the argument they pretend to make as evidence.
Let
me get to the argument. When
Prosecutor Lloyd Strickland stood up and said, correctly, that he had to deal
with the challenges raised by the Defense brief in our case, it's quite
true. I submit that the argument
we presented has built, brick by brick, a wall of reasonable doubt which they
cannot ever penetrate. So what do
they do? Instead of trying to
refute the argument we made--the written argument we made---they leave it—which
I would interpret as their ceding the case to us.
Instead,
he gets up and makes a couple of comments about Kansi and Saint André college
and then engages in a slanderous attack on General Ndindiliyimana and that he's
just a born liar because he's a politician.
--I'll
refute that later.--
But
they make no other argument at all.
And I was surprised when the arguments here started. I've never followed the arguments in
these cases really. But I
expected, even when I was in law school, that—I was taught that when you make a
legal argument, you have to deal with the argument that the other person
made.
The
Prosecution, in its brief, just puts out nothing but RPF propaganda. It's as if they were never at the
trial. They ignore their own
evidence. They ignore our
evidence. And they just repeat the
accusations in the indictment and page after page of pure RPF propaganda. And then, when they come to their oral
argument, you would expect that they would have something to say to knock—to
try and knock out our argument.
But no, they don't, because they can't. So they resort to innuendo and slander.
Now,
let's look at how they start off with this RPF propaganda campaign, which
they've engaged in since this trial began. I agree with Mr. St Laurent that they mischaracterized the
history of Rwanda totally. For
instance, at their paragraph 41, they say that since 1959 the country has
suffered ethnic unrest following the Hutu social revolution.
Well,
whose fault was it that there was social unrest in Rwanda? Because the émigrés, the aristocracy,
and the King, the King's clan, when they fled, because they were being hunted by
the Belgian police for murdering Hutu bourgmestres who had been elected, attacked the country
many times between 1959 and 1973.
And you heard evidence from the UN—from UN documents which agreed that
there was no reason for those attacks.
They were completely gratuitous.
Murdered people right, left, and centre, and they were forced out. And there was no unrest after 1973 and
until 1990.
The
country was, as everybody knows, considered the “Switzerland of Africa.” Why? Because it did have social and ethnic cohesion. It was a very poor country—even though
it was a poor country, it did have a progressive government, one of the most
progressive in Africa. It was a
model for African development and Third World development.
Then,
in October 1990, that's all destroyed.
And why? For no reason at
all except that the Tutsi aristocracy in the Ugandan Army, and President Yoweri
Museveni, and their allies, all wanted to conquer Rwanda in order to invade the
Congo. And that's the only reason.
Then
they say, in paragraph 42, that since then Rwanda has been a time bomb, which
went off on April 6th. No, it
wasn't. Rwanda was not a time bomb
until 1990 when the RPF attacked.
I
was going to go through their paragraphs seriatim. It's easier for me to do it that way.
The
military, ¶43. They say the
military involved in the conflict are the Rwandan Armed Forces [FAR] and the
RPF. Well, no. That's not true, either. The attack was made by the Ugandan
Army, by Mr. Museveni. But they
don't charge him.
Every
member of the RPF was a Ugandan Army soldier, every one of them. They used Ugandan military equipment:
Trucks, vehicles, weapons, heavy weapons.
They all carried their Ugandan NRA
identity cards.
The
RPF is not a rebel movement. It's
a ring within the Ugandan army disguised as a rebel movement.
[Tutsi
Historian] Antoine Nyetera testified here that many Tutsi businessmen wrote
them a letter saying, "We don't want this war. Who are you?
You don't represent us.
Things are fine here for us.
Why are you destroying the country? Destroying everything?
For what?"
Paragraph
¶50, they say another false thing: That Augustin Ndindiliyimana was designated
as chair of the Crisis Committee.
Well, no, he was not. And
I—you read in my brief. I'm not
going to argue about that too long.
But it's quite clear that committee ceased to exist April 8th. It's quite clear that the only reason
he took over the meeting on the 7th was that [General Théoneste] Bagosora was
trying to take over and that [Leonidas] Rusatira and Ndindiliyimana opposed
Bagosora, and, therefore, Ndindiliyimana stepped in to solve the dispute. That's the only reason.
General
Dallaire confirmed that. Alison
Des Forges confirmed that.
They
say, at paragraph ¶63, that the Rwandan Patriotic Front is a political and
military movement whose adepts were drawn from the Tutsis in the diaspora. As I say, that's not true. They were not drawn from the Tutsis of
the diaspora. And, as I said, they
were the Ugandan Army.
And
Antoine Nyetera said that he was surprised when the RPF columns came down from
Mt. Rebero in July, when the FAR had retreated. He was surprised to see that most of them weren't Tutsis at
all.
They
were Eritreans, Ethiopians, Somalis, Tanzanians, and Sudanese. Remember their hair down to their
shoulders, dark as pitch, tattoos everywhere: Mercenaries.
This
myth that the RPF was some sort of ‘People's Liberation Movement’ was bought
hook, line, and sinker, by many people in the West because of propaganda put
out by Des Forges and her acolytes.
But
nobody buys it anymore.
They
say that—at paragraph ¶64—that Prime Minister Sylvestre Nsanzimana’s government
collapsed.
There
was no collapse. And then that a
Transitional Government was formed on April 16th, 1992. No, it wasn't. A Coalition Government was formed in
1992. Why? Because President Habyarimana had
acceded to French and American influence and agreed to a multi-party
democracy.
And
there were successive governments, all made up of parties which represented the
people and with different views.
There's the MRND, PSD, PL.
And whom did they represent, really? The RPF.
It
was a Coalition Government. It was
not ‘Habyarimana's Regime.’ It
ceased to be that in 1991.
Habyarimana
was
just a figurehead. Pro-RPF Prime
Ministers were in charge of the country.
So there was no reason at all for this war. But the RPF persisted.
They
say, at paragraph ¶65, that the United Nations and UNAMIR got involved in the
conflict with the aim of resolving it.
And that's not true, either.
UNAMIR—the UN did not try to resolve this situation.
They
actively acted on the side of the RPF and ensured their victory.
Mr.
[Defense attorney Ronnie] McDonald put to General Dallaire questions about many
situation-reports where General Dallaire was receiving information about the
build-up for the offensive launched on April 6. He never passed it on to President Habyarimana or to General
Ndindiliyimana or to anybody else.
He passed it on to New York.
But
he kept it secret from the Rwandan government. He said, "Oh, I didn't receive those
reports." But it's quite
clear he did. They are all
addressed to him.
He
lied to the French and German ambassadors when they asked him about it. "We hear rumors they're building
for an offensive." "Oh,
I don't know anything about that."
He lied.
And
it's quite clear he didn't do it on his own. General Dallaire's a very competent officer. He did exactly what he was told to do.
They
say that Prime Minister Dismas Nsengiyaremye was against the handing out of—the
distribution of weapons to the population by civilian authorities, implying
that the Civil Defense was some sort of evil mechanism to kill Tutsis. Well, we all know the reason why Dismas
Nsengiyaremye was against that:
because he was an active agent for the RPF and didn't want the
population to be armed against their attacks. He broke up the intelligence—the civil intelligence
service. We heard evidence on
that.
They
say at paragraph ¶67, that UNAMIR's mandate ended on March 8th, 1996. That's also a lie.
UNAMIR
II ended in 1996, but UNAMIR I ceased to exist, in all practical terms, by
April 17th, 1994, when the Belgians pulled out and the Americans in the
Security Council refused the Rwandan government's request for 5,000 more troops
be sent in. The Prosecution wants
to bury that.
You
don't want the people to know that the Rwandan government asked for 5,000 more
men to be sent in in April. And
you don't want the world to know the Americans refused that request and pulled
out the UN forces in order to allow the RPF free access to roam around
murdering and massacring everybody.
General
Ndindiliyimana testified. You say
that the Americans brought US weight to bear on the Rwandan conflict. Well, they sure did. Paragraph ¶71. They tried to lure Habyarimana out of
the country and keep him in Washington.
In October 1990, on the day of the attack, he was with Mr. Museveni. They lured Habyarimana to
Washington. Well, Museveni knew
his men were going to attack Rwanda.
The Americans knew that, and then they offered him sanctuary.
Instead
of condemning Museveni, they say, "Well, Mr. Habyarimana, why don't you
stay here? It will be
fine." And this is the same
time when Iraq invaded Kuwait.
Iraq invades Kuwait, which they had some claim to, and the Security
Council and the United States bring all hell down on Iraq and Saddam
Hussein. At the same time, the
Rwandan ambassador in the Security Council asked for the United Nations to
condemn the attack by Uganda against Rwanda. It doesn't even get on the agenda.
That's
how Big Power politics are played.
In one situation the attack has to be—the aggression has to be
condemned. In the other,
"Let's just hush it up. It's
okay." Because that
aggression suits our purposes.
And
UNAMIR II only came in—they sent more men in for UNAMIR II after July
1994. Why? It's quite clear: to consolidate RPF power. And once it was consolidated, they
left. Now the Americans have three
bases in Rwanda, right in the heart of Africa.
Then
in paragraph ¶68, they refer to the resolution adopted by the Security Council
to create this Tribunal. But they
forget to tell the Judges—to remind the Judges that--as I read into the record
during cross examination of one witness--I think it was maybe Des Forges—that
Herman Cohen threatened to kill Habyarimana in October 1993, and said, unless
he ceded all power to the RPF—ceded all power, not shared power—ceded all power
to the RPF, they were going to kill him.
And they were then going to set up an international tribunal to try the
rest of his crew. And that's
exactly what they've done. They
killed him, and now we're all here.
It's not magic.
Then,
again, they go into this strange attack on France. France was Rwanda's friend. Well, that's true.
But
so was America and Belgium, at the time.
Rwandan army officers were trained in the United States and Belgium and
Germany. Rwanda also had friends
in the Soviet Union—the former Soviet Union, North Korea, West Germany, Canada,
Israel. It wasn't just France who
supported Rwanda.
And
who forced the French out? The RPF
did, in 1993. The RPF, "We
don't want them here," and the French left.
¶72. They talked about the fact that the
Organization of African Unity remained inconspicuous. Well, that's no big secret. And why?
Because President Museveni was the president of the African Unity
Association—OAU, sorry. And Salim Saleh [Museveni’s half
brother and principal advisor] was the secretary. And, here, Mr. Museveni was in favor of the attack on
Rwanda, because Tanzania had designs on Rwanda itself. It's no surprise the OAU said not a
word about the aggression by Mr. Museveni against Rwanda—not one word!
And
they make a surprise admission in paragraph ¶73. It says, "Some Human Rights NGOs, such as Human Rights
Watch, were, because of their public and official stance for peace and against
human rights violations in Rwanda, assimilated with the international
community"—which is just a euphemism for the United States and its puppets. That's right. Human Rights Watch and the rest of those NGOs are part of
the United States and British intelligence services.
That's
quite clear. Everybody knows that,
too. It's no secret outside this
courtroom. I don't see why it
should be a secret inside this courtroom.
Everybody
knows who funds those groups and who runs them.
And
then it says, "Mostly, the International Community”—which is really,
again, a euphemism for the United States and its allies”—is made up of all
those people worldwide who had seen the atrocities and were deeply
appalled."
Well,
no. That's not true. The whole world was deeply appalled by
what happened in Rwanda, not just the international community, that is, the
United States, the UK, and it's allies.
The whole world was appalled, because the RPF murdered millions of
people and is still doing it in the Congo.
In
paragraph ¶75, they mention, in respect to the Interahamwe,
that somehow the Akazu [‘Little
House’ in Kinyirwandan, a group of ‘Hutu Extremists’ gathered around President
Habyarimana and his wife Agathe and supposed by the uninformed to be
responsible for planning and instigating the Genocide, even unto assassinating
their own leader, the Rwandan President—cm/p] was involved in the creation of that organization. There's no evidence in this trial about
the Akazu.
I don't know where Mr. Van—who wrote this—but there was no evidence
whatsoever about the Akazu in this trial. But that's just, again, to inflame you.
They
say in ¶77, quite correctly, that the Interahamwe president was Robert Kajuga,
a young Tutsi businessman. That's
correct. As was the (Witness’s official position is
redacted here), 006, you
brought here, being protected by western governments. He's also a Tutsi.
It's very strange that an organization controlled by Tutsis is supposed
to be accused of killing Tutsis.
And
yet, apropos of that, I draw your attention back to that video we showed—that
my co-counsel Mr. Lurquin showed here, a video of Captain Amadou Deme, a UN
officer at the time, giving bulletproof vests and weapons to an Interahamwe leader.
Now, the ramifications of that are quite extraordinary.
We've
alleged for some time, and now, because of the disclosure, they finally gave it
to us after many years, statements of RPF officers confirming that many of—or,
at least some of–-or, many of the so-called Interahamwe
roadblocks in Kigali were actually manned by RPF, and that the RPF infiltrated
the Interahamwe.
Lt.
[Abdul] Ruzibiza, since we're bringing things out—from outside the case in your
argument—testified in Military I that they did infiltrate the Interahamwe, killed people in order to discredit the
government and create chaos behind the government lines. And they were very successful. So that ties in with the video and my submission
that the UN forces were involved in helping the RPF.
They
actively gave Interahamwe leaders bulletproof vests and were joking
around with their submachine guns and drinking. This is in—after the so-called massacres have begun. You don't want the world to know about
that either. The UN wasn't just
negligent. They were actively
involved, because the UN, which was the hope of the world in 1945, 1946 . . . "There will be no more war, no
more aggression." And if the
General Assembly ran things, there wouldn't be. But the Security Council, run by the United States and the
United Kingdom, have twisted it and destroyed it until there's nothing
left.
And
now they attack countries and nothing happens, nothing is said, and we have
this game going on in the Tribunal where these eminent Judges and us are just
wasting our time.
And
they say, again, the Interahamwe is the armed militia of the MRND. Well, there's no evidence of that. They've got no evidence—no credible
evidence they were ever an armed militia.
And
I draw the Judges' attention to the fact that the law—Rwandan law stipulated
that armed militias were banned—under the penal code they were banned. Yet neither Prime Minister
Nsengiyaremye nor Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana banned the Interahamwe or any other group under that code.
Why? Because they knew they were not an
armed militia. They were just an
ordinary youth wing in a political party.
But
to discredit the MRND, because that was the party of the majority of the
Rwandan people and the so-called Hutu party—even though it had many Tutsis in
it, the propaganda was the MRND was the bad party, and they try and equate
them, somehow, with Nazis in Germany.
They try and discredit that party by attaching that party to the Interahamwe youth wing and saying they killed people on a
mass scale.
So
they identify every killer, any bandit, or anybody who killed for any reason
whatsoever, and they say that was Interahamwe.
Even though their witness, their own witness, 006, AOG, the (Witness’s official position is
redacted by the Tribunal),
said there were only 1500 Interahamwe in the entire country and most of those were
in Kigali. You tell me how 1500
people, most of them in Kigali, could do what they say they did.
But
as Mr. Ciré Aly Bâ said here—and as they say in here—“Everybody who killed was Interahamwe."
That's
their point of view. Every Hutu is
Interahamwe; therefore, every Hutu is guilty. It's collective punishment, collective
guilt. And this is supposed to be
an advance in International Justice.
They
say in paragraph ¶80, “October 1st, 1990, the RPF launched an attack against
Rwanda from the Kagitumba border post.
A surprise attack was a complete success, and the sole garrison of
Mutara was overrun.” Like the
Prosecution is proud of the fact the RPF launched a war of aggression! A
surprise attack, a dirty surprise attack, in the midst of negotiations over
refugees’ return, murdered everybody at that border post, and started a
horrible war. And the Prosecution
says it was a SUCCESS. And yet they don't charge the RPF. They actually admit they committed a
war crime. Because at the
Nuremberg Tribunal, the supreme war crime is committing aggression, because all
other crimes follow from that, and if you don't condemn that, there's no
point. But they're proud of
that.
And
then Belgium and France, Mobutu, they decided to send troops to assist the FAR,
which was in disarray. Yes, the
Rwandan Army were in disarray, because nobody expected to be attacked like
that.
The
Rwandan Army, 5,000 men, wasn't expecting a sordid, dirty little attack like
that, which killed thousands of civilians, mainly Hutus.
And
Kagame brags about, "Oh, I—I—I was trying to stop the genocide." What was he doing? Hutus don't count? He kills Hutus, and that's not
genocide? Why did he kill those
men at that border post?
Why? Because he liked them? He obviously hates Hutus, and probably
most of the Tutsis inside the country, really, too. But the Prosecutor does nothing. They—they're—they're proud of what their man does.
They
say in ¶84 that the peace negotiations culminated in the signing of the Arusha
agreements in 1993. Well, that's
not true. I mean, it's true that
there was—there were the Arusha Accords, but they weren't a peace agreement. They were a ceasefire agreement, while
certain things took place politically.
But
what the Prosecutor leaves out at paragraph ¶84 is the fact that between
October 1990 and the signing of that accord, there are several other ceasefires
agreed to by the RPF, and every one of them was broken by the RPF. EVERY ONE!
Not by the FAR, but by the RPF.
And in February 1993, the biggest breach of the ceasefire was when they
attacked Ruhengeri and killed, in two weeks, experts say, 40,000 Hutus. Forty thousand! And we had soldiers testify here who
saw what they did. They testified
how the RPF treated people, cut women open, cut their eyes out, tied their
hands behind their backs and hit them with hoes, because that's the iconic
symbol of the Hutu peasant. And
still the Prosecution is proud of them and does nothing.
Not
only did they kill 40,000 people in those 14 days, before they were pushed back
by the army, they drove out, because of the fighting, one million, mainly Hutu
peasants, driven out of their homes, burned their homes down, drove them down
to Kigali to the camp at Nyaconga.
So you had around Kigali one million refugees out of a population of 8
million. And they took over the
breadbasket of Rwanda, which created starvation in the rest of the
country.
This
is your humanitarian, Kagame. This
is your hero. And you blame
General Bizimungu. You blame
General Ndindiliyimana.
Up
to this point the FAR has killed no one!
The government, which is a coalition government with pro-RPF people included,
has killed no one. RPF. RPF. RPF. RPF. Planting mines, blowing up kids with
land mines. And they placed
anti-tank mines on roads. Can you
imagine!? Not just anti-personnel
mines. Do you know what an
anti-tank mine can do?
[VO]
MR. PRESIDENT:
Mr. Black, just give
me one minute.
MR.
BLACK:
Sorry.
[VO]
MR. PRESIDENT:
In
reference to a Witness 006, AOG, you referred to his official position. I think we should place that under
seal.
MR.
BLACK:
Oh, sorry about that. Yes. I'm sorry.
[VO]
MR. PRESIDENT:
Yeah.
MR.
BLACK:
All right. That's all right.
You're right.
Why
do you—so why does the Prosecution mislead—try to mislead the Court in this
argument? Why?
Because
they are protecting the RPF, and if they don't put out this false story, then
the context in which they accuse these men here doesn't make any sense. Because if the world knew that there
was not just an explosion on April 6th, there was an ongoing war for four years
in which the RPF assassinated people, committed acts of terrorism every day,
created millions of refugees and murdered tens and tens of thousands of people,
all mainly Hutus, but their attitude is that the only good Hutu is a dead
Hutu.
That's
obviously their attitude.
Then
they say, in ¶87, the Arusha Peace Agreements ended the war. No, they didn't. That was just a ceasefire, which was
again broken by the RPF on April 6th, when they murdered the president.
Who
started the massacres on April 6th?
The RPF.
The
first massacre was committed by the RPF.
They shot down that plane.
Twenty people on that plane, two Hutu presidents. And, including the president killed in
Burundi, the Hutu president murdered by them, because the RPF is implicated in
that killing, too, in Burundi, in October, six months before: that's three Hutu presidents murdered
in six months or nine months.
Still they do nothing.
Louise
Arbour orders an investigation into the Habyarimana murder, and you find
out—the Prosecution finds out it was the RPF that murdered those people. Michael Hourigan is called to The Hague
to talk to Louise Arbour about it, from his affidavit which is filed here, one
of your—the only—one of the few people on the Prosecution that's got any courage
and integrity. And he went to
Louise Arbour and says, "We know who did it. It wasn't the Habyarimana—or the MRND extremists. It was the RPF." And implicating the CIA.
Louise
Arbour tells him to burns his notes, and she takes his disks, his CD with all
the information. And she kills
that investigation.
Yet
she's a heroine in Canada. And she
covered up and protects and is an accessory after the fact to murder, to mass
murder.
[Carla]
Del Ponte's continued that policy, and Mr. Jallow continues that policy. And they still pretend, "Oh, maybe
Hutu extremists shot down their own president." It's laughable.
Now you're making a film about Louise Arbour, looks like Dallaire. The propaganda put out is intense. But it doesn't matter a wit, because
History will find out that it's not true.
It's all nonsense.
And
History will absolve all these officers here eventually. And you will be condemned, because
you're acting for the neocolonialists and the imperialists, not these men. These men were fighting for majority
rule and democracy in Rwanda. They
didn't start the war. Your people
did.
They
mention, paragraph ¶88, about Operation Clean Corridor, supervised by the
MINUAR. Well, yes.
Also
the Coalition Government and the Gendarmerie. Remember the letter Colonel Marchal sent commending General
Ndindiliyimana and the gendarmes for helping bring the RPF into the CND, which
got General Ndindiliyimana a lot of flack because many people saw this as a
traitorous move, helping the RPF put a battalion of their own men right in the
centre of the capital. The critics
turned out to be correct. It was a
Trojan horse. But his hope at that
time was that this was going to lead to peace.
Everybody
believed that, in the government and the FAR.
Ambassador
Swinnen said the Rwandan army supported the Arusha Peace Accords. Colonel Marchal said that, too. Colonel André Vincent, who later became
deputy head of Belgian Army Intelligence, said the Rwandan army always supported
the peace accords. It was the RPF
who opposed them all the time.
They put up one obstruction after another—not the government, not the
FAR. And why?
Because
if the accords were fulfilled and the transitional government was actually
installed and then elections were held, the RPF knew it was going to lose
everything. It would lose all
power, because the majority of the people would still vote for the MRND or its
allied parties. They would control
a minority in the government, and they would have gained nothing after four
years of war.
That's
why they hit the plane on April 6th, because they don't believe in
democracy. They believe in
minority rule. And they want to
restore exactly that. They laugh
at me in here by saying, "Oh, the Hutus say the RPF
wanted
to restore the oppression of the pre-revolution days." That's true. That's exactly what they've done. There's no Hutu mass party in Rwanda now. Anybody who tries to start one, they're
put in jail or killed or disappear.
It's like Chile.
Paragraph
¶89. [Heckling] No. That's okay. . . .
They say that the president of the republic took the oath of office on
5th January, but other institutions were never set up, as all attempts to do so
remain fruitless. Well, why?
Again,
the attempts were fruitless because the RPF put up roadblocks at every
step.
President
Habyarimana was sworn in on January the 5th in the morning, but the swearing- in
ceremonies for the Deputies in the afternoon were cancelled. Not by these men here [ind the
accused]. Not by the FAR. Not by the MRND.
It
was cancelled by Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana, whose letter we've filed
here, but which the world had never seen.
She sent a letter saying, "Afternoon ceremonies
cancelled"—with no reason given and no further date given. She cancelled it because the RPF wanted
it cancelled. Because you could
have had a coalition government, a transitional government on January the
5th. There was no obstruction
whatsoever, except that she cancelled the swearing-in ceremony.
Because
soon after that, in March—they called for elections in March. The MRND and its allied parties would
have won, and the RPF would have been sitting out there with no excuse for the
war anymore.
So
they cancelled it. Colonel Claeys,
of the Belgian army, who was called by the Prosecution—this is their evidence,
your evidence—said that on January the 8th, when they tried to swear in some
Deputies for the pro-RPF parties, when President Habyarimana was out of the
country, in his absence, he said that that could be construed as an attempted
coup d'état. Luckily, Roger
Booh-Booh wouldn't take part in it, so the ceremony couldn't take place.
So
on January the 5th, they cancelled the swearing in ceremonies of all the
Deputies. January the 8th, the
president's out of the country.
They try to swear in their own Deputies to take over the
government.
But
Roger Booh-Booh, the UN representative, said no way.
And
even your witness said there was an attempted coup d'état. It's not my evidence. It's your evidence.
Then
going down to paragraph ¶90.
Evening of April 6, President Habyarimana has his plane shot down. Well, yeah. By whom? The
RPF. Do you charge them with
murder or a war crime? No.
And
you make up some cockamamie story about, "We don't have
jurisdiction." But it's quite
clear you do. It's quite clear you
found out who did it. You've known
since at least 1997 who shot down that plane.
And
the RPF immediately began hitting everybody else in that city they wanted to
eliminate. The troops left the CND
that night. We had a report from a
Belgian sergeant, Tabour, I think, an intelligence report in which—from
Lieutenant Nees, including a statement from this officer—or this Mr.
Tabour—saying, he received instructions from his commanding officers that you
can expect an RPF column from the CND to cross your point to attack Camp
Kanombe—I mean, to attack, yeah,
Camp Kanombe, I think it was.
"Do not resist it. Do
not oppose that movement."
And he said that they crossed.
But they were stopped. The
attack on Camp Kanombe on the night of the 6th was stopped by the FAR.
So
this line that Kagame puts out—that, "We only attacked when killings
began. We wanted to save the
world"—Is just nonsense. And
even Alison Des Forges stated that the myth put out by Kagame that he started
the war, or let his troops loose to stop it—I'll find it later—to stop the
killings was false. That's a
myth. She said he never cared
about people. He only wanted to
take power by force of arms.
That's in the testimony of Mme. Des Forges. And that's your witness. You're stuck with that evidence. It's not my evidence.
It's yours.
Kagame
couldn't care less about people's lives.
And Ruzibiza, in Military I, testified that he left—and many RPF
officers left—because they felt betrayed.
They actually believed the RPF was a liberation movement. And they were hoodwinked. And when they asked Kagame’s permission
to go on the streets, because they had more men in Kigali than the FAR, and
control bandits and ‘Interahamwe,’ if you will, Kagame refused to let them do
it, because he wanted people killed, because that gave him support from the
International Community, because then they could say it was a genocide. And it created chaos behind the Rwandan
lines. Any support this government
had in the International Community was totally—It just evaporated with all his
propaganda, and that's why many of the RPF officers fled and left, in bitter
disillusionment, and came here to testify.
Then
they say, in ¶94 again, the Crisis Committee, they, in total disregard of the
provisions of the Arusha Peace Agreements, formed an exclusive Hutu
government. Well, I'm not—you can
read my brief—I'm not going to repeat all that again. It's quite clear that the Crisis Committee, from your
witnesses, Des Forges and Dallaire—not just General Dallaire, but General
Ndindiliyimana and the FAR officers who testified here—it's quite clear that
that Committee was set up only to ensure security for the continued working of
the civilian government, because they'd been—the prime—because the President's
been assassinated. The army Chief
of Staff is murdered. There is a
security vacuum. So the Army and
the Gendarmerie and the UN—because General Dallaire and Colonel Marchal show up
at those meetings together—so they try it: "How are we going to control security so the civilians—so
we can try and pull back the Arusha Peace Accords somehow." So it was not in total disregard. It was in exact accordance.
Despite
the fact that it's clear the RPF broke the Accords, they were a dead
letter. They just burned them in
the ashes of that plane. Men like
General Ndindiliyimana and others—with his help and at his invitation—others
like General Dallaire, Marchal, Booh-Booh—all tried to pull the Accords back
from the ashes. They asked the
RPF, "Stop fighting. Stop
your fighting. For with the
ceasefire we’ll just keep the—we'll just get new people in the government and
keep going."
They
refused because, obviously, they didn't want to. They've attacked.
They've got the advantage, a surprise attack—in the sense that they've
got 10 to 14,000 men in that city—maybe twice as many as the FAR probably have
at that time.
And
yet the FAR, in my view, were naive enough to still believe that it is possible
to talk to these people.
"Ask
for a ceasefire." They're
pleading with Dallaire, "Ask for a ceasefire. Ask for a ceasefire.
Ask for a ceasefire. We
can't do anything. We don't want a
war."
Dallaire
comes up—comes back and replies like the RPF–arrogant, obstinate,
"No. No. No." And even on April 12th, when several senior FAR officers
actually offer the RPF an unconditional surrender, "We give up. Unconditional surrender. It's over. You won."
What
does the RPF do? They refuse
that. Why? The killing could have stopped on April
12th. But they don't want the
killing to stop. They don't want
the war to stop. Why? Because if they—if they agree to a
ceasefire then, they would have to negotiate with the government. They would have to agree to
things. They would not get all
power. They would have to share
power.
And
the FAR would still exist. They
would still have to integrate their forces with the FAR. And my friends over there [ind the Prosecution] talked about, "Oh, the FAR was against
the Accords because a lot of men were going to lose their jobs and positions in
the Army."
But
that was also true of the RPF.
Most of the RPF would have to be demobilized, and all the RPF officers
would be out of jobs. Don't they
have a motivation to break the Accords?
If you can argue that way
against the FAR officers, it applies equally to the RPF. What were those men going to do? Roam around the streets in Kigali? Go back to Uganda? What? They're not farmers.
They're soldiers. But no. The RPF disappears in the Prosecution’s
entire theory. In their argument
there's no mention of the RPF.
¶96:
They say some—oh, ¶95, an astonishing statement—General Ndindiliyimana and
Colonel Bagosora's Crisis Committee had just buried the Arusha Peace
Agreements. I mean, come on! You've got to be kidding me. RPF shoot down the plane. They attack. They won't agree to a ceasefire.
But
these men want to continue the Accords.
And you say they’re the ones buried it when they invite the UN in and
say, "How can we keep it going?" And that's your own witnesses talking.
What
surprises me and what the public doesn't know—or realize—is that this is their
case. This is not my case. General Dallaire said that. Dr. Des Forges, this celebrated expert,
said that here. And I'm going to
read some excerpts later about how she talked about General Ndindiliyimana
doing all he could to keep the peace accords going. Ambassador Swinnen who—you name it.
And
yet they put this lie in their brief.
It's as if they were never at this trial. Or that the purpose of the brief is not to make an argument
but, again, to be distributed to the press here, to Hirondelle and their allies
everywhere, and just to put out a propaganda tract. That's all it is.
It's not an argument about the evidence in the case.
It,
in fact, ignores everything that Dallaire and Des Forges say. Nowhere in their argument do they refer
to their main witnesses, Des Forges and Dallaire, except in passing. Why do they suppress that? Two of the most important witnesses
ever to testify at this Tribunal, and it just disappears from the argument
totally, which again supports my opening remarks that they—they're just working
for the RPF and those—the people behind them.
I
want to make a gratuitous remark that Mr. Van made also, that from 1973 on, the
Rwandan government was laced with military officers. Well, so what?
That's not relevant to anything.
The
United States, which controls your office completely, is heavily infiltrated or
‘laced’ with the American military—ex-military officers, present military
officers: General Colin Powell,
General Eisenhower, Alexander Haig, Brent Scowcroft. I can go on and on with a list of American military officers
holding high places in government.
It's nothing new in the world.
Many other countries have military officers in government positions. So what?
And
what was the RPF? It was a—you say
it was a political/military organization.
Well, if it's okay for the RPF, your heroes, to be a political/military
organization, what's your problem with the Rwandan government?
Paragraph
¶100. Talking about the attack of
October 1990, they say—they admit that—that Rwanda was attacked from
Uganda—which makes it an international war, by the way, not an internal
war. They say the RPF talked
mainly of the return of refugees and democratic reform. That's false also, because we heard
testimony from many witnesses, experts and UN documents, that in late September
there was an agreement between the UNHCR, the OAU, the UN, Uganda, the RPF wing
of the Ugandan army, and the government in Rwanda that there would be a mass-.
. .—they would allow, finally, a mass return of refugees into Rwanda, which is
difficult because it is such a small country.
And
the agreement was that the Tutsi refugees who wanted to return would send a
delegation to Kigali to discuss the mechanics and logistics. Like where are they going to put these
people? What are they going to
live on? Who's going to house
them? And the government was
expecting that delegation to come.
Instead, what do they get?
Machine gun bullets and murder!
Because
once that agreement was signed, the excuse for the existence of the RPF ceased
to be. Their excuse was, "Oh,
we want to come back to Rwanda."
Well—and it's quite clear that individual Tutsis could always go back to
Rwanda at any time they chose and many—and we had people testify they came
back. There's no prohibition with
Tutsis coming back if they wanted to, singly or as families. But it always was a concern for the
government that 30, 40, 50,000 people come back, because they had a problem with
that before. And no country could
absorb that many people without problems.
And
talk of a democracy. That also was
a figment of their imagination, because what happened in 1991? Aggiornamento.
(Not sure I pronounced that right.)
The
French president and the Americans put heavy pressure on Habyarimana, after the
collapse of the Soviet Union, to allow multiparty democracy. Did he resist? No. He changed the constitution, and Rwanda was changed from a
semi-socialist one-party state into a multiparty Western-style democracy.
Even
during a war---the country is now at war—and he still did it—which is
amazing! No other country would
have done that in the middle of a war.
Changed their entire constitution and allowed parties to be set up which
were obviously fronts for the enemy.
But he did, because he's bending over backwards to stop the war and take
away every excuse from the RPF to keep conducting that war. But still they press—they press—they
press for more—for more—for more.
And they never stop, because they were not interested in democracy. They wanted to take all power. And finally, with Herman Cohen's threat
and its realization, they took all power, and they have it now.
They
say on October 4th, 1990, in paragraph ¶101, the Rwandan Government Army staged
a fake attack on Kigali. That's
also a lie. The evidence was that
this fake attack was conducted by RPF agents inside Kigali, as a feint, F-E-I-N-T,
a diversion, to draw the Rwandan army away from the Northern Front, where they
were facing the RPF, in order to give the RPF an advantage.
But
the FAR did not fall into that trap.
They did not withdraw from the front, as they hoped to counter a threat
in the capital. And the Americans
were implicated in that too, because it was—the information was put out by an
official of the American Embassy in Rusatira. It was a deliberate Black Op, Black Operation, to try and
allow the RPF to win right there and then. You can read the evidence on that. I won't go into it in detail. And then they complain about 10,000 people being
arrested. Yes. Well, the country is at war. There is a feigned attack, machine gun fire
all over the capital at night and nobody knows who's firing. And they arrest people.
What
do the Americans do after 911?
Arrested tens of thousands of people. Some are still being held indefinitely, ten years—nine years
later—eight years later. What
country wouldn't protect its own security and wouldn't arrest suspects?
What
amazes me is that those people were all released in six months. In the middle of a war—and there's no
doubt some of them were involved, and I think there were charges laid that some
of them were involved—they released them!
The Americans didn't do that.
Look
what happened to the Japanese after their surprise attack on Hawaii. Every Japanese citizen in the United
States was put in a concentration camp and kept there for the entire length of
the war. No proof they were
involved in anything whatsoever.
Property seized. They never
got those properties back. Some
compensation came, like, 50 years later.
But
you complain that this government under—in the face of an enemy attack, takes
reasonable security measures to protect itself. And that's a—that's a sign of an anti-Tutsi bias. I mean, its crazy!
In
paragraph ¶105 they say that, while the Rwandan government was talking peace
with the RPF on one hand, on the other it was preparing for war and a final
solution to the Tutsi problem in Rwanda.
Well,
no. It's interesting they
incorporate the Nazi German reference to the Jews, "Final
Solution". It's all very
dramatic, like Mr. Tambadou's fake histrionics yesterday, where he tried to
tear at our heart strings because he has no facts to base his argument on.
No. Colonel Vincent and Colonel Marchal
went in and testified quite clearly that the fight at the—the talk-and-fight
strategy was the strategy of the RPF.
They would talk, get you to agree to a ceasefire, make some concessions,
and then after that they would attack again, push you to the wall. Get some more concessions. Another ceasefire, attack again. This is totally false, and it's against
the evidence in this trial. And,
again, it's as if the people who wrote this—I don't know who wrote this. I suspect some of these lawyers, they
didn't write this. Somebody else
did. Because nobody in this trial
could have—no one who was here could have written that and be honest.
It
was the RPF that engaged in the—in the fight-and-talk strategy, and they were
the ones preparing for a final solution.
I referred in cross-examination to a letter sent to the UN in 1999 by—I
think it was a Captain. Not sure
if it was a Captain, but . . .
Christophe Hakizimana, an ex-RPF officer. He wrote a letter to the UN at the time the UN was doing an
internal investigation on what went wrong.
And
he said, you—"The UN is investigating the wrong people." He said, "We killed 2 million
Hutus in those 12 weeks." Two
million and still continuing. And
he gave a very detailed outline of the RPF strategy and tactics up to that
point: Destabilization; Black
Operations; False Flag Operations; sabotage; assassinations, which they blamed
on the government; feeding false information to NGOs; planting people inside
the government and NGOs; economic destabilization; starting newspapers to
create ethnic tension. The RPF
were the ones that started that strategy to divide the people, not the
government, not the FAR. And yet,
despite that letter, which the Prosecution I'm sure has—and they have evidence
of this—they claim—they don't mention dead Hutus. Every dead person is a dead Tutsi or a moderate Hutu.
It's
like the Americans used to do in Vietnam.
Every Vietnamese they killed in their bombings was a
dead
Vietcong, every one of them, millions.
And
the Prosecution doesn't prosecute.
I remind the Judges that on your Rule 68 decision, when they were forced
to give us disclosure, they had found 3,000 more pages. We found in there statements from RPF
officers, where they received officers from Kagame personally.
I
will give you two examples. “We
have thousands of civilians, Hutu civilians, in Byumba stadium. What do we do with them?”
Order:
"Kill them."
“We
have thousands of civilians in Gitarama stadium, including former government
officials. What do we do with them?”
His
orders, "Kill them all."
This
is in May. In June. "Kill
them all!"
They've
had those statements for over ten years.
And that's why they didn't disclose them, because they don't want to
charge the RPF, even though they committed massacres on a mass scale.
I
refer to the Gersony report. They
hid that from us. At least we
found his preliminary report, which was sent to the UNHRC in October 1994 where
he said to the UNHCR, "I have done a study and it's my conclusion that the
RPF engaged in systematic and planned widespread massacres against the unarmed
and defenseless Hutu population."
And they were continuing to do so!
Now,
after that preliminary report, he made a final report, which the UN is still
hiding. But we referred to it in
another document. And, I forget
the document now, but you may recall it.
In a UN report, another situation-report, it referred to Gersony's full
report. And it referred to a
meeting between Robert Gersony, who, we remember, is a USAID man, now working
in Baghdad. He was so
incensed. He demanded a meeting
with Paul Kagame and presented him with the findings of the report, that he
found in just three préfectures, in those weeks in '94, the RPF had murdered
300,000 Hutus, and that he assumed—he concluded that they had done the same in
the other eight remaining préfectures.
And he accused Kagame of committing genocide. Kagame kicked him out of his office, and then the UN buried
that report.
Gersony
was taken off that file, and the report has been buried ever since. They even denied it existed.
So
who are the dead in Rwanda? That's
what I would like to know. Who are
the people at Gisozi?
I
will come back to that. Let's take
a break.
[VO]
MR. PRESIDENT:
Court
is adjourned for 15 minutes.
END OF ACT I
ACT
II
IN
BLACK:
[VO]
PROSECUTOR MR. VAN:
Let
me give you a number of examples, Mr. President.
First
of all, this is what you said:
"The
positions of the Accused, Bizimungu, Ndindiliyimana, and Nzuwonemeye, as Chief
of Staff of the Rwandan Army, Chief of Staff of Gendarmerie Nationale, and
the Commander of Reconnaissance Battalion, respectively, and the fact that the
institutions under their command and control engaged in various activities that
facilitated the mass killing of Tutsis on account of their ethnic
identification."
Secondly: "In 1991, following the invasion
of Rwanda by rebels of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, RPF, the previous year, the
government of President Habyarimana commissioned a report which defined
the enemy as Tutsi. This
definition was widely disseminated among elements of the
Rwandan armed forces, with a view to their indoctrination."
Thirdly,
you said, Mr. President:
"The Accused Bizimungu participated in various meetings between
1991 and 1994 to discuss the identity of the enemy and how to combat it. These meetings identified the Tutsi as
the enemy, and acquitted members of that ethnic group to the ‘Igusura’—I-G-U-S-U-R-A—the Igusura plan that needed to be
emanated."
Quatrièmement...
-- je ne veux pas citer tous les 15 exemples, Monsieur le Président, mais je
prends ceux qui me paraissent importants.
Quatriàments—dis-je: "Bizimungu and Ndindiliyimana made
remarks after 6 April, 1994, which arguably could be interpreted as a threat of
exhortation to kill Tutsi civilians."
Cinquièmement—ce
sera l'avant-dernier: "Ndindiliyimana and Nzuwonemeye
both attended the meeting held at the army headquarters in Kigali on the night
of 6 April 1994, soon after the president of the country was killed in a plane crash [dir: Warp and echo
this term].
At another meeting held at the École supérieure
militaire, ESM, the
following day, they established a Crisis Committee composed of senior military
figures under the chairmanship of Ndindiliyimana. The committee was responsible for the formation of a new
interim civilian administration dominated by Hutu."
And,
lastly: "Soon after the
president's death in early April 1994, several opposition politicians and
moderate Hutus were assassinated by members of the Rwandan army forces,
including the Presidential Guard and Recon Battalion."
LIGHTS
UP: The stage is as in ACT I.
[VO]
MR. PRESIDENT:
Yes, Mr. Black. Court has resumed. You can continue.
MR.
BLACK:
Thank
you.
They
talked in paragraph ¶109—I'm just going to go on my diatribe about the history
just a bit more, and then I will go on to the actual argument by Mr. Strickland
briefly. They say that in order to
defeat the enemy politically, the MRND launched a systematic campaign of
violence against moderate opposition politicians resulting in the deaths of
some of them, such as Félicien Gatabazi, Emmanuel Gapyisi. Well, I really fail to understand how
they could say that when the evidence in this trial clearly was—and in every
other—in Military I and other trials—that the RPF murdered Félicien Gatabazi,
the RPF murdered Bucyana, the RPF murdered Gapyisi. It's well known now.
Guichaoua wrote about that.
I mean, everybody—every expert now recognizes the RPF murdered those
people to try and discredit the government by saying they did it, and pass it
out to the whole world that the regime is an anti-Tutsi regime, an
anti-democratic regime. And when
they murdered Gatabazi, by the way, remember, he just came from a meeting with
[PM Faustin] Twagiramungu. He had
a gendarme escort. And they were
all shot, too.
So
why is the Prosecution deliberately writing material in their argument which
they know to be false? Why? Unless they take us all for fools! I don't know. Or, as I said, this is not meant to be an argument.
It
is just meant to be a propaganda tract.
That's it.
Now,
on page—paragraph ¶115, they say, from April 7th, the massacres of Tutsi
started in Kigali. That's not
true, either. The evidence is,
from many witnesses, that Hutus and Tutsis manned the barricades together until
about April 13th or so. And on
April 13th, most of the Tutsis left the barricades, and then everybody began
wondering what's going on. And
it's then that some killings took place.
Though
I just read in the book last night—this is not evidence, so you don't have to
take it. But Alan Cooperman wrote
a study for the Pentagon, analyzing a timeline for deaths. And he said, by April 15th—there's no
killings between 7th and 6th—6th, 7th, 8th and 9th. They started on the 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, and ended
by the 15th, 16th. But he is wrong
on many things, so don't take that for anything.
And
then, finally, ¶116, between April and July, hundreds of thousands of Tutsis
were killed. Well, where
is
the proof of that? Are we going to
be content with just this mythology—this myth? If this Tribunal, which is mandated to investigate and
charge people with war crimes in Rwanda in 1994, cannot present to the world
one scintilla of evidence about how many Tutsis were killed, then what are we
doing here?
What
are we doing here?
There
is no proof whatsoever that hundreds of thousands of Tutsis were killed! It may be so. I don't know.
But they've never established how many Tutsis were killed.
We
filed the census figures from 1991.
For Kigali alone—I may be off on the numbers, but I'm approximating, I remember the
population of Kigali is around 250 to 300,000 people or so. Maybe a bit more. The number of Tutsis in Kigali is
around 40,000 or so. General
Dallaire states in his book that 14—he saw a column of 14,000 Tutsis being
taken out by the RPF on around April 14th or so.
Bernard
Kouchner, in the letter we filed, dated May 20th, on his visit to Kigali,
states in this letter to the UN that 20,000 Tutsis were still alive in the city
after the killings in Kigali had stopped, except for the fighting between the
armies. That leaves you—that's
34,000. We are missing 6,000—and
many people fled.
So
who are—whose skulls are those at Gisozi?
Two hundred and fifty thousand skulls, supposedly killed in Kigali. That would be the ENTIRE population of Kigali. We have an inkling of who they might
be, because Antoine Nyetera said that when the RPF took the city, they rounded
up all the—the entire population of different districts. In his district, over 100,000 people
put in the Nyamirambo stadium. And
the RPF—he said he saw thousands of Tutsis in that stadium with him. And Antoine Nyetera, remember, is a
Tutsi, a very elegant man, famous artist trained in Paris, famous for designing
the national stamps for Rwanda, related to the monarchy, a Prince. And he said he was in Kigali and he
never saw what they say happened.
He said he never saw the army killing people.
He
said that when the RPF took the city, they rounded the people up, put them in
the stadium. He saw thousands of
people—Tutsis in the stadium with him.
And then the RPF began pulling out of line the Hutus and just shooting
them.
Bang,
bang, bang.
And
I asked him, what would happen if a Tutsi had complained about this. He said, "They'd shoot them,
too."
I
remember Rose. I won't tell you
her last name. This was a person
who came here, a journalist, testified about going—about fleeing on the first
few days of the war in April to Amahoro stadium, where General Dallaire's
headquarters were based. And the
refugees fled there. Mainly
Hutus. And that on the stadium
grounds—part of the stadium floor was occupied by, I think, Bangladeshi
troops. I'm not sure. The UN troops were there. And that Dallaire, from time to time,
walked through the stadium. And
she testified quite graphically about how the RPF pulled people out of that
stadium and shot them. Her husband
was shot by the RPF, by a sniper, while he was walking in the stadium. They fired at her and wounded her
foot.
She
says her two sons—she attributes the suicides of her two sons to that
experience. They committed suicide
just last year. Twenty years old,
hanged themselves because they can't take the injustice of the world.
And
she said she approached him—and other refugees approached General Dallaire and
said:
"When
are you going to stop the RPF from murdering Hutus in the stadium—right in
front of your eyes?"
He
just said nothing and walked away.
So
who are the dead people? Where are
the hundreds of thousands of bodies?
Where are the photographs?
Where are the mass graves?
Where are the lists of the dead?
Why does the RPF refuse to conduct a census to find out what the true
survival rate of the population was and who survived and who was killed?
Because,
if Christophe Hakizimana and Abdul Ruzibiza are correct—and I don't know, but
this is what they say—then two million Hutus were killed.
Davenport
and Stam at the University of Maryland put out a study based on Prosecution
figures they took, and RPF figures they were given to do a study for the
Prosecution. They came to the
conclusion that only 250,000 people were killed. And for every Tutsi, there were two dead Hutus. A two to one ratio. Their contract with the Prosecutor's
office was then cancelled.
But
they say that's what their figures revealed, based on reports they got from
each village, each site, from the Prosecution’s office and the RPF government.
So
it's in between there and there.
Two hundred and fifty thousand and two million. Nobody knows because nobody wants to
find out. Or they do know, but
don't want to tell us.
And
we have Gersony saying 300,000 dead Hutus, in three préfectures alone, in those 12 weeks.
But
the Prosecution doesn't charge anybody in that government. Not one single person!
And
by encouraging Kagame in his impunity from prosecution, this Prosecution
service is allowing him, encouraging him, giving him carte blanche to go into
Congo and kill 10 million more people.
We heard what they did to the Hutu refugees in eastern Congo, forced
into the forest. Four thousand
kilometers, they're pushed into the forest. Hunted down like animals every day. You heard those stories. It will make you cry.
And
we heard Rose ask: “Where is the justice for the Hutus?”
Obviously
there is none.
All
right. I am now going to go to the
Definition of the Enemy Document.
I think my friends before me addressed that very well, and the brief, I
think, just totally refutes their false argument on that.
They
do mention in their brief, here, that the Belgian War College thesis that
General Ndindiliyimana wrote in 1974, when he was a young cadet at the Belgian
War School, somehow spawned the Definition of Enemy Document.
First
of all, Military I said that document is fine. It doesn't say Tutsis were the enemy. It's quite clear. Their actual indictment says it
correctly. Tutsi extremists who
want to take power by force of arms were the enemy, and that would be true in
any state.
But
those who want to change the government by democratic means are not the
enemy. That's quite clear.
But
somehow they use a thesis which he wrote and which was approved by the Belgian
War School as correct, and then buried in their archives, somehow that
influenced the Definition of the Enemy Document, without any proof whatsoever
that anybody even knew about that thesis he wrote as a young cadet.
It
was never produced and circulated among the army.
"Oh,
that's great. We'll use that as a
template for our argument."
I
mean, it's just absurd what they are trying to argue here.
And
it doesn't even mention the Tutsis being the enemy in his thesis. But, if he is guilty of that, then the
Belgian government is too.
Para
¶525, they state that the Accused were against the Arusha Accords.
Well,
I'm going to read some excerpts from
some testimony which indicates that the FAR—and Ambassador Swinnen
struck me very strongly on this, the Belgian ambassador. He said, the FAR were quite clearly in
favor of the Accords—the Rwandan army. And it was the RPF who were the obstructionists.
And
in that—In his testimony, we filed the report by the Tanzanian Foreign Minister
who was acting as go-between for the negotiations between the RPF and everybody
else. The Tanzanian Foreign
Minister complained to the UN that it was the RPF who were the
obstructionists. And when the
issue about the CDR party being involved or not in the transitional government,
when finally everybody agreed that they could take part, and the CDR
agreed—acceded to the Arusha Accords—he said, it was the RPF who still refused
to go ahead with the Arusha Accords.
They were the ones opposing everything.
All
right. I think I'll—there are a
couple of things in this argument which also struck me as odd. This is our legal issue. It's a minor point in a way, but it's
important for your considerations because, as I said at the beginning, I
think—I submit that we have, brick by brick, built a wall so solid of
Reasonable Doubt that they could never penetrate that wall.
There
is Reasonable Doubt on every issue.
And I think, in fact, we have gone beyond that and proven that General
Ndindiliyimana is completely innocent—something we don't NEED to do!
They
say the notion of Reasonable Doubt, at paragraph ¶1344, is related to the
credibility of the evidence adduced.
That's false. That's not
true in law.
Reasonable
Doubt is not just based on credibility.
It's based on the totality of the evidence. And whether the Prosecution's proven its case on the facts
and on the evidence.
Credibility
is just one issue in assessing that evidence. So they don't even know what the law is on Reasonable
Doubt. They misstate it!
And
in—the following paragraph reveals their attitude completely in this case—in
¶1345, they say something astonishing.
But, unconsciously or not, they represent their true point of view. They say,
“After
the presentation by the parties of their evidence, the Prosecution observes
that the Defense has not established at any point in time the innocence of the
Accused.“
That
shows exactly what their mindset is, and why they don't back up any of their
charges. They make charges and
bring no evidence. They charge
that he should be in control of [Radio] RTLM, General Ndindiliyimana, but they
brought no proof that he had any legal responsibility over RTLM.
They
brought no expert to say so, no member of RTLM to say so, nobody in the RPF to
say so, no expert in law and media to say so. No one. They
just say, "He is responsible."
And, "You got a response to that, Mr. Black?"
That
is their attitude.
We
demolished that case anyway, because I know the thinking over there.
They
did it again when they alleged he could have done more to save lives. They didn't bring one military police
expert here—which they could easily have done—to say, based on the resources he
had at this time, based on what was going on on the ground and the dynamics of
the situation, he could have done this, he could have done that, and he could
have done the other, or he should have done this, he should have done
that. He didn't. And he didn't do it for bad reasons.
So
negligence is not enough. They've
got to prove he didn't do something with intent to assist in the killing.
They
just made the accusation: He
didn't do enough. And they could
have brought an RPF officer here.
"I was in Kigali at that time fighting. I knew what they had.
I knew they could have done that and done that."
They
could have brought General Dallaire to say so. They didn't do it.
They
could have hired any sort of military expert from all their military colleges
in Britain and the United States to come and do a study. They didn't.
Major
Nsanzimfura, who is their case manager in this case, because he is a G4,
logistics officer. Major
Nsanzimfura was aware of all the capabilities of the Gendarmerie: Number of men available, weapons, food
supplies. He knew everything that
General Ndindiliyimana had at his disposal, and he sits back there—he's not
called as a witness to say,
"General
Ndindiliyimana is wrong. He could
have done this and done that. We
complained, and he wouldn't do anything."
But
they don't call Major Nsanzimfura because Major Nsanzimfura would not agree
with them.
And
I go back just briefly to the charges they raised at the beginning of the case,
the horrible charges laid against General Ndindiliyimana and no evidence
whatsoever supported those charges.
They were just withdrawn, because they laid those charges to manipulate
the Judges and to make him look bad.
Now,
the big attack on General Ndindiliyimana was made by Mr. Strickland, who said
that he is a liar.
Plain
and simple. Without establishing
any reason why he should be considered a liar, he just says he is a liar.
So—and
why is he a liar? Because—well, he
is a General, and he is a politician.
He is a Hutu. Their
attitude is: All Hutus are liars.
So,
why have a trial? If no witness
can be believed here because he is a Hutu, why have these trials at all? It's a farce.
Since
I'm forced into this exercise, let's spend some time establishing that Mr.
Strickland's statements were totally groundless and slanderous.
I
read from my brief—I wasn't going to do this because I don't think I need to,
but I am forced to now.
Paragraph
¶17, page 10. Colonel Vincent
says, in support of General Ndindiliyimana's testimony, quote,
"I
am persuaded that the General—the General was in favor of implementing the
Arusha Accords.
And
the Gendarmerie cooperated fully with UNAMIR in the implementation of the
Accords, fully, indeed."
Further
he stated,
"At
no time did we have any perception of General Ndindiliyimana’s being in any way
implicated or involved in any of the massacres."
Page
15. Dr. Des Forges, I asked her—I
put this question to her:
"Question: In April—" and I'm reading to her from her
book. "’In April, General
Ndindiliyimana and Colonel Gatsinzi and Rusatira summoned Gahigi of RTLM and
Jean François Nsengiyumva of Radio Rwanda to the Military School in Kigali. The officers supposedly told them that
the radios must stop calling for violence against Tutsi and discrediting
military officers opposed to genocide.
Another RTLM announcer incited militia to attack Ndindiliyimana,
reporting that he was transporting RPF soldiers in his vehicle, for which the
license plate number was given, when he was trying to help Tutsi escape.’ You wrote those words, did you
not?"
She
said, "Yes, I did."
Colonel
Vincent, on page 19, in talking about the General’s cooperation with UNAMIR,
said, "At the level of the negotiations for the KW—the Weapons Secure Area
Agreement, he played a role which I may refer to as an important
role." And Colonel Marchal
confirmed that.
And
Colonel Marchal, to add to my last point, goes on to say that—explaining the
negotiations, he said,
"I
would say the Rwandan government forces"—now,
Colonel
Marchal is the head of the Belgian UN contingent to Kigali. He said,
"I
would say that Rwandan Government Forces and the Gendarmerie did not give me
major problems. There were
problems. but quite understandable, and that can be explained in the context at
the time. “
"However,
on the RPF side, it was a permanent struggle to have them comply with the
requirements of the Agreement, the Protocol. And when I say constant struggle, I say it because—with a
great deal of conviction, because at the time I kept a private journal and
would often send reports on my activities to my general staff in Brussels. And it is true, when I reread through
that period, I see that sometimes I had serious problems with the military
component of the RPF at the CND."
With
respect, specifically to the credibility of, and the sincerity of General
Ndindiliyimana at page 20, paragraph ¶36, I asked him—he said this—however, he
said this, and I quote him. He
said,
"In
regard to the Gendarmerie, Colonel Marchal testified he did not have problems
with them. And he had noted at the
time very clear orders from General Ndindiliyimana to all gendarme units to
comply with the agreement.
Further, Colonel Marchal assigned observers to see if the general had
kept his word or was
playing
a double game."
That
is, he put—he tailed him. He had
him followed to see if he was playing straight. This is what he says:
"So
I assigned observers, so I can tell you" this is a quote.
Quote, "So I can tell you that if there was any need for General
Ndindiliyimana to play a double game, so to speak. We would have been able to see through it, given the
circumstances, particularly in view of what we experienced. It is through these observations that I
became more trusting, and I found the chief of staff of the Gendarmerie to be a
credible person."
So
where does Mr. Strickland get off to saying he is lying? Where? Based on what?
[FREEZE]
[VO]
MR. STRICKLAND:
I'm
about to read from Mr. Van's cross-examination of your client in this case
where this very state—this testimony is put to him.
June 23rd,
2008. "Question: General, with regard to the information
provided to you by your collaborators—you made mention of this in the Bagambiki case. During the hearing of 17th of February 2003,
when you were testifying on behalf of Préfet Bagambiki,—“
This
is Mr. Van. "I have before me
an excerpt of the transcript of Monday, the
17th of February 2003.
And Counsel Lurquin put to you the following question:
'Before
the 6th of April 1994, when you were chief of staff of the
Gendarmerie, were you regularly informed of the security situation in the
Cyangugu préfecture?'
To
which you answered, 'Yes, Counsel.
In my capacity as chief of staff with a full department of employees, we
would regularly receive from all the Gendarmerie units, including Cyangugu,
information on the situation that prevailed in the préfecture where we had our units. Question: After the
6th of April, would you still receive such reports?
Answer:
Yes, Counsel.
Question:
Witness, were the reports made on a regular basis?
Answer:
The reports were indeed made on a regular basis. There is what we call information reports that are given
every day, and we receive them at the general staff.
Question: Who would send reports to you from the
Cyangugu préfecture?
Answer:
From Cyangugu, as from other préfectures, we had the Gendarmerie. It is the commander of the Gendarmerie
unit that would send the report to us.'
End
of quote."
Now,
I invite the Chambers to read General Ndindiliyimana's response. I don't want to go on too long. But what's interesting here is that,
before that Trial Chamber in the Bagambiki case, Ndindiliyimana wanted to
stress the extent of his knowledge of events in Cyangugu and never did he
suggest—never—I've read the transcript—never did he suggest that his
intelligence was incomplete or ever incorrect. Never. But, in
this case, it is the—almost the first point he brings to the floor, that the
information we received is incomplete or sometimes false, because here he wants
to make it appear that he was largely in the dark with respect to the killings
throughout Rwanda and largely in the dark about the actions of his own
officers.
Mr. President,
on April 6th and 7th, 1994, the political survival skills,
techniques, of General Ndindiliyimana came to the fore. He occupied a central position in the
military-led Crisis Committee, which initially took the reins of power in the
aftermath of the president's death.
General Dallaire
testified that at times he was under the impression that
General Ndindiliyimana was acquiescing to General Bagosora's agenda, and,
at other times, Ndindiliyimana expressed concern and a desire to stop the
massacres and the killings.
Well,
Mr. President, after hearing all the evidence, Prosecutor wants to make
our position crystal clear. We are
not confused, like Dallaire was.
It is our position that Ndindiliyimana was wholly insincere in his
dealings with Dallaire. He simply
told General Dallaire whatever he thought the UN wanted to hear.
[MR.
BLACK BACK LIVE]
MR.
BLACK
General
Dallaire said,
"In
the case of the Gendarmerie, I have absolutely no reports of any maneuvering
outside the KWSA rules. He was
cooperative in trying to maintain order within the limited resources he
had."
Ambassador
Swinnen said, page 25, . . . the Belgium ambassador said,
"I
knew him when he assumed his responsibilities and when he went to the National
Gendarmerie. He showed a
determination to work and cooperate with Belgium and with the Belgians. And I had a very favorable view of
Ndindiliyimana."
And
this despite the fact there was some tension between Belgium and Rwandan at the
time. But he was able to transcend
this tension.
"I
saw someone who really wanted to work, who really demonstrated his will to make
process—processes work."
And
he remembers that General Ndindiliyimana had a conversation with the Chief of
Staff of the Belgian Army, the armed forces, Admiral Ver Hurst. It's V-E-R, H-U-R-S-T. Admiral Ver Hurst, he said—he told
Admiral Ver Hurst that he was in favor of a stronger exercise of the mandate of
the United Nations. He said that
to Admiral Ver Hurst. And I was
given that as one of the examples of what we believed to be a sincere
commitment to peace. And Belgium,
in line with the General's wish, thought that that should work.
And
General Dallaire, paragraph ¶53, I asked him, "Oh"—he's talking here
about the cooperation with Ndindiliyimana and UNAMIR.
He
said—I asked him, "Oh, so you regarded him as the most cooperative officer
on either side, RGF or RPF?"
His answer was, what?
"Absolutely."
Absolutely.
They
attack him by saying that–-Van attacked him by saying that the Crisis Committee
was some sort of Machiavellian plot to take over the government.
Des
Forges says this about that meeting: “With Gatsinzi at least nominally in
command of the armed forces, he, Rusatira, and Ndindiliyimana sought to wrest
control from Bagosora. And the
Crisis Committee met on the evening of April 7th. They refused to allow Bagosora to run the meeting. He insulted others, particularly
Rusatira, and boycotted the rest of the meeting. The others made some plans for bringing the Presidential
Guard under control and setting up the government based on the Arusha
Accords.”
You
wrote those words? “That sounds
familiar.” That's fine.
This
is their witness, not my witness.
This is their case, not my case.
How can they come here and deny their own case and just put out lies
when their witnesses said the Crisis Committee did not have that purpose and
General Ndindiliyimana’s role was not as they say it was?
And
that's why they suppressed all mention of Des Forges and Dallaire in their
argument—because they're dishonest.
A
dishonest lawyer would say, "Dallaire and Des Forge said this, but we
think . . ." They don't even try to argue their way out of it. Just drop it out of the picture
entirely.
And
Des Forges goes on:
"In
the early days of April, it appears that General Ndindiliyimana made efforts to
organize some sort of opposition in—meetings with opposition to Bagosora and,
in addition, made efforts to save lives”—despite what Mr. Van says.
He
didn't save anybody?! Mr. Van has
the temerity to say he didn't save anybody! And yet he saved 37 Tutsi orphans and two priests at his
house in April.
He
had his armored car taken away from him because they thought maybe he was
working for the RPF.
And
then she wrote this:
"The
senior officers opposed to Bagosora" because he—Mr. Van mentioned
something about international support for the so-called moderates, which is a
false dichotomy, but she said,
"The
senior officers opposed to Bagosora either could not bring themselves to join
forces with the longstanding enemy or do not believe that they could lead a
substantial number of soldiers into such an arrangement. They looked instead to the
International Community for support.
"Dallaire
would have liked what he saw as a new army, but he was blocked by the narrow
interpretation of the mandate, . . ." and so on.
"Ndindiliyimana
explored the possibility of foreign support with the Belgian ambassador, Johan
Swinnen, the evening of April 7th.
No one had resources to offer dissenters who hoped to oust Bagosora and
stop the slaughter of Rwandans.”
“You
wrote that, did you not?"
She
says, "Yes, I believe I wrote that."
And
Dallaire, who was at the meeting of the Crisis Committee, says—I say to him:
"Question: I believe you classified someone like
Ndindiliyimana and somebody like Rusatira as so-called moderates."
He
said, "Yes."
Now,
I don't like that false dichotomy, and other officers here don't like that
dichotomy. It's a false
dichotomy. But those are the terms
they used.
And
Colonel Marchal, who was at the meeting of the military officers on April 6th,
7th, at the ESM, invited by General Ndindiliyimana, and General Dallaire was
present, invited by General Ndindiliyimana.
Colonel
Marchal says this:
"Another
aspect of this part of the meeting which seems essential to me, is that
everyone, everyone in the FAR was of the decision to put in place, as soon as
possible, the transitional institutions and help manage the crisis and to hand
over authority as rapidly as possible to the politicians. And the soldiers present did not raise
any objection to this.
The
soldiers said, 'It's not our role to manage. We help. It's
the politicians who need to manager the crisis.'"
This
was a great concern. And he
confirms that General Ndindiliyimana supported that initiative. In fact, he was the one that broached
it first.
Then
we have—to support his credibility—the telephone call of Johan Swinnen, the
night of the 7th and 8th.
I
won't read the entire transcript here, but the second paragraph on page 44 is
important.
The
general phones Ambassador Swinnen and says,
"Don't
leave us. Belgians will be
killed. Soldiers will be
killed. Don't leave Rwanda. We need you here or else it's just
going to deteriorate and get worse.
Please stay."
It's
a long conversation, 3 o'clock in the morning. Mr. Strickland says he is a
liar.
Well,
Ambassador Swinnen said, "That was a very emotional conversation. And I think that at that time I could
not have thought that he was just pretending or acting. I think that he was acting lucidly and
seriously. Unfortunately, I had to
tell him, 'We have not yet taken a decision.' And I had the feeling that I was talking to someone who was
very disappointed and still wanted to make an effort to see to it that the
Belgians do not—are not compelled to take a decision to leave."
And
Dr. Des Forges, their witness, confirmed in her remarks on this
conversation. She said,
"So
I think it does reveal, probably—no, I think it does reveal, certainly—on the
part of Ndindiliyimana—a sincere desire for the international forces to remain
there."
This
is their witness.
I
can go on. Colonel Marchal
confirms that the gendarmes could do no more than the blue berets, that the
blue berets who were guarding the so-called moderate politicians were
overwhelmed by the Presidential Guard attacking their unit. Four or five men were attacked by
twenty. He said,
"Our
men couldn't resist the Presidential Guard and the Gendarmerie couldn't do
anything better."
So
that also corroborates the General's testimony.
They
laughed at the fact that he says,
"Oh,
I didn't have resources and I couldn't control the events."
“You
could have done SOMETHING!”
They
forget the argument in my brief about the consequences of the RPF attack on the
refugee camp at Nyacyonga.
Remember there is, north of the city, one million people, one million
living in tents, forced there by the RPF.
April
10th and 11th, they begin bombarding that camp with heavy, heavy—high explosive
shells. How many thousands of
people were killed in Nyacyonga?
How
many?
That's
a war crime, to attack a refugee camp with heavy artillery, hour upon hour,
over two days.
Why
did they do that?
Because
they wanted to force that mass of people into the city to create chaos. They just flooded the city. The army couldn't even function. You got a million people blocking
roads, swarming everywhere, running away from that shelling. And many of them were killed by
civilians in Kigali who thought they might be RPF infiltrators.
Many
innocent people died because of that.
And whose fault is that?
Not
General Bizimungu’s, General Ndindiliyimana’s.
It's
General Kagame’s fault!
He
shelled that camp.
And
you people don't even charge him.
And you know he did that. I
mean, can you imagine attacking one million people—living in tents—with heavy
artillery. And not a word is said
about it.
Again,
on page 72, Colonel Marchal repeats,
"I
would say that what was true as far as the UNAMIR was concerned was true as far
as the Gendarmerie was concerned.
The gendarmerie was not numerous enough to face a normal situation. You must realize that after the crash,
the plane, very quickly, the gendarmes' means were frozen—well, frozen. I say they were nailed to their camps
because of the RPF action."
Because
all the camps were attacked. All
the gendarme camps were attacked.
Remera camp was overrun and eliminated. Attacked his headquarters. Just bombed it.
What was he supposed to do?
Run a police operation?
And
police stations are being bombed and overrun.
And
they, even in their brief, question the validity or the veracity of his
statement that he lost most of his command. Colonel Vincent stated, page 72,
"So
any Gendarmerie unit within that sector, operational sector, falls under the
operational command of the commander of that sector."
And
General Dallaire said, when I asked him did General Ndindiliyimana have a
command left, he said,
"Well,
I recall him explaining it to me, and we had a couple of meetings during that
time. And he explained that the
Gendarmerie was reverting to the command of the Army. And so, essentially, he didn't have a command
left."
That's
their evidence.
"He
didn't have a command left. And
the way I saw it at the time, and certainly the Minister of Defense never
negated that."
So,
in fact, he was sort of like a floater.
He had no job. And,
witnesses said, in the entire country, 200 men were left to his command: 100 in
Kigali, which he placed to try and protect Tutsis as best he could with that
small amount of men.
And
they confuse, misconstrue our argument.
Our
argument is not that gendarmes specifically—where he gave orders to gendarmes
to do certain things, he didn't have command over them.
Of
course he did—that's obvious.
Our
argument about command responsibility is about capacity. He lost most of his command.
Therefore,
he could not do more than he did.
Now,
they say he did not support the communiqué of April 12th to the RPF offering a
surrender.
Well,
General Dallaire confirms that Ndindiliyimana supported the communiqué.
And
Dr. Des Forges also confirmed that he was part of that group of officers.
[FREEZE]
[VO]
Mr Strickland:
In
this context we see the best example of Ndindiliyimana's talent for duplicity
and self-serving overtures.
Chambers will recall that there was discussion of a surrender communiqué
that was released by several high-ranking Rwandan officers
on April 12th, 1994.
General Dallaire heard of this surrender communiqué, this overture
of peace, and he wondered why Ndindiliyimana—whom he considered a moderate
Hutu—why he had failed to sign that document. He asked the General for an explanation. In response Ndindiliyimana told
General Dallaire that he had failed to sign a surrender communiqué
of April 12th, 1994, because he was busy saving Tutsis in
Butare.
That—that
was an utter lie! It was an utter
lie!
Because,
as General Ndindiliyimana made clear, himself, when he testified, himself,
he told us this: He didn't visit
Butare until April 15th.
So here it is. Here we see
the real General Ndindiliyimana.
This is a concise example of the tenor and tone of his testimony before
this Tribunal. It was
disingenuous, dishonest, self-serving, insincere. He claims to have supported a surrender communiqué. For some reason he didn't sign it. He held himself up as a savior of Tutsi
refugees. He wasn't even in Butare
before the 15th. How could he be
busy there saving refugees?
[MR.
BLACK BACK LIVE]
MR.
BLACK:
And
Dr. Des Forges says that Gatsinzi—I asked her in cross-examination about
Gatsinzi. Mr. Strickland said that
he never—he told General Dallaire—General Ndindiliyimana told General Dallaire
he was off in Butare saving Tutsis.
Well, he was down south saving Tutsis. Because Antoine, the
hotelier—remember him?—he was a very interesting character, the Tutsi hotel
owner. He came here to testify for
us. A very interesting
character. You can't forget him.
And
he testified that General Ndindiliyimana, with his gendarmes, the few he had
left, on a mission down there, went to the hotel, found out they were being
threatened by so-called Interahamwe and left his unit—his close-protection
unit—some of it, right there to protect the Tutsis in that hotel--who included
several Tutsi businessmen and their families. And they survived the war. And those gendarmes stayed with those Tutsi families
throughout the war until they left in late or early June.
And
Dr. Des Forges confirmed, when I put to her General Gatsinzi's letter—we
referred to a letter by General Gatsinzi in which he confirms that General
Ndindiliyimana supported the April 12th communiqué, but he couldn't sign it
because he said he was in the south saving Tutsis. And she said,
"That's
correct."
That's
their witness, not mine. That's
the Minister of Defence from Rwanda.
I
don't know why they charged General Ndindiliyimana, and I would really like to
know why. Maybe in their rebuttal
they can tell me why he has spent the last nine years in prison for no reason.
I
put several questions to Dr. Des Forges about Gatsinzi, Rusatira,
Ndindiliyimana, trying wrest control from Bagosora, trying to stop the
killings, trying to keep the Peace Accords going. There are many references to that. And in each one of them, I put to her this question—at page
75:
"Well,
I'm going to press. Aren't those actions consistent with someone who opposes
any killing of Tutsi civilians and any plan to do so? Aren't they consistent with a man who opposed that, those
actions in themselves?"
And
she replied, "Those actions in and of themselves do appear to be
consistent with that, yes."
That's
their case.
He
is not guilty. They raise
reasonable doubt—and more of it in their own case!
And
they did that with their very first indictment.
My
Honourable Judges, here, were not here at that time.
But
when the first indictment came down against him, in the indictment itself, in
the sections they wrote, they actually put in evidence which clears him of the
very charges they charged him with in the preceding paragraph. It was bizarre. It was quite clear they just
concocted—rapidly—an indictment in order to keep him in prison for some
reason.
To
testify against Bagosora, that was their main objective, I think.
And
at page 76, regarding, again, Gatsinzi's letter stating that Ndindiliyimana was
in favor of the April 12th telegram,
Des
Forges says, "If you recall yesterday I said that the actions which I knew
about concerning Ndindiliyimana seem to me a period when he was not in favor of
genocide."
She
never negates the contents of the letter.
And
we have General Mahundi, the Tanzanian Inspector General of police who
testified for General Ndindiliyimana.
And General Mahundi was not only the Inspector General of police at the
time, in 1993, he was also the vice president of Interpol. And he states that General
Ndindiliyimana spoke to him and talked about the fact that the political
leaders in Rwanda are likely to come to an agreement, and they would like to
integrate our forces. So we would
like to get training in your country so we can more easily integrate the forces
together. And he was more
concerned with the crime and tranquility, generally.
And,
page 78, his point of view was, he was expecting the two sides, politically,
the two sides to--
[VO] THE ENGLISH INTERPRETER:
Mr.
President, could counsel give the interpreters time to find the reference that
he has given.
MR.
BLACK:
It's
page 78 in our brief. I'm sorry.
So
he was expecting the two sides to negotiate their conflict and find a solution
to their conflict. He was very much
hopeful that that negotiation there would be likely to end up
successfully.
I
think that puts ‘paid’ to Mr. Strickland's arguments that—I can make some other
references here. I haven't got
much time left.
Mr.
Strickland attacked me about his witness, GCB, about the so-called massacre at
Saint André. We state, based on
the evidence, there was nobody killed there at all. Period. And he
mocks my argument by saying, "Mr. Black, this man said he was wounded in
the hand, shot in hand, and Mr. Black mocked him because he had no wounds—no
bullet wounds."
Well,
it's true. Read the
transcripts. That witness,
remember, came and said he was forced on the ground and laid down, his hands
covering his head like that, and a gendarme, he said—he alleged, fired a
high-powered automatic rifle five times at his head, and not only did his head
not explode from the first round or second, third, fourth or fifth, but he only
lost one finger. And I put it to
him that that finger was probably lost some other way.
There
was no bullet wound from a high-powered automatic—high-velocity round. That would have blown his head apart
the first time.
And
with respect to "you can't use DH91 and DH90," well, I used it in
cross-examination. That's the
evidence. Read the brief. There was no killing at Saint André
College.
They
go on and say, this is not an international armed conflict. Well, I said that the Ugandan Army was
heavily involved, as was Museveni.
There is some evidence that Burundi also invaded from the South.
And
it's quite clear, General Ndindiliyimana testified that he received
intelligence reports from the field, Kibungo especially, that an American
C130 Hercules was seen
dropping men by parachute behind RPF lines. That's an act of war by the United States.
So—and everything confirms that—because now, Rwanda is nothing but an
American military base.
Now,
I just want to end with—I haven't much time left, so a few minor things—like
communications.
General
Ndindiliyimana’s ability to know and react. I think our chronology is very well done. And I thank Ms. Tipton for doing a
large part of it. And that quite
clearly shows what he knew when and what he did in reaction to that.
And
he testified that the Alcatel system was bombarded, was destroyed. His jeep, which had communication
equipment in it, was destroyed by a bomb.
He did have information coming in.
He explained quite clearly, and in a detailed manner, what type of
information and how he reacted to it.
And he went further than that.
He said that he sent teams out into the field to try to find out what
was going on.
So
it's not—we are not saying we didn't have information. He searched for information. But he never received any information
that the gendarmes were hurting anybody.
Only that they were trying to protect people.
And
this ridiculous remark that they made about—oh, I can't find it.
But,
anyway, Mr. Strickland said something about the gendarmes in his house, the
General said, walked 12 miles and made a report from Butare. That's not what he said. He said, in a general answer about the
context of his communications—he gave an example. He said,
"It
was so bad. For instance, the men
guarding my house, if they had wanted to make a report to me, had to walk 12
kilometres to make such a report."
He
didn't say they made a report.
So—yeah,
I've got the quote here. It's
page—June 18th, 2008, page 49. So,
he said,
"So
we had these small operational detachments. That's how the gendarmes worked. We send out small teams. For instance, the team that was in my place in Nyaruhengeri,
if I had a minor problem, the gentlemen would need to walk or trek some 12
kilometres to Butare to report. So
there weren't really any means of communication between those small units
operating on the ground and the command post."
It's
the opposite of what Mr. Strickland said.
And Mr. Strickland knew that when he said it. And I found the quotes—just very quick—where—this is Des
Forges, said that she—the claim by Kagame that he started—he loosed "the
dogs of war" on the 7th or 8th—his claim to save Tutsis is wrong.
She
said this, page 18, October 11th, 2006, she says,
"I
had concluded previously, and I believe the evidence is solid, that the RPF
gave priority to winning a military victory and not to saving the lives of
civilians, including, particularly, Tutsi civilians in the country. I have said that on a number of
occasions, and I believe that the evidence supports that conclusion."
—Give
me five more minutes. I'm going to
close with—I refer you to—because I have only got three or four minutes on
this. But I want to refer you to
the assessment of—remarks by Colonel Marchal at the end of my brief, remarks by
Ambassador Swinnen about the character of General Ndindiliyimana and how they saw
him, and that he was viewed in a very positive way, and then I will sit down.
So
I think—I don't like to hit them over the head with these things, but it's
true. If I can find it—excuse
me. Oh, here we go.
First
of all, at page 243, Alain De Brouwer said,
"I
briefly remind you of the very well-known role occupied by General
Ndindiliyimana in Kinihira in 1993, where he saved the Arusha Accords by giving
a solution to the military aspect."
And
talking about the telex sent by Willy Claes, the Belgian Foreign Minister, in
regard—with respect to General Ndindiliyimana, he says,
"We
knew that the person of General Ndindiliyimana, we had somebody who would bring
a great deal of collaboration in the search for the truth as to the events
which occurred in Rwanda."
The
truth. And he praises him.
The
Belgian ambassador, Mr. Swinnen, read the telex sent by Willy Claes, and Willy
Claes was then the Belgian Foreign Minister, and became later the Secretary
General of NATO. And his telex
says, in instructing the Belgian ambassador to Kinshasa to give him a visa,
"The
person concerned has always proven to be of service to proper conduct towards
Belgium. Similarly, during a
recent period of violence in Rwanda, the person concerned showed that he was a
friend of Belgium. Furthermore, he
helped many Rwandans. He helped
many Rwandans to find a safe shelter or to find safety, and helped many
Rwandans to escape a certain death and obvious death."
Then
the ambassador continued:
"I
want to say a lot of things because we are dealing with a case which, to my
book, deserves very special attention.
I consider General Ndindiliyimana as a positive person. I do not have all the details about his
movement during the genocide, not even about the period preceding the genocide,
but I have given you the basis upon which I have always and I still take
General Ndindiliyimana seriously.
I have not had any signals or got any statements from him which make it
possible for me to create any doubt about his commitment to reconciliation." And he goes on.
One
minor thing—and I am going to conclude—about Nyaruhengeri and Kansi. I think our brief is very complete on
that. There is one thing you
should also consider. They say,
"Well,
the gendarmes could have heard shots," and then,
"You
should have gone and helped people."
Well,
no test was done to see if shots could have been heard several kilometers
away. That's just
speculation. And sometimes a shot
could be heard that far. It
depends on atmospherics, wind direction, all sorts of things. It's equally possible he didn't hear a
damn thing. Excuse my
language. I retract that. He didn't hear a thing.
But,
in any case, on the 21st of April, you remember, the same day Radio Muhabura—I
believe it was Muhabura, RPF propaganda hate radio—put out a message that
General Ndindiliyimana had been killed by northern officers trying to create
chaos in the ranks, I suppose.
Why
would the gendarmes—Marie, his wife, allow gendarmes—there are several
gendarmes there, three or four gendarmes there—to leave her when she heard on
the radio that her husband had been assassinated?
Do
you think those gendarmes assigned to protect her by Charles Kabeza, the
burgomaster, would have left the family they were loyal to to run down the
road, some possible shots being fired 3 kilometers away, knowing their
chief
had been murdered? It doesn't fly.
I'm
going to conclude with—I think of my friend and comrade Maître Lurquin, who can't be with us today because he
has been elected, happily, to the European Parliament. And I would like to read those remarks,
because Maître Lurquin wrote the last two pages of this
brief.
I
translated from French into English.
He approved of my translation, so I think it's ok.
At
page 247, paragraph ¶615—and I read this because I submit that it's true based
on the evidence.
“General
Ndindiliyimana is a man who is more than just his function. The Prosecutor's strategy appears to be
to charge those who occupied the highest functions of the state in Rwanda, Ministers,
préfets, Chiefs of Staff and intellectuals, who
appear to have been arrested, not because of what they did but because of their
position.
“The
trial is a nightmare for the Prosecutor because behind the veil of his function
was the reality of the man, with his weaknesses, perhaps, but also a man with
strengths and commitment, a man that no witness, either for the Defense or the
Prosecution, ever accused of being an extremist in his politics or with respect
to ethnicity.
“On
the contrary, he was portrayed as a man who is tolerant, good, respectful of
and respected by all, no matter what their social rank, a man who could have
remained”—like Nsanzuwera, who works for you—”who could have remained, like so
many others, a spectator fleeing the violence, rather than a man who tried to
fulfill his responsibilities, a man who could have been among those who pretend
to judge instead of a man being judged.
But to have been among those who fled their responsibilities, he would
have had to surrender his humanity and the lives of all those he saved, a man
whose heart made him steadfast in his commitment to the people of Rwanda. And perhaps that's why he is really
accused, because he did not abandon the people he is proud to be proud of. And that is not a crime.”
Now,
I have been on this case for ten—almost ten years. When I came here, I believed everything I read in the press
about the so-called genocide. And
the entire case to me has been frustrating, depressing, distressing and
shocking.
I
once believed in International Justice.
I no longer do.
I
believe in you Judges, and I am sure you believe in International Justice. I would like to.
But
the maneuvers of the Prosecution in imprisoning this man without an indictment
for four years, and then, one month before the trial starts, handing down a
totally different indictment with a totally different theory of what the facts
said, and forcing us on to trial, and then not backing up most of their charges
at all, making accusations, hiding disclosures, manipulating the Judges, lying,
cheating, I've never seen anything like it in my life. I've never even heard of anything like
this in history.
And
many other people are distressed by what they see going on here. I am lucky, I think, because, Mr. President,
we had some struggles early on in the case, and that may be a reflection of
what you and I both read when we first came here. But I am confident now that after you've heard the evidence
and you've had all the hot debates about procedure and evidence that you have,
I believe, sincerely you have been listening. And, therefore, I really hope and urge you, on the evidence,
to acquit General Ndindiliyimana of all the charges.
Because
the Prosecution has not proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt—on any charge
whatsoever!
And
if this man is convicted—if General Ndindiliyimana is convicted, there is no
hope for national reconciliation in Rwanda—ever. Ever.
The
Hutus are going to feel condemned and hated just because of the fact they are
Hutus—forever.
And
it is going to create more ethnic tension in Rwanda and lead to more violence
in the future.
And
we don't want that.
But
I want this man to go home to see his wife and children.
Thank
you. Unless you have any questions
for me, those are my submissions.
END OF PLAY